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Foreword 
 
Until 1980, the agricultural sector in 
Vietnam was collectivised. Most land was 
cooperatively used and only five per cent was 
left for individual household use. Farm deci-
sions were made by the central government, 
which set areas and targets for each of the 
crops produced by the cooperatives which 
ran the farms.
This system led to a fall in rice production 
below that needed to sustain the population, 
leading to serious food shortages.
New policies since 1981 to decollectivise 
agriculture have had considerable effect. 
Vietnam is self sufficient in rice and is a 
large exporter. However, the impact of these 
policies at the farm level, on factors such as 
household incomes, land use, credit provision 
and taxation, are important questions that 
have had little investigation.
Australian agricultural economists have 
considerable expertise in resolving socio-
economic problems that arise during the 
development process and their experience 
was used in this project to assess the impact 
of the new government policies on land use 
in the agricultural sector during the transfor-
mation to a market-based economy. In the 
process the project provided opportunities 
for Vietnamese researchers to develop their 
skills in agricultural policy research, formula-
tion and analysis.
The main aims of the project, which 
provided the information for this book, were 
to assess the impacts of the Vietnamese 
government’s new policies on agriculture 
and to provide economic models suitable for 
analysing policy reforms.
This book brings together many of 
the outcomes of the project. The final 
chapter, containing policy briefs, is also 
being published as a separate volume in 
Vietnamese. The work will be useful to 
both Vietnamese policy makers and the 
international research community. It can 
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preFAce 
 
Land use has been central to the history and 
development of Vietnam, as has been true in 
other parts of the world. The ways in which 
land is used and ownership defined and trans-
ferred between generations have profound 
effects on the economic, social and political 
outcomes in a country. This is particularly 
true for Vietnam given her political history 
and the dramatic changes that have taken 
place over time in land use policy.
The current challenges facing Vietnamese 
agriculture in the context of land use are:
The need to increase capacity for 
commercial farm production through 
both land consolidation and land 
accumulation.

Ensuring that with the rising 
opportunity cost of labour there are 
opportunities for the under-utilised 
labour in agricultural areas to be 
employed and that as labour is 
withdrawn from agriculture land 
consolidation and accumulation can 
occur to raise the overall economic 
efficiency in rural areas.
Maintaining livelihoods in subsistence 
households given small farm size, 
fluctuating prices for crops being sold on 
world markets, and increasing input prices.
The need to allow flexibility in land use 
(at the moment constrained by policy) 
to allow farmers to respond to market 
signals and thus maximise their incomes.
These are difficult challenges and a better 
understanding of how policies can be devel-
oped to progress the goals of a more efficient 
use of resources and improved incomes 




The long-term development of Vietnamese 
agriculture depends on the efficient and effec-
tive use of land. This is related to the policies 
adopted in relation to land, land markets and 
the associated inputs and resources. With 
some 75 per cent of the population still living 
in rural areas, the issues of land consolidation, 
flexibility of land use, the role of technical 
change, and the impacts of policies related to 
taxes and credit will all be important. As the 
rest of the economy develops there is likely 
to be strong demand for significant changes 
in the structure and ownership of land in 
the future.
Within the work involved in the project, 
data were collected in four provinces: two in 
the North and two in the South. Each was 
chosen for their different characteristics in 
relation to agricultural land use. The data 
were used to describe the nature and the 
structure of farms, the markets in land-use 
rights and land exchange of various types. 
It became clear that such exchanges were 
limited except for rental arrangements. It was 
also found that each farm, particularly in the 
North, was made up of a significant number 
of plots of land. One of the many policy 
issues being considered is the amalgamation 
of these plots. From the analysis it became 
clear that there were both benefits and costs 
to having a large number of plots and that 
as the demand for labour rises elsewhere 
in the economy and thus the opportunity 
cost of agricultural labour rises there will be 
incentives for farmers to reduce the number 
of plots they operate. Thus, encouraging 
development elsewhere in the economy 
will raise the efficiency of agriculture. 
Also, it became clear that reducing the 
transaction costs in land exchange and in 
rural adjustment generally (including those 
for obtaining credit) is likely to be a powerful 
means of bringing about the transformation 
of agriculture.
The work for the project involved 
the Faculty of Economics and Rural 
Development at Hanoi Agricultural 
University, Agricultural and Resource 
Economics at the University of Sydney and 
a contribution from the International Rice 
Research Institute. The chapters in this 
book are a collection of many of the papers 
written at various stages through the life 
of the ACIAR Project ADP 1/1997/092 
entitled ‘Impacts of Alternative Policies on 
the Agricultural Sector in Vietnam’, which 
was financially supported by ACIAR. The 
book concludes in chapter 12 with a series 
of policy briefs that summarise the main 
findings of the research in a policy context.
One of the very significant outcomes 
of the project was the development of a 
wonderful team spirit within those working 
on the project. The sense of ownership and 
camaraderie in carrying out the work and the 
knowledge exchange and development has 
been very substantial. This will impact future 
generations of agricultural economists both 
within Vietnam and in Australia and there 
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AgriculturAl development And lAnd 
policy in vietnAm: An overview And 
tHeoreticAl perSpective
T. Gordon Macaulay, Sally P. MarSh and PhaM Van hunG
Land is a vitally important resource in Vietnam. The long-term development of 
Vietnamese agriculture depends on the efficient and effective use of land, and on 
the adoption of policies in relation to land, land markets, and associated inputs and 
resources. With around 75% of the population still living in rural areas, the issues 
of land consolidation and flexibility of land use, the role of technical change and the 
impacts of policies related to taxes and credit will all be important. As the rest of 
the economy develops there are likely to be demands for significant changes in the 
structure and ownership of land in the future. In this chapter results from a project 
on land use policies in Vietnam supported by the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research are interpreted in a theoretical context. Information was 
obtained on farm size, farm incomes, the effects of plot size and the number of plots, 
the trading and application of land use rights, transaction costs for land use transfers, 
the use of credit, input and output pricing, and the flexibility of land use. Comments 
are made in relation to policy directions.1
Introduction
In December 1986 at the Sixth National 
Congress, the Government of Vietnam intro-
duced a wide-ranging set of reforms known 
as doi moi (renovation), which recognised a 
number of the failures of central planning 
and were designed to gradually deregulate 
and liberalise the economy. Vietnam has 
undergone almost 20 years of reform 
following the doi moi resolutions. Despite 
some setbacks in the late 1990s when growth 
slowed, the economy is now sustaining strong 
economic growth, second only to China in 
South-East Asia (World Bank 2001a), and 
the country is considered to be successfully 
working towards a transition from a planned 
to a market-oriented economy (East Asia 
Analytical Unit 1997; United Nations 1999; 
World Bank 2003). The implementation 
of further broad-based reforms in 2000, 
including the New Enterprise Law and the 
revised Foreign Investment Law, and the 
signing of the United States – Vietnam 
Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2001 are 
examples of the improved policy environment 
that has enabled Vietnam to record strong 
economic growth in recent years. In addition, 
a broad spectrum of social indicators have 
shown widespread and visible improvements 
in the lives of the Vietnamese people (Asian 
Development Bank et al 2004)
Agricultural development, through land 
reforms, technological change and market 
development, is now recognised as being 
important in developing countries, and is 
closely linked with macroeconomic policies 
and enabling institutional environments. 
Since doi moi Vietnamese agriculture has 
responded to the reform environment. The 
most noticeable and publicised achievement 
is a rapid increase in rice production, such 
that Vietnam is now the second largest 
exporter of rice in the world behind Thailand. 
In addition, Vietnam is a significant 
player in world markets for coffee, pepper, 
cashew and seafood. Export earnings from 
agricultural and aquaculture products have 
been continuously increasing since 1990. 
Because agriculture in Vietnam is now more 
diversified, subsectors such as industrial 
crops, vegetables and livestock have developed 
rapidly and have been able to meet domestic 
demand. During the reform period the level 
of farming intensity has improved and new 
technology has been more widely applied.
These achievements in agricultural develop-
ment are recognised as having being made 
possible by land reforms that began in 1981. 
Land policy is an essential component of 
economic development in all countries, and 
especially so in developing and transitional 
countries (Deininger 2003; Lerman et al 
2002). In Vietnam more than 75% of the 
population lives in rural areas, and land and 
related policies have a direct effect on their 
livelihoods through influences on land tenure, 
size and fragmentation of land holdings, 
land use, land and credit markets, input and 
output markets, and technology development.
In this chapter results from a project on 
land policy changes in Vietnam supported 
by the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research are interpreted in 
a theoretical context. The overall purpose 
of the project was to contribute to the 
understanding of policies needed to raise the 
income, wellbeing and economic capabilities 
of the rural population in Vietnam. This was 1
achieved by using various analysis methods 
and economic modelling of some key factors 
in the use of land as a resource. Information 
for the analyses was obtained at the micro-
level from farm household surveys in four 
provinces. Data were provided on farm size, 
farm incomes, the effects of plot size and the 
number of plots, the trading and application 
of land-use rights, transaction costs for land 
use transfers, the use of credit, input and 
output pricing, and the flexibility of land use.
Vietnam is a country in transition from 
a planned to a market-oriented economy. 
Transition is not simply the adoption or 
modification of a few policies or programs 
but a passage from one mode of economic 
organisation to a completely different one 
(World Bank 1996). In this situation consid-
eration of history, geography and culture 
becomes important as they are influential 
on not only what can be accomplished but 
also how quickly change can occur. The long-
term development of Vietnamese agriculture 
depends on the efficient and effective use of 
its small land area, but land tenure and use 
sit within a complex historical, political and 
cultural context.
Land policy in Vietnam: 
historical perspective 
and recent changes
Land tenure in Vietnam: 1945–81
Both the history of the national liberation 
revolution and the economic development 
of Vietnam are closely linked to land issues. 
Conflicts over land policy (access to, and 
the ownership and use of, land) have been 
integral to the period of French colonial 
rule, the conflict with the United States, 
and the policies of the Communist Party 
Government after re-unification of Vietnam 
in 1975.
Before the birth of an independent Vietnam 
in 1945, agricultural land was divided into 
two categories: communal and private. In 
rural areas there were two main classes 
according to ownership of land: landlords 
and tenants. The landlord class accounted 
for only 2% of the whole population but 
occupied more than half of the total land 
area, while 59% of farm households were 
landless tenants of the landlord class 
(Cuc 1995).
After 1945 the new government imple-
mented changes to economic development 
policy, including agricultural policy. In the 
first stage, up to 1952, the government 
carried out land redistribution and reduced 
rents for poor farmers and tenants. After the 
end of the French War in 1954 the north of 
Vietnam implemented a radical land reform 
program. The target was to nationalise land 
of the Vietnamese and French landlords and 
to redistribute it to peasants with little or no 
land, using the slogan ‘land for ploughmen’. 
As a result, about a quarter of the land 
was redistributed to farmers on a more or 
less equitable basis, benefiting about 73% 
of the north’s rural population (Cuc 1995; 
Kerkvliet 2000; Pingali & Xuan 1992).
Following this initial period of land reform, 
rural areas in the north of Vietnam entered a 
stage of agricultural collectivisation involving 
‘low-level’ and ‘high-level’ cooperatives. By 
1960 about 86% of all peasant households and 1
68% of total agricultural land were in low-level 
agricultural cooperatives, where farmers were 
still owners of their land and other production 
assets. In high-level cooperatives farmers 
pooled their land and other production forces 
(eg buffaloes, cattle and tools) under unified 
management. From 1961 to 1975 about 
20,000 high-level cooperatives involving 80% 
of households were established (Cuc 1995; 
Pingali and Xuan 1992; Nakachi 2001).
In the south the government based in Saigon 
implemented land reform in a different way, 
using rent control and a land ownership 
ceiling program in 1956, and a distribution 
of land and titling program in 1970. 
Approximately 1.3 million ha of agricultural 
land were redistributed to over one million 
farmers under the latter program, which was 
known as ‘the land to the tiller programme’ 
and was completed by the end of 1974 
(Pingali & Xuan 1992).
After the end of the war of reunification in 
1975 the Vietnamese Government planned 
to further develop the movement toward 
agricultural collectivisation. In the north 
agricultural cooperatives enlarged their size 
from village to commune level. In the south 
farmers were still allowed to operate under 
a relatively free market until 1978, but then 
were urged to move gradually toward collec-
tivisation. Results varied between regions and 
were particularly low in the Mekong Delta, 
where less than 6% of farmers belonged to 
an agricultural cooperative (Pingali & Xuan 
1992). Unlike the north, agriculture in the 
south continued on a household farm basis 
although farmers worked in cooperatives. 
They shared their labour and production 
resources but were still the decision-makers 
about inputs and technologies used.
After 1975 Vietnam’s economy in general, 
and agriculture in particular, suffered heavily 
in the aftermath of the war with the United 
States and from policies based on the central 
planning model and the collectivisation of 
agriculture. Under collectivised agriculture, 
production fell as a result of a lack of 
incentives for individuals to contribute to 
production, and gross output of agriculture 
increased annually at a low rate of 2% (Table 
1). At the same time population growth 
increased rapidly (2.2–2.35% per annum), 
resulting in a need for more than a million 
tonnes of food to be imported each year 
during the period after the war, and much 
of the population suffered from hunger 
and poverty.
Land reform in the period 
1981–88
Reform in the agricultural sector started 
with the Communist decree known as the 
Khoan 100 (Contract 100). Under this policy 
agricultural cooperatives assigned agricultural 
land to farming groups and individuals, 
who became responsible for three stages of 
crop cultivation. Outputs were still under 
the control of the cooperative, and at the 
end of the crop season farmers were given 
income in kind based on the output levels 
produced and labour input used throughout 
the three stages. Land was still owned by the 
government and managed by the agricultural 
cooperatives. Although small, the reform was 
the first step in the process of moving toward 
a market-oriented economy. The introduction 
of the system had a significant impact on 
agricultural production, especially rice which 
increased by 6.3% a year during the 1981–85 
period. However, after 1985 growth in 1









1976–80 2.0 –0.4 9.9 11.6 5.1 8.8 0.6
1981–85 5.5 6.3 8.8 9.5 7.4 23.4 2.4
1986–88 2.2 3.1 7.1 0.4 –0.4 29.0 –0.3
1989–93 4.8 4.7 3.3 6.6 5.7 35.1 17.6
1994–99 6.7 5.9 18.2 3.0 9.0 22.0 14.1
2000–03 4.6 2.4 1.8 11.8 11.7 8.7 6.2
1981–88 
(averaged)
4.5 4.6 5.3 6.5 5.0 28.9 1.9
1989–2003 
(averaged)
5.4 4.4 8.4 7.5 7.9 23.3 14.6
a  At constant 1994 prices
Source: General Statistical Office 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004.
agricultural production declined such that the 
overall growth rate of the total agricultural 
gross output in the period 1986–88 was only 
2.2% annually. In early 1988 food supplies did 
not meet demand, leading to starvation in 21 
provinces and cities in the north of Vietnam. 
In the south a series of conflicts arose in rural 
areas, especially in relation to land relations 
caused by ‘equitable’ land adjustment (Cuc 
1995; Hung & Murata 2001; Pingali & 
Xuan 1992). It became obvious that further 
reform was needed.
In response to the crisis the doi moi in 
agriculture was carried out according to 
Resolution 10 of the Politburo in April 1988. 
Under this reform, which was commonly 
known as the Khoan 10 (Contract 10) 
system, farmers were assigned agricultural 
land for 10–15-year terms and the farm 
household was recognised for the first time 
since the collectivisation period as the basic 
economic unit. Since this time most of the 
means of production (eg machines, buffaloes, 
cattle and agricultural instruments) have 
been recognised as privately owned. Another 
aspect of this policy was that farmers could 
be assigned the land they had owned prior 
to 1975 (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 2000; Pingali & Xuan 1992).
However, Khoan 10 was not supported by 
laws for the assignment and inheritance 
of land use rights (LUR) (Nakachi 2001). 
Problems also arose with facilities such as 
power stations, rural transport networks 
and markets, which had previously been the 
responsibility of the agricultural cooperatives 
(Cuc 1995). The 1993 Land Law was 
enacted in response to these problems.1
Land reform developments after 
doi moi
During the doi moi period a series of policies 
and laws in the agricultural sector, especially 
concerning land use, were issued. The most 
important policies were the Land Law (1993) 
and its revised versions (1998, 2001), the new 
Land Law (2003) and Ordinances 64/CP 
(1993) and 02/CP (1994) of the government 
dealing with the regulation of agricultural 
and forestry land allocation. There were 
also other policies that were directly related 
to land issues as well as supportive policies 
indirectly related to land issues.
Under the Land Law farmers were allocated 
land for long-term and stable use and were 
granted five rights of land use – the rights 
of transfer, exchange, lease, inheritance and 
mortgage. The duration of land allocation 
was 20 years for land used for annual crops 
and aquaculture, and 50 years for land used 
for perennial crops. The allocation could 
be renewed at the end of the period if the 
holder still had a need for the land. The 
Land Law also put ceilings on the land areas 
allocated to farm households. This limit for 
annual crop land was 2 ha in the northern 
and central provinces and 3 ha in the 
southern provinces. For perennial crop land 
the land limit was 10 ha in communes with 
flat fields and 30 ha in midland or moun-
tainous communes (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development 2000).
Following the land allocation, agricultural 
land use titles were issued to farm house-
holds. By 1998 land use certificates (LUCs) 
had been issued to 71% of farm households, 
and by the end of 2000 this number was 
more than 90% (Do & Iyer 2003). For 
forestry land in upland and mountainous 
areas, where many traditional and cultural 
issues complicated land allocation, the 
certification process was slower (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development 2002a; 
Vy 2002). The process of issuing land use 
certificates is still continuing.
In 1998 two additional LUR were assigned 
to farmers, the right to re-lease land and the 
right to use the value of LUR as joint venture 
capital for investment. In 2001 further 
revisions to the 1993 Land Law resulted 
in farmers being assigned the right to gift 
their land to relatives, friends or others. The 
revisions also set out the circumstances 
for allowing land related changes and 
procedures for registration of changes. A 
new Land Law, which has replaced the 1993 
Land Law and its revisions, was enacted in 
December 2003 and has been in effect since 
July 2004. For agricultural land there were 
no changes in the new law in the duration 
of land allocation and land area ceilings. 
However, significantly, for the first time land 
was officially recognised as being a ‘special 
good’, having a value and hence able to be 
traded. The law has confirmed that ‘land is 
a significant internal force and capital of the 
state’, and acknowledges that the real estate 
market including the market for LUR should 
be encouraged in urban areas. Individuals 
(farmers) and economic organisations are 
allowed to participate in the market.
Land policy changes in Vietnam since 1981 
are recognised as contributing significantly 
to production increases and development in 
the agricultural and rural sectors. Total agri-
cultural output increased by 6.7% annually 
during the period 1994–99 and about 4.6% 
during the period 2000–03. Food security 1
at the national level is no longer an issue and 
poverty has continuously decreased. But 
many challenges still exist for agriculture 
in Vietnam, such as falling agricultural 
product prices, increasing competition as 
Vietnam integrates with the global economy 
through the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA) and the WTO, and a slowdown 
of agricultural production growth rates. 
Moreover, farmers in Vietnam are likely to 
remain relatively poor, and a high propor-
tion of the population will continue to be 
involved in agriculture and live in rural areas. 
This will lead to heavy pressure on the rural 
sector, with a consequent need for continued 
policy reforms.
Considerable pressure is being exerted on the 
government in relation to the completion of 
the allocation and registration of LUR, and 
to issues related to compensation and the 
desirability of stable and long-term tenure. 
The government has given LUR to farmers 
in order to encourage the use of land as if 
it were their private property, but the State 
maintains ultimate ownership of the land.
Property rights in Vietnam 
resulting from the 1993–2003 
Land Laws
Land policies that distribute land to 
individuals and assign LUR (ie some degree 
of private property rights) allow the develop-
ment of land markets that can bring about an 
efficient allocation of resources, given certain 
conditions. Because well-defined and enforce-
able private property rights are one of these 
necessary conditions, efficient allocation of 
resources depends on the nature of prevailing 
property rights (Perman et al 1999).
Under the Vietnamese Constitution land is 
the property of the people as a whole and the 
State administers it on their behalf. The new 
2003 Land Law states that the government 
is the ‘representative of the people’s owner-
ship’. Since land is ‘owned’ by the people as 
a whole, it is not possible for individuals 
(or corporations) to own land, although 
they (and foreigners) can own and transfer 
structures such as houses built on land. 
Vietnamese (but not foreign) individuals, 
households and organisations can hold and 
transfer rights to use land.
The intent of the 1993 land reform was 
to give farmers security of land tenure by 
allocating agricultural land to them for stable 
and long-term use and issuing land use 
certificates (LUCs). However, the duration 
of land allocation is still short, and has not 
been changed under the new 2003 Land 
Law. This may result in farmers still having 
insufficient incentive for long-term invest-
ment in agriculture. In addition, land use 
flexibility is still constrained, particularly the 
conversion to other crops in paddy areas that 
traditionally have grown rice.
By providing increased security of tenure 
over land, facilitating access to credit through 
allowing the use of LUR as collateral, and 
making LURs tradeable, the 1993 Land 
Law provided the foundations for a formal 
market for land in Vietnam (Do & Iyer 
2003). However, as elsewhere in the world, 
LUR in Vietnam are not free of legislative 
requirements and constraints. The ability to 
transfer, lease, exchange, mortgage or inherit 
LUR varies between different categories 
of land, landholders and LUR (East Asia 
Analytical Unit 1997). Transfer of LUR 
involves payment of a tax by the transferor 20
and payment of a registration fee by the 
transferee. Likewise, conditions apply for the 
leasing of LUR. Households can make their 
LUR available for lease if the family is in 
poverty, if they have taken up other occupa-
tions or if they lack the capacity to work 
the land. Official restrictions placed on land 
transactions are discussed in more detail 
in Marsh and MacAulay (2002). Another 
constraint on the land market is that rental 
and land transfer values do not reflect true 
market prices but rather are determined 
within a pricing framework set by the central 
government, although the 2003 Land Law 
now specifies that the pricing framework 
should be close to the market price.
Vietnam has a large population and limited 
land, the value of land is high and LUR 
are very important. These rights are crucial 
to improved private sector development 
but there are ideological issues that remain 
important (AusAID 2001; East Asia 
Analytical Unit 1997; Fforde 1995). There 
is also debate regarding to what extent there 
should be an unrestricted land market. As 
LUR become longer in duration and can be 
implemented with fewer restrictions, they 
become more like the western concept of 
‘private’ land ownership. However, it is also 
understood that there are benefits to be 
obtained in providing for long-term owner-
ship of land, particularly its efficient use and 
investment in the productive capacity of 
the land.
Key perspectives on 
Vietnamese agriculture 
related to land policy
Labour
In Vietnam the combination of small land 
area and a large, growing rural population 
results in significant population pressure 
in relation to land. Following the doi moi 
economic reforms, the share of GDP 
generated by agriculture has been steadily 
falling (Government Statistical Office 2002, 
2004). However, the employment share for 
the agricultural sector remains high, falling 
only from 71% to 66% between 1993 and 
1998 (World Bank 2000). In recent years 
the composition of employment in the 
agricultural sector has changed. Since 1998 
the proportion of people who mainly work 
on their own farm has dropped from almost 
two-thirds to slightly less than half, and many 
more are now in waged employment – 30% 
of workers in 2002 compared to 19% in 1998 
(Asian Development Bank et al 2004).
Although labour market participation 
rates are among the highest in the world 
(Asian Development Bank et al 2004), 
in rural areas there are periods of surplus 
labour when both underemployment and 
unemployment are widespread. Small farm 
sizes combined with the high proportion 
of the population involved in agriculture 
means that labour productivity is low. 
There is potential for productivity growth 
as labour moves out of agriculture but there 
are restrictions to migration and movement 
of labour. However, growing rural/urban 21
income gaps are providing a strong incentive 
for migration to cities, and administrative 
barriers to population movement, no matter 
how severe, may not be sufficient to prevent 
this from occurring (Asian Development 
Bank et al 2004).
Despite high enrolment in primary and 
secondary schooling, education and skills 
are still limited in the rural population. Data 
collected in household surveys during the 
ACIAR project showed that most household 
heads had not completed primary education, 
and many had not had the opportunity to 
participate in training offered by govern-
ment extension services. These services are 
under-resourced and unable to reach many 
farmers at the village and commune level (Be 
2004). Because of better participation rates, 
education levels are now higher among the 
younger population, and from the 1990s 
there has been a visible upward trend in the 
labour market returns to education (World 
Bank 2003). However, secondary enrolment 
is lower in the poorer sector of the popula-
tion because of both direct and indirect 
costs (Asian Development Bank et al 2004). 
With the poor concentrated in the rural 
population, education levels in this sector 
will remain lower.
Poverty
It is well recognised that poverty, however 
measured, has declined in Vietnam to 
such a degree that it has been called ‘one 
of the greatest success stories in economic 
development’ (Asian Development Bank 
et al 2004, p xi). Using the expenditure 
approach and a poverty line computed to 
international standards, it has been estimated 
that the percentage of the population 
living in poverty has dropped from 58% 
in 1993 to 37% in 1998 and 29% in 2002. 
Accompanying this decline there has been a 
consistent improvement in a range of social 
indicators, from education enrolment to 
infant mortality.
However, there are striking and growing 
disparities in poverty reduction. Despite 
general improvement in farm incomes, 
poverty continues to be concentrated in the 
rural areas (Asian Development Bank et al 
2004; United Nations 1999; World Bank 
2000). Other things being equal, an urban 
household spends 78% more than a rural 
one (Asian Development Bank et al 2004). 
In addition, many rural households have 
income levels not far above the poverty line 
and are particularly vulnerable to ‘income 
shocks’ such as ill health or accidents, crop 
failure, investment failure (eg death of 
livestock), decreases in the prices of key 
agricultural commodities, low and unstable 
off-farm employment opportunities, and 
natural disasters, which can push them 
below the poverty line,.
There is evidence that the percentage of 
landless farmers is increasing in Vietnam, 
particularly in the Mekong Delta (Asian 
Development Bank et al 2004). A report 
by the World Bank in Vietnam (2000) 
considers that the imbalance of land owner-
ship is getting larger, creating a visible gap 
between the landless poor and richer land 
owners, with households that are unable 
to make a living from the land finding few 
opportunities for stable income generation 
off the farm.22
The rural industrial sector that would supply 
off-farm jobs is underdeveloped (Luong 
& Unger 1999), and the generally low 
level of education in rural areas provides a 
further constraint. Employment and income 
growth in agriculture, off-farm enterprises 
and services in rural areas are seen as being 
critical for poverty reduction in the future.
The Vietnamese Government maintains a 
strong emphasis on poverty reduction in its 
reform strategy, including a commitment 
to heavier investment in rural areas (World 
Bank 2003). The Asian Development 
Bank (Asian Development Bank et al 
2004) considers that poverty reduction is 
likely to be sustained by the government’s 
reform measures, as embodied in the 
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Strategy.
Small and fragmented land 
holdings
Approximately 80% of the population of 
some 80 million people in Vietnam live in 
rural areas, and there are over 11 million 
household farms. Land allocation policy 
has resulted in fragmented and small land 
holdings, especially in the north, because 
of the emphasis that was put on equitable 
allocation. Although land allocation has 
contributed significantly to agricultural 
and rural development in recent years, land 
fragmentation and small-sized farms are 
crucial issues which can lead to less efficient 
land use and conflicts about land.
Throughout Vietnam there are estimated to 
be between 75 and 100 million parcels or 
plots of land (Hung et al 2004; World Bank 
2003), on average about seven to eight plots 
per household. Around 10% of these plots 
have an area of only 100 m2 or less (Phien 
2001). Small and scattered land holdings 
hamper mechanisation and technology 
adoption, and involve additional time and 
labour for farming activities that must be 
carried out in geographically distant plots 
(Blarel et al 1992; Hung et al 2004; Lan 
2001). In the south of Vietnam the degree 
of land fragmentation is not so pronounced, 
with many farmers in the Mekong Delta 
having only one or two plots. There was less 
concern with equitable distribution in the 
south and land allocation to households was 
more likely to be based on land held prior 
to reunification in 1975 (Do & Iyer 2003; 
Luong & Unger 1999; Marsh & MacAulay 
2002; Ravallion & van de Walle 2001, 2003).
Although farm sizes vary throughout the 
country, they are typically small, around 
0.2 ha per capita (World Bank 2001a). 
Small farm sizes constrain the potential 
income from farm production, with around 
50% of the farm households surveyed for 
the ACIAR project having a net value of 
farm production less than VND10 million 
(US$645) in 2000.
Although limits on land holdings are set 
by the Land Law, they are not binding in 
many provinces in the deltas because most 
land holdings are much lower than the 3 ha 
ceiling. In areas where there is unused land 
the limit is not strictly enforced. Land held 
in excess of the limit can be leased from the 
State, but lease money is not always charged, 
especially for land not considered highly 
productive (eg ‘barren hills’ in upland areas).2
Small and fragmented land holdings are 
considered a problem for agricultural 
development, and the government is actively 
encouraging plot consolidation in northern 
Vietnam (Hung et al 2004), and allowing 
larger land holdings through supportive 
policies for larger ‘commercial’ farms. 
Research based on data from the 1993 
Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) 
suggests that the land allocation process 
carried out in association with Contract 100 
in 1988 and the Land Law of 1993 was not 
dominated by the rich or influential, and 
resulted in a remarkably egalitarian distribu-
tion of land (Ravallion & van de Walle 2001). 
However, more recent work based on data 
from the 1997–98 VLSS suggests that some 
degree of land accumulation by more wealthy 
and educated households, particularly those 
with a long history in a particular area, is 
occurring (Ravallion & van de Walle 2003).
Land use rights markets
Although an LUR market is emerging 
in Vietnam in response to reforms that 
have given a degree of security and tenure 
to land holdings, it is still constrained. 
Considerable official restrictions exist for 
LUR transactions, with official decrees 
controlling the circumstances under which, 
and to whom, LUR can be transferred 
(Marsh & MacAulay 2002). However, 
following the 1993 Land Law many 
researchers have reported that land transfers 
are occurring (eg Chung 1994; Deininger 
& Jin 2003; Do & Iyer 2003; Fforde 1995; 
Ravallion & van de Walle 2003), many 
illegally (eg Do & Iyer 2003; Humphries 
1999; Kerkvliet 2000; World Bank 2003). 
The reasons given for illegal transactions 
include the costs associated with registering 
LUR transactions, time-consuming and 
Buffalo are often used for land preparation in small fragmented fields in the north of Vietnam. 
Excessive land fragmentation is perceived as a barrier to the adoption of mechanisation.2
cumbersome procedures, unclear regulations, 
and opportunistic rent-seeking behaviour 
in near-urban districts and along newly 
constructed inter-regional roads. Humphries 
(1999) also notes that most households were 
issued with only one land use certificate for 
all their allocated plots, with the consequence 
that if a household wishes to dispose of or 
exchange any one of their plots they must (in 
theory) surrender their land use certificate 
and have it reissued. There are transaction 
costs involved in doing this, and in practice 
LUR transactions occur without being 
officially registered.
A second constraint arises because rental 
and land transfer values do not reflect true 
market prices, but rather are determined 
within a pricing framework set by the central 
government, with the actual prices fixed by 
the provincial or municipal authorities. The 
new Land Law, which came into effect in July 
2004, has stipulated that the pricing frame-
work for the LUR market should be more in 
line with market values. A third constraint 
relates to the reluctance of rural households 
to sell their LUR unless they have better 
prospects elsewhere with reasonably low risk.
There are conflicting reports on the extent of 
the LUR market. Based on an analysis using 
data from the 1997–98 VLSS, Ravallion and 
van de Walle (2003, p 11) state that ‘A more 
active rental market has clearly not emerged 
since the reforms’. However, other work 
by World Bank researchers on land rental 
markets also using 1997–98 VLSS data 
states the contrary opinion, that ‘Descriptive 
evidence on land market participation … 
points towards a rapid increase in land trans-
actions, together with considerable differences 
across regions’ (Deininger & Jin 2003, p 12). 
Research work carried out by the ACIAR 
project team resulted in data showing that 
there is an active LUR market but the extent 
of the market varies substantially by region, 
and that there is more rental than sales 
activity, particularly so in northern Vietnam.
Credit provision
Vietnam is in the process of implementing 
reforms to the banking system and 
undertaking a gradual liberalisation of credit 
markets (World Bank 2003). However, 
small household farms in Vietnam, and the 
rural sector in general, are recognised as 
facing significant credit constraints (Duong 
& Izumida 2002; World Bank 1998). 
Historically, the credit market in Vietnam 
has been seriously distorted by government 
intervention including priority credit given 
to state-owned enterprises and various 
commodity production programs (World 
Bank 1998). Additionally, agricultural 
credit policy in Vietnam is often used as an 
instrument of social welfare policy, targeting 
finance to poorer regions and households 
through the activities of the Vietnam Bank 
for Social Policy (previously known as the 
Vietnam Bank for the Poor).
Commercial credit availability for farm 
households commenced in 1993. Decree 
14/CP gave farm households access to 
credit, whereas previously loans had only 
been available to households through 
institutions. Following this reform, credit 
could be provided directly to households by 
commercial banks and financial organisa-
tions. The 1993 Land Law allocated LUR to 
households and also gave them the right to 
use these as collateral for bank loans.2
However, there are effective limits on the 
loan amounts that can generally be obtained 
using LUR as collateral. Banks consider 
LUR as the trust or guarantee for a loan 
that has the support of local government 
and sociopolitical groups in rural areas. The 
value of LUR is the same for each Red Book 
(the record of the LUR) and is independent 
of the land area or the value of land in the 
Red Book or the productive assets (eg 
industrial trees) on the land. Using LUR as 
a ‘trustable mortgage’ (tin chap), a household 
can therefore borrow a fixed amount. Based 
on current regulations, the amount that 
can be borrowed from the Vietnam Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD) is not larger than VND10 
million for household farms and VND20 
million for commercial farms. The advantages 
of this arrangement are that households can 
access credit easily, and households with 
lower production levels and less capital can 
be supported. However, although LUR are 
accepted as collateral, if foreclosure occurs 
the bank cannot easily rent or sell the land. 
The difficulties associated with using LUR 
as collateral are well documented (Duong & 
Izumida 2002; Humphries 1999; Vietnam 
Economic Times 2001).
The use of LUR as a mortgage asset results 
in a high incidence of small and short-term 
loans, primarily for production. Survey work 
conducted for the ACIAR project showed 
that generally loans were around VND5–10 
million. Such small and short-term loans 
constrain development of the farm house-
hold economy.
The incidence and extent of poverty in Vietnam has been reduced at an impressive rate 
in the last decade. These ethnic H’mong school children from Ha Giang province in the 
north-west mountainous region are still more likely to come from poor households, but face 
a brighter future.2
Formal, semi-formal and informal credit 
providers operate together in the rural credit 
market in Vietnam. The formal banking 
sector, and particularly the VBARD, is now 
responsible for the bulk of loans made to 
rural households (Duong & Izumida 2002; 
Marsh et al 2004b).
Changing policies
Vietnamese farmers have been operating 
under a continuously changing policy 
environment since recent land reforms first 
commenced in 1988 with Contract 100. 
Successive land reform policies since then 
have tended to reduce land fragmentation, 
and allow larger holding sizes, longer 
LUR, more flexibility in land use and more 
freedom to transfer LUR. These policies 
were intended to provide farmers with an 
environment in which they can feel confident 
about cultivating and investing in their land. 
However, many changes over a short time 
period can create a feeling of uncertainty 
about future changes, even though the liberal-
ising direction of change has been consistent. 
In addition, there have been and continue to 
be problems associated with agricultural land 
management and the implementation of the 
1993 Land Law and its revisions in 1998 and 
2001. The new 2003 Land Law is directed 
towards addressing some of these problems.
Farmers in Vietnam are also facing a 
changing policy environment as a result of 
pressure for the widespread policy changes 
needed to meet the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) and WTO guidelines. 
These changes will primarily influence input 
and output prices for agricultural businesses 
through requirements to discontinue trade 
barriers and remove or reduce subsidies.
With this background in mind, it is impor-
tant to discuss the nature of the changes that 
have taken place, the potential policy changes 
and how they fit in a theoretical context.
Models of agricultural 
development
To understand the role of land in economic 
development a number of models will be 
considered in this section under the headings 
macro- and micro-models.
Macro-development models
A useful starting point from the macro 
perspective is the Harrod-Domar model 
of economic development (Domar 1946; 
Harrod 1939; Ray 1998), which highlights 
the role of investment (Figure 1).
In this simple model firms produce and 
households consume. Households, by not 
consuming all of the income they derive from 
the firms, can save and the firms then invest 
these savings. It is assumed for the sake of 
simplicity that the economy is closed, that 
the investor creates a demand for investment 
goods, and that the investment may also 
include human capital.
In any economy consumption is usually less 
than the total income of households, with 
the remainder being savings. These savings 
provide for investment and so macroeco-
nomic balance is achieved when savings equal 
investment. Economic growth is positive 
when investment exceeds the amount needed 
to replace the depreciation of the existing 
capital stock.2
The model can be expressed as follows:
(1)  Yt = Ct + St
(2)  Yt = Ct + It
(3)  St = It
(4)  Kt+1 = (1-δ) Kt + It
where Y is the total output, C is consumption, 
S is savings, I is investment and K is the 
capital stock in the economy with a depre-
ciation rate of δ. If the savings rate is s, the 
capital:output ratio is θ and the growth rate of 
output is g, then by rearranging the equations 
the following equilibrium condition, known as 
the Harrod-Domar equation, is obtained:
(5)  s/θ = g + δ.
While this model is clearly a simplification, 
it highlights the role of investment and the 
two key variables of savings rate and capital:
output ratio. However, as Meier (1995, 
p 91) points out the ‘… ultimate flaw as a 
theory of growth was the assumption of 
a strict link between the growth of capital 
stock on the one hand and the consequent 
growth of potential output on the other.’ The 
implicit conclusion is that if the demand 
was appropriate then the only bottleneck to 
growth was a lack of physical capital. Meier 
also points out that the widespread use of 
the model for representing economic devel-
opment arose because of the assumption 
that developing countries suffer from surplus 
labour where the marginal productivity 
is very low. Thus, capital investment was 
seen as a means of giving employment to 
otherwise unemployed labour.
Figure 1.  Relationships between production, consumption, savings and investment. Source: 
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Ray (1998) reports an extended version 
of the Harrod-Domar model in which 
population growth is included. When this is 
done the approximate equilibrium condition 
becomes:
(6)  s/θ ≅ g*+ n+δ
where n is the population growth rate and 
g* is the per capita rate of growth in income. 
For most economies there will therefore 
be a basic set of connections between the 
growth rate of the economy (g or g*), the 
ability to save and invest (s), the capacity 
to convert capital into output (θ), the rate 
of depreciation of the capital stock and the 
rate of population growth (n). Agriculture 
in both developed and developing countries 
faces this rather fundamental set of relation-
ships, which are key factors in determining 
the rate of growth in a macroeconomic 
context. In evaluating the framework of 
the Harrod-Domar model, investment is 
clearly significant. Land is one of the most 
important assets that farmers have, and the 
ability to use land as an asset against which 
to borrow for investment is thus important. 
In rural dominated countries such as 
Vietnam, both investment in agriculture and 
the mobilisation of savings from agriculture 
are essential.
One way to better understand the role of 
agriculture in economic development is to 
consider models with two sectors: the agri-
cultural or traditional sector and the modern 
  It is worth reflecting on the significance of the 
very recent introduction of automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) into Vietnam and the 
possibilities their widespread use might have 
for the mobilisation of savings, particularly 
in rural areas.
or industrial sector with new technologies 
(Ray 1998, p 353). These are referred to 
as dual economy models. The basic flows 
involved in rural–urban transactions are the 
flow of surplus labour from agriculture and 
the flow of surplus food. The reverse flows 
from the modern sector are of equipment 
and machinery (eg tractors), chemicals 
and pesticides and also human capital 
generated in educational systems. Because 
the traditional sector is also likely to have a 
very large population, it is also a source of 
demand for goods produced by industry in 
the modern sector.
In the context of what is known as the 
Lewis model (Lewis 1954; Ray 1998), 
the traditional sector has a labour surplus, 
is family based, and can be characterised 
as using older and more labour-intensive 
technologies, while the modern sector is 
considered to be capital intensive and profit 
based. The traditional sector is the supplier 
of labour to the modern sector and the 
growth of the modern sector is limited by 
the available supply of capital (ie, savings and 
investment are limiting). It is assumed that 
labour can move from the traditional sector 
at a low opportunity cost.
The notion of surplus labour is represented 
in Figure 2, based on the idea that land 
is limited and thus there are diminishing 
returns to labour and possibly other inputs. 
In addition, not much capital is required to 
be able to farm the limited amount of land 
since traditional technologies are used. In 
Figure 2 the marginal product of labour is 
zero beyond point B.2
Another factor in the use of labour in the 
traditional sector is the concept that farm 
production or income is generally shared 
among the members of the household, and 
the effective wage is an average. Thus, it is 
the average output that matters, and as long 
as this is still positive then more labour is 
employed than would be the case for a profit 
maximising firm. Also, reducing the labour 
input would have little or no effect on the 
output of the traditional sector. Therefore, 
provided the average output is greater than 
alternatives elsewhere, labour stays employed 
in the traditional sector as disguised 
unemployment and the effective wage in the 
traditional sector remains lower than in the 
modern sector.
In the modern sector the capital stock is 
increased through investment of the profits 
generated in the sector. Thus, the total 
product curve TP for the modern sector 
rises, resulting in a shift in the marginal 
product curve MP for labour, which in a 
competitive system is the demand for labour 
(Figure 3). At the same time there is a large 
pool of underemployed labour so that the 
supply of labour is very elastic and wage rates 
are stable while this labour is being absorbed 
into the modern sector. Because the average 
return to labour in agriculture will be below 
the wage rate wm in the modern sector, 
transfer to the modern sector is attractive. 
Thus, labour moves out of agriculture and 
the output from agriculture does not change 
much because of the movement. Fei and 
Ranis (1961) extended this model to give 
it a more dynamic perspective, reflecting 
the changes that take place over time. First, 
surplus labour is transferred to the modern 
sector, then disguised unemployment is 
gradually reduced, and finally the impact 
of rising modern sector wages is felt in the 
traditional sector with the removal of most 
of the disguised unemployment. This process 
gives rise to the commercialisation of the 
traditional sector. Much fuller descriptions 
and details of these models are given in Ray 
(1998, chapters 4 and 10) and Todaro and 
Smith (2003, chapter 4).
These models provide a macro perspective 
on the current stage of development of 
Vietnamese agriculture and are also sugges-
tive of future directions. Of course, the 
Vietnamese context has many special charac-
teristics (as discussed above) that will affect 
the way in which the country will develop, 
but some of the broad and fundamental 
economic tendencies will be as characterised 
in the Harrod-Domar and Lewis models.
Figure 2.  Representation of surplus labour 

















































































Land and labour markets and 
incentives for input use — imperfect 
markets
There are three dominant features of land 
use in Vietnam. First, the distribution 
of land among households is very much 
a function of the history of the country. 
Second, land for agricultural use is not 
owned but the rights over it are specified in 
a land use rights certificate. The third factor 
is that land is clearly scarce relative to labour 
and it is likely that there is considerable 
underemployment of labour in agriculture.2 
This observation is consistent with the Lewis 
model and also the Ranis and Fei modifica-
tions discussed above.
2  Recent estimates of production functions for 
two provinces in the north and two in the 
south of Vietnam using data from the ACIAR 
project ADP 1/97/0092 ‘Impacts of alterna-
tive policy options on the agricultural sector 
in Vietnam’ have very small elasticities of 
production for family labour and hired labour 
(Hung & MacAulay 2005).
  In the north the elasticity of scale for family 
labour was estimated to be 0.04 at average 
input levels and the marginal product of 
labour was 0.98 kg of rice equivalent per day 
of labour input. From the survey data, on 
average, one labour unit equivalent works 
about 195 days/yr, which is about 70% of the 
standard full-time work load of 270 days/yr. 
The price of rice is about VND1,500–1,800/
kg and a typical rural wage rate is about 
VND15,000/day. Thus, the value of the 
marginal product of labour is of the order of 
VND1,470–1,760/day and the average wage 
rate is approximately 10 times this value.
These observations raise the question of 
what are likely to be the effects of under-
employment or unemployment on the use 
of land. Using the idea that labour will be 
employed to the point where its opportunity 
cost is equal to its marginal product, consid-
eration of the effects of unemployment or 
underemployment on the opportunity cost 
will provide a perspective on how land will 
be used in the face of such imperfect labour 
markets. One way to take unemployment 
or underemployment into account is to 
allow for the probability p of getting work 
that generates a return (Figure 4). This may 
also include the probability of working on 
the farm. Thus, the expected wage will be 
the going wage rate w multiplied by the 
appropriate probability p. A probability of 
less than 1.0 changes the slope of the wage 
cost line for family labour, and so the optimal 
level of use of family labour on family-based 
farms will be L* rather than L** as in the 
case of hired labour. Family labour use will 
be higher where there are imperfections in 
the labour market than when there is an 
efficient labour market. Thus, land will be 
used more intensively with respect to labour. 
This may be a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing depending 
  In the south the elasticity of scale for family 
labour was 0.14 at average input levels, the 
marginal product of labour was about 10 kg 
of rice equivalent per day and the average 
product was 71 kg of rice equivalent per day. 
The average hours worked were estimated at 
110 days/yr or 41% of the 270 days. The price 
of rice was about VND1,200–1,500/kg and 
the average wage about VND30,000–35,000/
day. Thus, the value of the marginal product 
of labour is of the order of VND12,000–
15,000/day with the wage rate being about 
2.5–2.3 times this value.2
on the real marginal cost of labour and 
whether unemployment in agriculture is 
keeping the real wage in the non-agricultural 
sectors too high.
The reverse effect may occur with market 
failure in the area of credit and possibly other 
inputs where market inefficiencies may cause 
the opportunity costs to be increased. In this 
case too little credit or other inputs will be 
used in agriculture. Restrictions and other 
difficulties in borrowing (eg a lack of ability 
to use assets such as land for collateral; 
poor infrastructure for the distribution and 
marketing of other inputs) may all increase 
the opportunity cost.
Pooling and land consolidation
As the land area per household in Vietnam 
is very small, an important policy question 
is whether or not there are gains to be had 
from households working larger areas. On 
what grounds would larger farm sizes be 
recommended as a way of improving the 
efficiency of resource use?
Farms are likely to face returns to size in 
the areas of marketing and production. In 
marketing, bulk purchasing and selling may 
bring advantages, and this is most likely to be 
an issue of organisation of farmers or traders 
rather than of farm size. In production, 
mechanisation is an area of potential gains 
in efficiency. However, large farm sizes are 
needed over which to spread the capital cost 
of items such as a tractor.


























In very simple terms the larger the area of 
land farmed by a household (given the severe 
limits on available land) the greater will be 
their income in total. However, in general, 
to increase one household’s land area will 
require reducing the area available to one 
or more other households. If the expected 
real wage for labour used in agriculture is 
low (and considering the upper limits on 
the accumulation of land), imperfections 
in the labour and land markets may have 
significant consequences for land use 
regardless of the efficient farm size. Also, 
the ownership structure, as Ray (1998, p 
454) points out in a study of West Bengal, 
affects productivity: ‘… the productivity of 
owned land exceeds the productivity on 
sharecropped land by about 50%’. Ray also 
suggests that a number of studies record an 
apparent negative relationship between farm 
area and productivity, which indicates that 
the smaller farms are more productive but 
appear to have less advantage in riskier envi-
ronments. Results from the ACIAR survey 
data show that there appears to be little 
difference in productivity over the rather 
limited range of farm sizes studied (Hung & 
MacAulay 2005). The gains seem to be more 
pronounced in the north of Vietnam than in 
the south.
  Using data collected for the ACIAR project 
ADP 1/97/0092, the provinces of Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai had average technical efficiency levels 
estimated from frontier production functions of 
85%. For Binh Duong it was 58% and for Can 
Tho 72%. The net value of production in the 
provinces was VND28.3 million for Ha Tay, 
VND8.1 million for Yen Bai, VND33.8 million 
for Binh Duong and VND13 million for Can 
Tho. For details of the regressions see Hung 
and MacAulay (2005).
One possibility is for the land market to 
evolve in such a way that an efficient farm 
size is reached through market forces. This 
is likely to be slow for a number of reasons, 
eg the land markets and the market in LUR 
seem to be very small because of the diffi-
culty of using land for collateral in Vietnam. 
The value of land may be above the capital-
ised value of the income stream because of its 
value as collateral (Bardhan & Udry 1999). 
Thus, the smallholder wishing to expand 
must be able to pay the premium to cover 
the collateral value, and then once the land is 
mortgaged, it cannot be used to raise further 
collateral. If, as well, the credit market is 
imperfect, the small but efficient farmer will 
have considerable difficulty entering the land 
market. Thus, it is unlikely that land owner-
ship or LUR will pass from the large farmer 
to the small farmer. In the case of Vietnam it 
is more likely to be from one small farmer to 
another because of the generally small areas 
farmed by most households. Experience in 
developing countries suggests that land is 
most often sold as a result of some family 
crisis, and it is more likely that it will move 
from small farmers to large farmers.
Thus, there are many incentives working 
against the consolidation of land. Clearly, 
there are benefits in ensuring that individual 
responsibility for production makes a large 
difference. The benefits of economies of size 
appear small but creating an environment in 
which land transactions can easily take place 
(eg with low transaction costs and suitable 
supporting inputs such as credit) will allow 
such benefits to be obtained, particularly as 
both technology and the opportunity costs 
of labour in the agricultural sector change.
Key factors in the use 
of land as a resource 
in Vietnam
In this last section of the chapter results 
derived from research work (see Appendix 
I for details) undertaken for the ACIAR 
project in four provinces, Ha Tay and Yen 
Bai in the north and Can Tho and Binh 
Duong in the south, are presented and 
discussed under subheadings representing 
key factors in the use of land in Vietnam.
Benefits and costs associated 
with land fragmentation
The benefits and costs associated with land 
fragmentation are complex and include 
both private and social aspects. The negative 
impacts include reduced incentives for 
mechanisation, higher costs, loss of use of 
land due to boundaries, increased negative 
externalities, and more limited application 
of new technologies. On the other hand, 
land fragmentation may benefit farmers by 
spreading output risk and seasonal labour 
use, and allowing crop diversification.
Analysis of survey data from 508 plot-based 
observations from 185 farm households 
in the north of Vietnam indicated that the 
number of plots per household appeared to 
be correlated with the rice equivalent crop 
yields. The partial elasticity of the number 
of plots was negative, a result which suggests 
a negative effect of plot number on farm 
performance. This is consistent with findings 
of Wan and Cheng (2001) on crop produc-
tion in China. Data analysis also showed 
that fragmentation was not a significant 
determinant of output risk spreading but it 
did appear to be a significant factor for crop 
diversity. In an upland province (Yen Bai) 
fragmentation was positively related to the 
total value of farm production, and in the 
delta provinces (Ha Tay and Can Tho) it 
was negatively related. This work is discussed 
in more detail in chapter 3 by Hung et al.
Plot-based production data collected from 
household surveys were also used to estimate 
economies of farm size and scale in the north 
and south, using a production function 
approach estimated by frontier regression 
methods (Hung & MacAulay 2005). The 
results were different for the two regions. 
In the south economies of size measured by 
farm area were not indicated, but the partial 
elasticity of scale of variable inputs used 
(fertiliser and labour) was higher than in the 
north. This suggests that increasing inputs 
could increase not only crop productivity 
but also farm output and technical efficiency. 
In the north results showed that economies 
of farm size exist, indicating that land 
consolidation and accumulation could result 
in increased crop productivity.
The Vietnamese Government has encour-
aged exchange of land to address excessive 
land fragmentation. Theoretical analysis 
suggests that land consolidation would be 
increased by an increase in the wage rate and 
a decrease in the transaction costs of both 
land transfer and obtaining credit (Hung 
et al 2004), and this is supported in an 
empirical analysis by Hung et al in chapter 
10. As Vietnam appears to have surplus 
agricultural labour, at least for much of the 
production year, the real benefits to farm 
households from land consolidation may 
not be apparent until the real opportunity 
cost of farm labour begins to rise. This 
opportunity cost will clearly be affected by a 
number of factors such as the availability of 
employment opportunities for farm family 
members, the wage rate associated with these 
opportunities, the level of education and age 
of the rural workforce, and the time of year 
and season. The transaction costs involved 
in job searching will be a factor, as will the 
reliability of employment. Therefore, creation 
of new off-farm jobs and movement of the 
agricultural labour force to other sectors of 
the economy will be a key policy for agricul-
tural and rural development in the future.
Farm size, farm income and 
poverty issues
Data from the household surveys showed 
that farm size is extremely variable within 
communes and between regions. Variability 
tends to be greater in areas with compara-
tively larger farm size, and is also associated 
with land type. Few of the surveyed farmers 
reported that they were farming land 
holdings over the land limits. Amongst the 
surveyed households, 80% farmed only 50% 
of the land in Ha Tay and 34% of the land 
in Yen Bai. Regression analyses showed that 
farm size is a consistently significant variable 
affecting income from farming activities.
The net value of production (NVP) from 
farms was also extremely variable. Some 
farmers in all provinces, but particularly in 
Binh Duong and Ha Tay, reported large 
NVPs; however, half of the surveyed farmers 
had an NVP of less than VND10 million. 
This median value for the NVP is low 
and remarkably similar across provinces, 
but in Binh Duong and Ha Tay provinces 
some households have a very large value 
for farm production that affects the average 
NVP. This indicates that, first, a substantial 
inequality exists between rural households 
in these provinces on the basis of farm 
production alone and, second, that poverty is 
a concern in all provinces.
Net income from off-farm activities made a 
substantial contribution to both average and 
median total household NVP in all prov-
inces. The increase in average NVP ranged 
from 12% to 56%. Median NVP increases 
were higher, ranging from 32% to 106%. This 
indicates that off-farm employment is impor-
tant in raising the incomes of the poorer 
50% of households. A substantial number of 
households perceived that opportunities for 
off-farm employment were now greater than 
5 years ago, especially in Binh Duong and Ha 
Tay provinces, which are adjacent to Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi respectively.
Small farm size and small asset value are 
clearly linked to households classified as 
being in the ‘poor’ (ho ngheo) socioeconomic 
group. Poor households in Ha Tay have on 
average approximately half the land area of 
households classified as ‘above average’ (ho 
giau), and in Yen Bai poor households only 
have approximately one-fifth the land area of 
above average households.
The results indicating the importance of 
off-farm income and the link between small 
farm size and low incomes are consistent 
with the findings of other researchers 
(reported in Asian Development Bank et al 
2004; World Bank, 2003). Farm size, farm 
income and poverty issues are explored 
further in this book by Chung in chapter 8, 
and Marsh et al in Chapter 9.
Development of the market for 
land use rights
Based on analysis of the project survey data 
there is an active market for LUR but the 
level of activity varies considerably between 
provinces. Rental transactions were reported 
more often in the northern provinces and 
sales more often in the southern provinces. 
Some individual households have acquired a 
large percentage of their land holding, up to 
100%, through buying or renting activities, 
as distinct from land that has been allocated 
or inherited. In Ha Tay province there 
has been a steadily increasing level of land 
transaction activity and land price over time, 
and the price paid for LUR appears to be 
a rational capitalisation of the rental price. 
Also, a similar percentage of households 
in Ha Tay from all socioeconomic groups 
are involved in the LUR rental market. 
The ’above average’ group has acquired the 
majority of the land area transacted, both in 
terms of area per transaction and total area 
involved in renting and auction transactions. 
The majority of LUR bought have been 
acquired by households in the above average 
group, and all LUR sold have been from the 
‘poor’ socioeconomic group. This observation 
is supported by an extensive literature (eg 
Binswanger & Elgin 1998) that suggests that 
small farmers are not able to raise (or repay) 
the capital required to buy land to enlarge 
their holdings.
The incidence of households involved 
in multiple LUR transactions over time 
indicates that some households are steadily 
accumulating land. Deininger and Jin (2003) 
suggest that a functioning LUR market 
should result in land transferring to small 
but efficient producers, as well as to house-
holds with larger endowments. Data from 
this study illustrate that this is indeed occur-
ring but the effect is only minimal, and larger 
more wealthy households are obtaining the 
most land from the LUR rental market. 
This is possibly a desirable result in terms of 
allocative efficiency and the development of a 
commercial agriculture, but it raises poverty 
and equity concerns when few off-farm 
opportunities are available in rural areas. In 
Ha Tay province, however, where this trend 
is reported, off-farm opportunities could be 
expected to be higher than in other provinces 
further from major cities.
There is a clear demand for rental land, 
particularly so in the communes surveyed 
in the north. However, not surprisingly, lack 
of available land is perceived by farmers as 
a major constraint. Overcoming this will 
eventually be dependent on off-farm oppor-
tunities and the freedom of rural people 
to move freely and without substantial 
risk into other regions and occupations. 
Finance is also perceived as a significant 
constraint, particularly in the south, raising 
concerns about credit availability for farm 
households. On the other hand, farmers do 
not perceive market procedures and the limit 
on the amount of land that can be held as 
constraints. In practice, for the rental market 
at least, they see these as secondary issues 
compared to land availability and finance. 
This does not mean that transaction costs are 
low, but that they may be avoided through 
informal market transactions.
This research work on land markets is 
reported by Marsh et al in chapter 4. It is 
likely that an active LUR market, as appears 
to exist in Ha Tay, will tend to favour 
accumulation of land by the more wealthy 
farmers. While this will assist with the 
commercialisation of Vietnamese agriculture, 
it will inevitably raise poverty and equity 
concerns while off-farm employment oppor-
tunities in rural areas remain low. The World 
Bank (2003, p 44) also notes that further 
land reforms will not result in changes that 
can be expected to bias benefits towards 
the poor, but rather land ownership ‘could 
become gradually more concentrated in the 
hands of wealthier households’.
Land use flexibility
That improvements in rural living standards 
during 1993–98 are considered to be driven 
predominantly by a diversification of on-farm 
activities (World Bank 2000) points to the 
importance of land use flexibility. However, 
despite evidence of changing land use, rice 
still accounts for over 60%, and food crops 
for over 70%, of the total sown areas. Despite 
an official policy that supports diversification, 
there still remain inconsistent government 
requirements and local pressures to produce 
rice and food (Hung & Murata 2001). These 
concerns about the use of land are linked 
closely to issues of rice policy and food 
security. Some 4 million ha of land in Vietnam 
is still ‘required’ to grow rice, although this 
represents a decrease of 0.2 million ha on land 
previously set aside for rice production.
A high proportion of the farmers surveyed 
during the ACIAR project reported land use 
changes in the last 5 years, and few perceived 
serious restrictions on land use. From the 
survey data it was found that production 
activities are more diverse in the northern 
than southern provinces, and production 
diversity is positively related to the number 
of plots. Of the surveyed provinces, Ha 
Tay had the greatest amount of both LUR 
transaction activity and reported land use 
change. This province is close to Hanoi and 
there are opportunities to provide products 
such as fish, meat, vegetables, flowers and 
fruit for the increasingly affluent Hanoi 
population. There has been a sharp rise in 
LUR transactions in Ha Tay since 1997 and 
an increase in the rental price being paid for 
land, indicating that crops more profitable 
than rice are being grown on rented land 
(Marsh et al 2005). This suggests that 
profitable land use change is driving LUR 
transaction activity. Ensuring that land or 
LUR are tradeable is necessary but not 
sufficient for a land market to develop: there 
also need to be actual or perceived profitable 
production opportunities. Issues related to 
land use and land use flexibility are explored 
further by Tien et al in chapter 3.
Credit provision for rural 
investment
Credit provision for investment in production 
is crucial for rural development. Households 
need access to adequate credit to enable them 
to take advantage of market opportunities and 
expand their production. Research reported 
by Duong and Izumida (2002) has shown 
that credit-constrained farm households in 
Vietnam cannot optimise their production. 
Based on analysis of the survey data, the 
following conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to rural credit use in these four prov-
inces. These issues are covered in more detail 
by Marsh et al in chapter 6. Many results are 
consistent with those of Duong and Izumida 
(2002), who surveyed farmers in three 
different provinces located in the northern, 
central and southern regions of Vietnam.
Farmers have a high awareness of alternative 
credit sources. Most rural credit is supplied by 
the formal sector, particularly the VBARD. 
Semi-formal sources and the Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policy are significant credit 
providers in the northern but not the 
southern communes. This effectively means 
that poor farmers in northern provinces have 
greater access to subsidised credit than those 
in southern provinces. Households also used 
informal credit sources but less so for loans 
taken out in 2001 than for loans held in 
2000. This may indicate a lessening of credit 
constraints in the formal sector as a result of 
policy change, although many households 
reported differences between credit received 
and credit requested from formal credit 
sources. Farmers also said that credit 
constraints were affecting their ability to rent 
and buy land, especially in the south.
Credit use was widespread across all socio-
economic groups. In fact, wealthier farmers 
accessed credit less than poorer farmers, 
which may indicate credit constraints in 
the commercial sector or lack of produc-
tion opportunities for wealthier farmers. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers are 
reluctant to borrow as agricultural returns 
are low. It also illustrates the high priority 
placed by the government on enabling poorer 
farmers to have access to credit. It would 
appear that this policy has been successful but 
it is a concern that this may be at the expense 
of commercial agricultural development.
Generally, loan amounts obtained from 
the commercial formal sector were low, at 
less than VND10 million, and were for 
short- or medium-term loans. Loan amounts 
also appear to be unrelated to farm size. 
Uncertainty with the value and effectiveness 
of agricultural LUR as collateral is probably 
restricting both loan amounts and the 
availability of long-term loans suitable for 
development projects. Given the complex 
nature of land ownership, management 
and use in Vietnam, this will not be an easy 
problem to solve.
The new 2003 Land Law addresses some 
of the issues facing credit providers with 
regard to using LUR as collateral (Vietnam 
Economic Times 2003).
Transaction costs in the land 
and credit markets
There is commitment in Vietnam to ongoing 
administration reforms (Asian Development 
Bank et al 2004), which should lead to a reduc-
tion in the transaction costs associated with the 
credit market, the market for LUR, and land 
consolidation through plot exchange. Separate 
comparative statics and empirical analyses 
suggest that if transaction costs are reduced 
then land consolidation would be encouraged 
and the market for LUR would also be likely 
to be more active (Hung et al 2004, chapter 
10). That many land transactions occur infor-
mally suggests that the direct and indirect costs 
of transfers may be substantial. Many house-
holds complained of high transaction costs (eg 
complicated procedures and kickbacks) when 
obtaining credit (chapter 6).
Technology development, 
extension and training
A number of analyses supported the need for 
increased research and extension activities. 
Many households nominated ‘not sure 
what to do’ or ‘lack of knowledge to change’ 
when asked why they did not change their 
production activities (Marsh & MacAulay, 
2003). Comparative statics analysis shows 
that land fragmentation is likely to decrease 
with increased agricultural production ability 
(Hung et al 2004). In econometric analysis 
using production data in Ha Tay, the educa-
tion level was significant and positively related 
to the value of farm production (chapter 9). 
Additionally, frontier analysis suggests that 
technical efficiency in the northern provinces 
is high, pointing to the need for technology 
development to shift the production frontier; 
whereas technical efficiency was lower in 
the southern provinces, indicating the need 
for extension and training to improve farm 
productivity (Hung & MacAulay 2005).
Summary and conclusions
Some of the key issues from a policy 
perspective can be summarised as follows:
Care needs to be taken in applying a 
general policy of plot consolidation since 
there are a number of interacting factors 
involved. In some cases there may be 
gains to be made, and in other cases the 
gains are much less clear.
The ability to use land as collateral and 
as a means of enhancing investment in 
agriculture seems to be very restricted 
at this time in Vietnam, with limits on 
borrowing and only a limited capacity to 
trade in LUR. In addition, LUR have a 
relatively short horizon of ownership in 
many cases. The use of land as collateral 
in the context of market failure in the 




Lenders need to be able to liquidate land 
assets if land is to be used as collateral 
for loans.
In general the effective transaction costs 
for land exchanges are high and difficult 
to implement (eg, all owned plots are 
on the one ‘Red Book’ certificate). Low 
transaction costs and ease of exchange 
are needed in both the land and credit 
markets for effective markets to develop.
There is a significant need to have a 
more flexible and effective credit system, 
particularly for longer term debt related 
to land.
Investments in human capital through 
education and extension services 
seem vital to the development of 
higher income levels in agriculture so 
that labour mobility and alternative 
employment opportunities are enhanced.
Land policy in Vietnam is a politically 
sensitive and complicated issue. There are 
social, historical and cultural perspectives that 
impinge on the economics of land policy (eg 
Kerkvliet 2000). Within policy circles there 
is disagreement on policies to encourage the 
land market, including the desirability of accu-
mulation of land (see chapter 11). However, 
pressure is coming from both within and 
outside Vietnam to allow accumulation of 
land and changes in land use. Restrictions 
on the land market limit the capacity to both 
invest and disinvest, and also reduce the 
ability of Vietnamese agriculture to adjust to 
the economic and technological changes that 
take place. However, care needs to be taken to 
ensure that land policy liberalisation does not 







AgriculturAl lAnd uSe Flexibility in 
vietnAm 
To dunG Tien, nGuyen PhuonG le and Sally P. MarSh
Agricultural land use flexibility in a market economy is important in allowing 
farmers to respond to market signals. Following the renovation in agriculture in 1988 
in Vietnam, when farmers were able to make their own production decisions based 
on their available resources, crop patterns in some farm households have changed 
remarkably. Land use flexibility in practice is affected by several factors including: 
farmers’ awareness of land use opportunities and possibilities, rules and regulations 
governing the use of land, and the ability of farmers to respond to market oppor-
tunities. In this chapter policies affecting flexible land use in Vietnam are outlined 
and discussed. Household survey data from four provinces are used to summarise 
common land uses and the economic returns from alternative land uses. Flower 
production in Ha Tay province is used as a case study to illustrate profitable land 
use change. The study shows that the flower industry plays a key role in generating 
household cash income even in farm households growing flowers on only 9% of their 
total cultivated area. Flower production also contributes to creating job opportunities 
for family labour as it requires more workdays than other crops. These results are 
used to discuss policy to promote more profitable land use.2
Introduction
Agricultural land use flexibility in a market 
economy is important in allowing farmers to 
respond to market signals such as the prices of 
inputs and outputs. Input prices directly affect 
investment levels and production costs, and 
output prices have an impact on production 
results and returns to investment. In a market 
economy prices are always fluctuating, and 
flexibility in land use allows producers to take 
advantage of market opportunities and reduce 
disadvantage when price changes occur. 
Additionally, agricultural production takes 
place under variable climatic conditions that 
increase production risk. Rigid and inflexible 
production in response to pre-determined 
targets doesn’t allow adaptation to unusual 
changes in conditions. Farmers benefit from 
land use flexibility that allows them to reduce 
the risk associated with the production 
process, thus saving costs, reducing possible 
losses and increasing income.
Therefore, the extent to which land use 
flexibility exists has a direct effect on 
both farmers’ incomes and agricultural 
development. Since 1986, following doi 
moi (renovation), Vietnam has moved 
from a centrally planned economy where 
agricultural production was under the 
control of the State to a socialist-orientated 
market economy where farm households 
have more individual control over their 
production activities. Assessing the impact of 
this increased land use flexibility is necessary 
to aid the development of appropriate policy 
recommendations in further strengthening 
flexibility of land use and production, and 
enhancing living standards for farmers.
Flexibility in the use of agricultural land 
indicates how readily land use patterns vary 
in order to adapt to changes in production 
conditions and opportunities, including:
changing cropping patterns and livestock 
raising
adopting appropriate advanced 
technology
changing investment levels in production 
inputs.
Intensive investment is usually related to the 
adoption of modern technologies such as 
new varieties and breeds, fertilisers and crop 
protection methods.
In this chapter changes in land use since 
doi moi are briefly outlined, followed by a 
discussion on policies affecting flexible land 
use. Typical land use patterns in Vietnam are 
described and data from household surveys 
are used to illustrate the wide diversity of 
current land use and the economic returns 
from different land uses. A case study of 
flower production in a commune in Ha Tay 
province is used as an illustration of a high 
input / high return land use. Farmer percep-
tions of land use flexibility are explored, along 
with actual changes in land use reported 
by surveyed farmers. A discussion of the 
role of extension services in promoting land 
use change leads to conclusions and policy 




Changes in land use 
since doi moi
Substantial changes in land use have 
undoubtedly occurred since doi moi. The 
growth in land area planted to industrial 
crops such as tea, coffee, rubber, sugarcane 
and pepper are readily shown by govern-
ment statistical data (Figure 1), eg the rapid 
growth in the area planted to coffee, from 
111,900 ha in 1988 to a peak of 565,300 ha 
in 2001.
Changes in land area planted to major 
food and annual industrial crops (maize, 
soybean, cassava, sweet potato and peanut) 
are shown in Figure 2. The area planted to 
sweet potato has steadily decreased since 
1992 while the area planted to maize has 
more than doubled, from 431,800 ha in 
1990 to 909,800 ha in 2003. Areas planted 
to soybean and cassava have increased 
since the year 2000, while peanut has been 
relatively constant at around 240,000 ha. 
Although not shown in Figure 2, the total 
area planted to rice has increased from 
5,740,800 ha in 1988 to 7,449,300 ha 
(preliminary figure) in 2003 (GSO 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2004).
The percentages of land area planted to some 
major annual food and industrial crops are 
provided in Table 1. The dominance of rice is 
clearly evident, with around 70% of the total 
land area planted to annual crops growing 
rice. The percentage areas planted to maize, 
cassava and soybean have increased since 
2000, whereas the percentage area planted to 
sweet potato has decreased.
Land use changes are also being reported 
by researchers. Fforde (1995, p 91) reports 
that ‘low profitability cash crops have been 
abandoned in favour of crops offering 
higher returns’, citing examples such as the 
planting of high-value fragrant rice in the 
Figure 1.  Area planted to tea, coffee, rubber, sugarcane and pepper 1988–2003. Data for 2003 






















































High value horticulture crops (lettuce, roses, chrysanthemums) being grown in Ha Tay 
province for the market in Ha Noi.
Figure 2.  Area planted to peanut, soybean, maize, cassava and sweet potato 1988–2003. 



















































Red River delta. Khiem et al (1999) report 
that land reforms (and improved market 
access) have affected land use patterns in 
the northern uplands, with areas planted 
to fruit trees and horticultural crops 
‘increasing dramatically’. In districts close 
to towns and cities high-value horticulture 
and flower crops are becoming increasingly 
common, with some communes specialising 
in specific high-value crops. In some coastal 
areas of the Mekong Delta there is an 
expansion of more profitable rice–shrimp 
farming systems (Ben 2000). However, 
despite evidence of changing land use, rice 
still accounts for over 60%, and food crops 
over 70%, of the total sown area. Despite 
an official policy that supports diversi-
fication, there still remain inconsistent 
government documents and local pressures 
to produce food, in particular rice (Hung 
& Marata 2001).
There are conflicting views about the extent 
to which the use of land should be the 
province of the individual or controlled by the 
State. However, the centrality of state land 
management to government policies is still 
paramount (AusAID 2001). These concerns 
over the use of land are linked closely to 
issues of rice policy and food security. Control 
Table 1.  Major annual crops grown in Vietnam as a percentage of total area under all annual 
crops, 1995–2003
Year Area of each crop as a percentage of total area under all annual crops
Food crops Annual industrial crops
Rice Maize Sweet 
potato
Cassava Sugarcane Peanut Soybean
1994 73.3 5.9 3.8 3.1 1.9 2.8 1.5
1995 83.1 6.0 3.3 3.0 2.4 2.8 1.3
1996 73.8 6.5 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.8 1.2
1997 73.3 6.8 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.6 1.1
1998 73.5 6.5 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.7 1.3
1999 73.1 6.6 2.6 2.2 3.4 2.4 1.2
2000 72.7 6.9 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.3 1.2
2001 72.4 7.0 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.4 1.4
2002 70.8 7.7 2.2 3.2 3.0 2.3 1.5
2003a 69.7 8.5 2.1 3.5 2.9 2.3 1.6
a  Figures for 2003 are preliminary
Source: Adapted from data reported by the GSO, various years
over production in still exerted by the State, 
particularly with regard to rice production 
(World Bank in Vietnam 1998). Production 
targets are set at the local level in response to 
government directives and individual house-
holds may have to grow crops as directed. 
Some 4 million ha of land in Vietnam is 
still ‘required’ to grow rice, although this 
represents a decrease of 0.2 million ha on land 
previously set aside for rice production.
Policies and factors 
affecting flexible land use
Three conditions need to be met to 
encourage land use flexibility:
1.  Farmers themselves must be aware 
of possible and effective land use 
alternatives and be able to change their 
production activities accordingly. Farmer 
decision-making plays a key role in land 
use change. For flexible land use to occur, 
farmers need to respond to changing 
factors affecting the production process as 
well as production results. They also need 
a sufficient level of knowledge to apply 
the technology and management methods 
associated with the new land use. 
Additionally, community and government 
support in providing accurate market 
information and creating favourable 
conditions for business management in 
the farm household economy is necessary.
2.  Farmers must have rights to change 
land use within the land use planning 
guidelines provided by the government. 
Under the 1993 Land Law, farmers 
have both rights and responsibilities 
in using land, as stated in the policies 
associated with land use rights. For 
example, planning of production 
activities depends on land classification; 
land size; the term of land use; and the 
degree to which land use, as stated on the 
land-use-rights certificate, is allowed to 
be changed. Land-related changes such 
as changing the land use purpose stated 
in the certificate or reshaping land plots 
are officially required to be registered 
with the local authorities. Registration 
can only be made after the changes are 
‘permitted by the People’s Committee 
of the competent level and effected in 
accordance with current regulations’ 
(Government of Vietnam 1998, p 87).
3.  Farmers must have the necessary 
conditions to realise their desire to change 
land use. This is affected by government 
policy, and also by the financial resources, 
technical skill and knowledge situation of 
the farm household.
A number of land use polices have a consid-
erable effect on land use flexibility, including 
those related to the:
term of agricultural land use. Land use 
rights have, since 1993, been granted for 
20 years for land used for annual crops 
and 50 years for land used for perennial 
crops. Annual and perennial crop land 
classifications are determined by the 
government and stated on the land-use-
rights certificate.
amount of land that can be held by the 
farm household. The Land Law has put 
a ceiling on the amount of land that can 
be allocated to individual households: 
for annually cropped land this is 2 ha in 


the central and northern provinces and 
3 ha in the southern provinces, and for 
land planted to perennials the limit on 
holdings is 10 ha. Land limits are not 
rigidly enforced in all areas, especially 
when there is unused land, but limits 
hold in the heavily populated delta 
areas. Although, theoretically, land use 
rights in excess of the land limit cannot 
be transferred to households, provision 
is made for households to be able to 
work land in excess of the limit. Land 
transferred in excess of the limit must 
be leased from the State; however, lease 
money is not always charged, especially 
for land not considered highly productive 
(eg ‘barren hills’ in upland areas).
rights and responsibilities of the agricultural 
land user. As land is ‘owned by the people 
as a whole’ there are responsibilities 
associated with its use. Land use should 
be complete (day du), ie all land should 
be used; and reasonable (hop ly), ie the 
land should be farmed efficiently with 
appropriate crops and rotations and 
attention paid to maintaining the fertility 
of the land. In practice this is determined 
by restrictions on land use that are 
specified on the land-use-rights certificate.
tax on agricultural land. Many land-
related changes are required to be 
officially registered and incur a fee. 




High value farming system in Soc Trang province in the Mekong Delta: rice-shrimp paddy field 
with coconuts on the bank.
agricultural land price. Rental and land 
transfer values do not reflect true market 
prices, but rather are determined within 
a pricing framework set by the Central 
Government, with the actual prices fixed 
by the provincial or municipal authorities.
Other government policies which have an 
impact on land use include those related 
to: credit provision to rural households and 
rural industries, investment in rural areas 
and infrastructure, markets and prices, goods 
circulation and trade, education and training, 
and science and technology. Besides these 
policies, other factors also affecting land use 
flexibility are:
the land use design and planning system 
from central government implemented 
by local government at provincial and 
district levels
land use planning at the communal 
level such as the planning of irrigation 
systems, transportation networks and 
land allocation
the service provision system at the 
communal level such as input supplies, 
land preparation, crop protection and 






Agricultural land use in 
Vietnam
Typical land use patterns in 
Vietnam
In 2000 the natural land area of Vietnam was 
32.9 million ha, of which 9.3 million ha (28%) 
was used for agriculture and 11.6 million ha 
(35%) for forestry. The land use pattern in 
Vietnam can be described according to the 
arrangement of crops and animals on each 
type of land and crop rotations on each plot 
of land. The main land use patterns (on 
suitable land types) can be summarised as:
specialised rice – cropping patterns on a 
yearly basis include: 3 rice crops, 2 rice 
crops, 1 rice crop
rice + short-term crop (STC) – cropping 
patterns include: 2 rice crops + STC, 
rice crop + 2 STC, rice crop + 1 STC; 
short-term crops can include vegetables, 
soybean, peanuts etc
specialised non-rice crop – cropping 
patterns can encompass 3–4 crops/year 
or 1–2 crops/year and include vegetables, 
flowers and short-term medicine crops
perennial crop – crops include perennial 
industrial crops such as rubber and 
coffee, fruit trees and medicine trees











Land use patterns in the study 
sites
In order to examine agricultural land use, 
a survey was conducted over two years 
(2001 and 2002) in four provinces: Ha 
Tay, Yen Bai, Binh Duong and Can Tho. 
Because these provinces differ in land type 
and quality, the land use patterns could be 
expected to differ substantially. In northern 
Vietnam, Ha Tay is located in the Red River 
Delta and has little land and a high level of 
agricultural intensity, whereas Yen Bai is a 
mountainous province with comparatively 
more land and a low level of agricultural 
intensity. In southern Vietnam, Binh Duong 
is located close to Ho Chi Minh City and 
is characterised by a diversified production, 
whereas Can Tho is located in the heart of 
the major rice growing region of the Mekong 
Delta. Two districts were selected in each 
province and two communes were chosen in 
each of those districts, with 20–25 house-
holds being surveyed in each commune. 
More detail about the survey design and 
methodology is contained in Appendix I.
The average farm size varied across the 
communes, ranging from 3,268 m2 in Dai 
Dong commune (Ha Tay) to 35,266 m2 
in Lai Uyen commune (Binh Duong) and 
46,931 m2 in Dai Dong commune (Yen Bai) 
(Table 2). Plot numbers per household also 
varied, being generally much higher in the 
northern provinces compared to the southern 
provinces. Similarly, land types farmed by the 
households also varied, with more perennial 
land in the southern provinces Binh Duong 
and Can Tho, and a substantial percentage of 
forestry land (more than 60%) in Yen Bai.
The numbers of different land use patterns 
(or rotations) on different land types for the 
surveyed households in the eight northern 
communes are shown in Table 3. It can be 
seen that there are many different land use 
patterns, totalling 63 distinct land uses from 
this comparatively small sample of approxi-
mately 200 households. This indicates a 
diverse agriculture, although it is evident that 
there is greater land use diversity in Ha Tay 
province than in Yen Bai.
Economic results from different 
land use patterns
As discussed above, land use patterns among 
the households are diverse. Production 
results and economic returns vary according 
to the type of land because of the different 
production activities that are possible on 
differing land types. Even on the same land 
type, economic returns from land use varies 
considerably due to different cropping 
patterns, technology adoption, input use 
level and marketing.
Survey sites in the north: Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai provinces
The returns and costs associated with some 
of the main cropping rotations on cultivated 
land in the survey households are shown 
in Table 4, and returns and costs for some 
of the main crops grown in Table 5. Costs 
are cash costs and do not include the cost 
of family labour or any depreciation costs. 
These data are based on prices paid and 
received by individual farmers, and are 
average figures over the period 2000–01.0
Table 2.  Average farm size, plot numbers and percentage of perennial land in the surveyed 
households in 2000
Province Ha Tay









Average farm size (m2) 3,268 9,412 5,310 3,910
Number of plots  8 7 5 5
% perennial land 0 26 42 0
Province Yen Bai









Average farm size (m2) 46,931 11,661 22,921 18,760
Number of plots 9 7 8 7
% perennial land 1 10 8 11
Province Binh Duong









Average farm size (m2) 4,267 10,538 35,266 12,729
Number of plots 2.3 2.7 2.5 2.3
% perennial land 35 68 93 58
Province Can Tho









Average farm size (m2) 15,943 16,725 9,082 12,605
Number of plots 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.0
% perennial land 34 3 85 431
The results from the survey of households in 
these provinces indicate that:
Gross and net returns from land use in 
Ha Tay were higher than those in Yen 
Bai. It is likely that this is due to:
more fertile land in Ha Tay
a higher level of intensive farming 
(input investment and technology 
adoption)
a higher educational level of labour 
in Ha Tay (according to Human 
Development Indicators, Ha Tay 
ranked 25 while Yen Bai ranked 43 in 
the total of 51 rural provinces)







On annual crop land, rotation combin-
ations between rice and other crops bring 
higher returns compared to rice alone.
On annual crop land, higher returns 
are obtained from land growing two or 
three crops, indicating that improving the 
irrigation system and enabling cropping 
intensity to increase to either two or 
three crops will result in higher returns.
For other land, cropping patterns which 
include flowers, vegetables, baby corn or 
papaya with other short-term crops obtain 
high returns. For example, net returns 
from baby corn were VND29.1 million/
ha, papaya with beans VND33.5 million/




Table 3.  Number of different land use patterns amongst surveyed households in the 
northern communes

















Annual landa 7 7 16 17 8 7 10 8
  rice land 2 2 1 – 1 1 2 3
  rice land + other  5 5 9 9 5 5 3 4
  other crop land – – 6 8 2 1 5 1
Perennial land 4 3 6 – 6 – 3 –
Mixed garden 4 5 – 3 – – – –
Pond 4 – 1 2 – – – –
Total 19 15 23 22 14 7 13 8 63
a  Cropping patterns on annual land are broken down into those on rice land, rice + other crop 
land, and other crop land.2
Table 4.  Gross returns, costs and net returns from main cropping patterns in Ha Tay and Yen 
Bai (average per hectare of land in 2000–01)

















Gross returns/ha (mill VND)
Rice–rice–maize 28.76 28.33 28.48 29.42 18.76 23.83 25.92 22.52
Rice–rice–soybean 25.83 25.23 33.03 34.83 21.08 – – 22.08
Rice–rice–sweet potato  23.01 21.01 37.22 22.14 – 23.67 25.67 25.77
Rice–rice–potato 37.21 – 64.37 – – – 33.84 31.94
Rice–rice 17.43 17.54 19.47 – 14.62 17.36 16.48 18.44
Maize–maize 12.62 – 11.64 12.35  9.82 11.17 13.14 12.03
Total cost/ha (mill VND)
Rice–rice–maize 11.00  7.12  9.03 12.24  8.35  8.61  7.28 11.55
Rice–rice–soybean 10.07  6.67  8.65 14.24  8.25 – –  8.66
Rice–rice–sweet potato   6.48  5.95  7.28  6.33 –  6.33  6.17  7.74
Rice–rice–potato 15.18 – 17.24 – – – 14.78 13.68
Rice–rice  6.39  5.90  7.80 –  6.46  5.50  7.42  8.42
Maize–maize  8.11 –  7.80  7.92  3.45  4.15  4.43  4.51
Net returns/ha (mill VND)
Rice–rice–maize 17.75 21.21 19.18 17.18 10.40 15.21 18.64 10.95
Rice–rice–soybean 15.75 18.56 24.38 20.58 12.82 – – 13.41
Rice–rice–sweet potato  16.52 15.04 29.93 15.81 – 17.34 19.50 18.02
Rice–rice–potato 22.03 – 47.49 – – – 19.05 18.24
Rice–rice 11.03 11.64 10.80 –  8.16 11.86  9.06 10.01
Maize–maize  4.51 –  3.8 4.43  6.37  7.02  8.71  7.51
Table 5.  Gross returns, costs and net returns from main crops in Ha Tay and Yen Bai (average 
per hectare of land in 2000–01)

















Gross returns/ha (mill VND)
Rice  9.6  8.6 10.5 13.7  7.3  8.7 12.7  9.0
Soybean  6.2 23.0  8.9  8.3  2.6 – –  2.5
Sweet potato  3.8  2.2  2.3  1.1 –  1.0  1.2  1.0
Potato 17.4 – 46.2 – – – 18.2 19.0
Maize  9.6  6.1  6.0  9.2  4.9  6.3  6.9  4.9
Total cost/ha (mill VND)
Rice  3.6  2.8  3.7  6.3  3.2  2.9  3.7  4.1
Soybean  3.0  6.5  2.0  2.6  1.5 – –  1.5
Sweet potato  2.1  1.1  1.5  0.9 –  0.6  1.0  0.9
Potato  6.4  –  2.4 – – –  5.5  5.7
Maize  3.7  1.7  2.4  3.9  1.7  2.3  2.0  2.3
Net returns/ha (mill VND)
Rice  6.0  5.8  6.7  7.4  4.1  5.8  9.0  4.9
Soybean  3.2 16.5  6.9  5.7  1.1 – –  1.0
Sweet potato  1.6  1.0  0.8  0.2 –  0.4  0.2  0.1
Potato 11.0 – 37.1 – – – 12.7 13.3
Maize  5.8  4.4  3.6  5.3  3.2  4.1  4.9  2.6
On rice–cereal crop land, higher returns 
are obtained from cropping patterns 
which include ‘food-stuff’ (compared to 
‘food’) crops such as potato, cabbage, 
tomato, squash, cucumber, beans 
and peas. Cropping patterns with 
only food crops (rice, maize, cassava 
and sweet potato) give lower returns 
while rotations of rice and other 
vegetables usually obtain an income of 
VND23.3–23.5 million/ha.
Monoculture rice land returns a very low 
income. However, rotations using rice 
and livestock fodder crops or rice and 
fish result in higher incomes.
Returns and costs for perennial tree crops 
and aquaculture activities are shown in 
Tables 6 and 7 respectively. As for annual 
crops, these figures are based on prices paid 
and received by farmers, do not include the 
cost of family labour, and are averages for 
the communes over the period 2000–01. 
On all four main types of agricultural land, 
surveyed farmers had no land specifically 
reserved for raising livestock (pasture). 
Generally, gross and net returns from aqua-
culture production were higher than from 
cultivated land. Perennial trees also brought 
higher returns, especially in Song Phuong.
On perennial land, returns from different 
cropping patterns vary by region. In Song 
Phuong the income obtained is higher 
than that in Dai Dong (Thach That). One 
reason could be that the production cycle 
of perennial crops is longer than that of 
annual crops, and the level of production 
depends on the age of the trees. Perennial 
trees in different regions could have been at 
different production levels. Another reason 
is that because the technical requirements 


of perennial crops are higher than for other 
crops, the household head’s knowledge and 
the capacity of members of the household for 
technological adoption are very important. 
Of all perennial crops grown, mango and 
pomelo (grapefruit) showed higher returns. 
Perennial crops showed higher returns than 
mixed gardens, in which there tends to be low 
investment because they are characteristic of 
subsistence production.
Survey sites in the south: Binh Duong 
and Can Tho provinces
Returns from some of the main cropping 
rotations and perennial crops in communes 
in Can Tho and Binh Duong are shown in 
Tables 8 and 9. These figures show that, in 
general, higher returns are generated from 
perennial than from annual crops. In annual 
crops, cropping patterns with flowers obtain 
the highest returns, followed by rotations 
using two rice crops. There is little difference 
between the returns from growing two or 
three rice crops. For perennial land, the 
highest returns were obtained from orna-
mental plants, fruit trees and pepper. Rubber 
and cashew bring low returns.
Assessment on returns to 
investment in production
To evaluate the efficiency of input use, which 
is one aspect of flexible land use, the levels 
of investment for three land use patterns 
on annual crop land were considered. The 
results are presented in Table 10. Investment 
levels of ’high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’ and ‘very low’ 
correspond to relative absolute levels of 
investment made by the farm households 
(ie not quartiles). There is a clear return 
from high-input investment on specialised 
Table 6.  Gross returns, costs and net returns of some main perennial tree crops in Ha Tay 
and Yen Bai (average per hectare of land in 2000–01)
Ha Taya Yen Baia
Thach Hoa Song Phuong Dai Dong Bao Ai Mau Dong
Gross returns/ha (mill VND)
  Pomelo – 89.8 – – –
  Longan – 54.0 – – –
  Lychee 16.9 47.5 – – 21.0
  Mango – 62.5 – – –
  Apricot – – – – 40.0
  Tea 26.3 –  6.1 13.3  5.9
  Coffee – – – – 11.1
  Cinnamon – – – – 26.3
Total costs/ha (mill VND)
  Pomelo – 60.1 – – –
  Longan – 35.8 – – –
  Lychee  6.1 27.0 – – 14.7
  Mango – 58.8 – – –
  Apricot – – – –  7.8
  Tea 15.4 –  3.2   4.1  1.9
  Coffee – – – –  5.6
  Cinnamon – – – –  7.3
Net returns/ha (mill VND)
  Pomelo – 29.7 – – –
  Longan – 18.2 – – –
  Litchi 10.8 20.5 – –  6.3
  Mango –  3.7 – – –
  Apricot – – – – 32.2
  Tea 10.9 –  2.8  9.2  4.0
  Coffee – – – –  5.5
  Cinnamon – – – – 19.0
a  There were no data for perennial tree crops in Dai Dong and Tho Xuan communes (Ha Tay) and 
Dong Cuong commune (Yen Bai)
non-food crops, with income/ha double that 
from very low to medium input levels. The 
ratio of gross output to costs falls from 8.0 
at very low levels of investment to 2.1 at high 
levels of investment, which is consistent with 
the expectation of lower marginal returns at 
higher levels of input.
The returns to investment are not so clear for 
the other two cropping patterns considered. 
In the case of a rotation with two rice crops 
and one specialised crop, income/ha is highest 
at medium levels of investment, although 
there is little difference in income/ha at all 
investment levels. The ratio of gross output to 
costs again shows a falling trend, from 2.9 at 
very low to 2.0 at high levels of investment. In 
the case of a rotation with two rice crops only, 
the highest income/ha is at low levels of input, 
suggesting over-investment in this particular 
rotation at high levels of input. As with the 
other rotations, the ratio of gross output to 
costs shows a falling trend, from 3.4 at very 
low to 1.4 at high levels of investment.
Flower production in Ha Tay: a 
case study of high input / high 
return land use
Tho Xuan is a commune in Dan Phuong 
district, Ha Tay province, 25 km from 
Hanoi City. Following the implementation 
of policies allowing farmers to make choices 
about which crops to grow, many farmers in 
this commune changed from rice to flowers 
to take advantage of the increasing market 
in Hanoi for cut flowers. Floricultural 
products appear to have helped farmers 
in Tho Xuan commune to increase their 
incomes and improve their living standards 
remarkably.
Secondary data on crop production in 
Tho Xuan commune were gathered from 
commune annual reports and statistical 
data. Primary data on production and 
marketing of annual crops, especially 
flowers, were obtained through interviews 
with 40 representative flower-farm 
households in Tho Xuan commune. 
Those households were categorised into 
three groups: group 1 with 13 households 
growing flowers on more than 50% of their 
total cultivated area; group 2 with another 
Table 7.  Gross returns, costs and net returns from aquaculture in million VND (average per 
hectare of water surface in 2000–01)















Gross returns/ha 26.9 25.7 46.3 36.8 36.1 11.8 28.7 45.8
Total costs/ha 13.3  9.7 10.9  7.9  9.3  3.8  8.6 21.9
Net returns/ha 13.6 15.9 35.5 28.9 26.9  8.1 20.1 23.8
Table 8.  Gross returns, costs and net returns for main cropping patterns in Binh Duong and 
Can Tho (average per hectare of cultivated land in 2001)

















Gross returns/ha (mill VND)
2 rice crops 23.6 14.0  –  6.2 14.0 14.2 –  8.4
3 rice crops 18.4 – – – 15.7 13.0 17.4 13.0
1 food crop – – 13.0  – – – – –
2 rice +1 food crop – – – – – 22.3 – –
Flower 66.6 13.4  – – – – – –
Vegetable  8.4 – – – – – – –
Total costs/ha (milli VND)
2 rice crops  9.3  3.1  –  5.6 11.7  6.5 –  8.6
3 rice crops  8.8 – – –  9.1  6.1  4.3  7.5
1 food crop – –  2.5 – – – – –
2 rice +1 food crop – – – – –  4.8 – –
Flower 20.2  2.7  – – – – – –
Vegetable  2.0 – – – – – – –
Net returns/ha (mill VND)
2 rice crops 14.3 10.9 –  0.6  2.2  7.7 –  –0.2
3 rice crops  9.6 – – –  6.6  6.9 13.0  5.5
1 food crop – – 10.5 – – – – –
2 rice +1 food crop – – – – – 17.6 – –
Flower 46.4 10.7  – – – – – –
Vegetable  6.4 – – – – – – –
13 households growing flowers on 20–50% 
of their total cultivated area; and group 3 
with 14 households growing flowers on 
less than 20% of their total cultivated area. 
Comparative analyses were made of produc-
tion from flowers and other annual crops to 
find out the differences between the three 
groups and to investigate the economic 
returns from flower production.
Table 9.  Gross returns, costs and net returns for main perennial crops in Can Tho and Binh 
Duong (average per hectare of perennial land in 2001)

















Gross returns/ha (mill VND)
Fruit trees 136.0 16.7 23.0 21.7 16.6 3.7 25.2 8.0
Ornamental plants  50.0 – – – – – – –
Rubber – –  6.5 10.4 – – – –
Pepper – – 36.4 35.2 – – – –
Cashew – – –  3.2 – – – –
Total costs/ha (mill VND)
Fruit trees  9.0  4.2  6.3  0.9  2.6 0.5  4.9 3.0
Ornamental plants  0.8 – – – – – – –
Rubber – –  1.4  2.4 – – – –
Pepper – – 10.1  7.5 – – – –
Cashew – – –  0.7 – – – –
Net returns/ha (mill VND)
Fruit trees 127.0 12.4 16.7 20.9 14.0 3.2 20.4 5.0
Ornamental plants  49.3 – – – – – – –
Rubber – –  5.1  7.9 – – – –
Pepper – – 26.3 27.7 – – – –
Cashew – – –  2.5 – – – –
Overview of the flower industry in Tho 
Xuan commune
Flower growing has been carried out in Tho 
Xuan for nearly 10 years. Initially there were 
about ten households involved in flower 
growing, but now hundreds of households 
grow flowers, most having changed from rice 
growing into flower production. Initially, 
roses were the most popular flower grown 
in Tho Xuan but when roses were grown in 
neighbouring communes in large quantities, 
Tho Xuan farmers changed to growing 
tuberose and chrysanthemum. Because 
these flowers are grown in open fields, they 
are not protected against rain, storm, flood 
and diseases, and this influences flower 
quality significantly.
The crop structure in Tho Xuan commune 
has changed during recent years (Table 
11). The percentage area devoted to food 
crops has decreased while the area growing 
flowers has increased rapidly, with an average 
annual growth rate of 46%. However, the 
area growing flowers is still relatively small, 
occupying only 0.98% of the total cultivated 
area in the year 2001.
Costs and returns from the production 
of flowers and other crops
The total revenue and income generated from 
flower growing patterns were very high in 
comparison to those from other cropping 
patterns (Table 12). The total income from 
chrysanthemums was VND3.06 million/sao 
(a common land area measurement in north 
Vietnam equal to 360 m2) and from tuberose 
VND3.04 million/sao, while equivalent 
figures for rotations of two rice, two rice + 
soybean, two rice + maize and two maize + 
jute rotations were just VND0.37, 0.62, 0.58 
and 0.66 million /sao respectively. The ratio of 
total income to total cost for tuberose was the 
highest, at 6.4, while the equivalent figure for 
chrysanthemum was just 1.4. This is because 
growing chrysanthemum required a very high 
investment cost, around four times higher 
than tuberose and five times higher than non-
flower patterns. Flower growing also returned 
a higher income (around VND40,000) 
per family working day, approximately two 
times higher than that for other cropping 
Table 10.  Economic result by level of investment in 2001 (calculated for all survey sites)




cost per ha 
(mill. VND)
Gross output 










High 28.9 62.0 33.1 2.1
Medium 10.2 26.5 16.2 2.6
Low  5.5 18.9 13.4 3.4
Very low  1.9 15.2 13.3 8.0
2 rice crops + 1 
specialised crop
High 18.2 36.5 18.3 2.0
Medium 13.8 33.1 19.2 2.4
Low 11.3 28.3 17.0 2.5
Very low  8.4 24.6 16.3 2.9
2 rice crops High 14.3 20.6  6.3 1.4
Medium 10.1 20.1 10.0 2.0
Low  6.2 19.5 13.4 3.1
Very low  4.9 16.6 11.7 3.40
patterns. These results help to confirm that 
the economic efficiency of flower production 
was much greater than that of other cropping 
patterns in the farm households.
However, family labour use is not included in 
the costs of production for the different crops 
shown in Table 12, and flower production 
requires more labour than other crops. While 
farmers usually spent only 20–30 workdays/
sao/year for non-flower production, they 
were required to spend 70–80 workdays/
sao/year for flower production. Flower 
production is therefore useful in creating 
job opportunities for farmers, but the high 
labour requirement could pose problems for 
households lacking sufficient family labour. 
Also, as wages rise the relative profitability of 
flower production can be expected to fall.
The farm households in group 1 generated 
the highest turnover, VND30.1 million, in 
2002 from selling their crop products. Of 
this, the turnover from flowers accounted for 
97% although they devoted just 70% of their 
land area to flower growing (Table 13). The 
turnover of farm households from group 2 
was VND19.3 million, with the contribution 
from flowers being 89% from only 41% 
of their land area. Farm households in 
group 3 obtained the smallest turnover, just 
VND7.8 million, of which flower production 
contributed 49% though flowers occupied 
only 9% of their total land area. Other crops 
such as soybean and jute made a relatively 
small contribution to total sale turnover. 
Only in group 3 did crops other than flowers 
(mainly rice) contribute more than 50% of 
total turnover for the household.
Despite there being little difference in flower 
productivity levels between the three groups, 
the total flower production volumes were 
very different because farm households 
in the different groups planted flowers on 
a different percentage of their land area. 
However, it was found that the cash income 
Table 11.  Flower and other annual crop areas in Tho Xuan commune















Flowers 3.0 0.5 5.5 0.8 6.4 1.0 46.1
Food crop 501.7 77.1 501.7 76.9 501.1 76.7 – 0.1
Cash crops 131.5 20.2 135.3 20.7 138.8 21.2 2.7
  soybeana 81.5 62.0 87.2 64.5 93.8 67.6 7.3
Other crops 14.3 2.2 10.1 1.6 7.3 1.1 –29.7
Total area 0. 100.0 2. 100.0 . 100.0 0.2
a  Soybean is a major cash crop in this commune
Source: Statistical unit of Tho Xuan commune in 20021
generated by flower production accounted 
for a significant percentage (50–99%) of 
total crop cash income for all farm groups. 
Flower production also played a role in 
creating job opportunities for family labour 
as it required more workdays than other 
crops. Despite the higher investment cost, 
flower production, especially tuberose, gener-
ated higher returns in comparison with other 
crops. Flower production also generated 
much greater income per unit of land area, 
and income per family workday. Thus, flower 
production has been more profitable than 
other crops for these farm households and 
illustrates the advantages for households of 
being able to switch land use to a high return 
crop such as flowers.
Land use change and 
land use flexibility issues
Perceptions regarding the 
degree of land use flexibility
As part of the household survey, household 
heads were asked for their opinions about the 
degree of land use flexibility they had on their 
farm, their perceptions about restrictions 
that prevented land use change, and what 
land use changes they had made over the 
last 5 years. Few households reported major 
restrictions on their farming activities because 
of restrictions on land use (see Table 14). 
Generally, around 10% of households said 
they were only restricted on some of their 
land, except in Can Tho where the percentage 
Table 12.  Economic returns from flowers and other cropping patterns in the farm households 
(average for all households)
Group  Flower Other cropping patterns
Tuberose Chrysan-
themum






Total revenue/sao (‘000 VND) 3545.1 5161.9 800.8 1171.0 1145.2 995.4
Total cost /sao (‘000 VND) 479.9 2116.9 421.4 544.6 560.6 335.0
Total income/sao (‘000 VND) 3065.3 3045.0 379.4 626.4 584.6 660.4
Total income : total cost  6.4 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.0 2.0
Income/workday (‘000 VND) 38.7 43.5 19.0 21.8 19.9 19.6
Notes:
1.  Total cost includes total production costs (material costs, service costs and other costs such as 
taxes, depreciation) but does not include the cost of family labour
2.  Total income = total revenue – total cost
Source: Survey data, 20022
was lower. Over 75% of households in 12 out 
of 16 communes said that they didn’t face any 
restrictions on their farming activities.
Households were asked for reasons why they 
had restrictions on land use. The reasons 
given varied from restrictions because of land 
type (eg ‘can only grow rice on marshy land’) 
and land zoning (eg ‘not allowed to grow 
tea-plants on forest land’, ‘can’t choose crops 
other than rice’); to restrictions imposed by 
the commune or cooperative (eg ‘to fit with 
the irrigation timetable of the cooperative and 
adjoining plots’, ‘the cooperative doesn’t allow 
growing fruit trees on paddy land’); or simply 
restrictions because of lack of funds. More 
households in Ha Tay province reported 
restrictions because of the organisation of 
agriculture (eg irrigation schedules, commune 
plans), whereas more households in Yen Bai 
and Binh Duong provinces reported restric-
tions because of land type or land zoning.
Generally speaking, these results support the 
idea that most households do not feel unduly 
restricted in their choice of cropping activi-
ties. This is supported by data on land use 
changes made by households during the past 
5 years, which is discussed in the next section, 
and also by data presented in the section on 
the role of extension. ‘Not being permitted to 
change’ is not identified by farmers as a major 
reason constraining change (Table 18). Lack 
of knowledge and lack of funds are identi-
fied by farmers as being more important 
constraints to change.
Changes in land use
Many households reported making changes 
to cropping and livestock activities in the 
last 5 years. As shown in Table 15, those in 
Ha Tay province reported the most changes 
(65% of households made changes), while 
those in Yen Bai province reported the least 
changes (37%). Over 40% of households in 
12 out of 16 communes reported changes 
to crop and livestock produced in the 
last 5 years.
The changes reported by households are 
shown in Table 16, with many households 
reporting more than one change. There 
are some distinct differences, as might be 
expected, between provinces. One striking 
aspect of the data is the diversity of changes 
that have been made, particularly in Ha 
Tay. As stated in the previous section, this 
suggests that households are relatively 
free to change land use activities in these 
communes at least, and are doing so. This 
is as would be expected in an agricultural 
economy where households, either at an 
individual or commune level, are free to 
respond to a variety of market signals.
In all provinces farmers reported increasing 
the area planted to perennial crops and, in the 
two southern provinces in particular, changing 
the types of perennial crops grown. In Can 
Tho this has generally been replacing citrus 
with other fruit trees such as banana, mango, 
durian and longan; and in Lai Uyen district 
(Bing Duong) cashew has been replaced with 
either rubber or pepper. In all provinces except 
Yen Bai, many farmers state that they have 
replaced rice with either perennials or alterna-
tive annual crops. In Tho Xuan commune 
(Ha Tay) many farmers report replacing 
rice with flowers and vegetables. In the two 
northern provinces many households report 
an increase in animal enterprises, and others 
an increase in aquaculture.
Table 13.  Returns from sale of household farm produce by farmer group





















Flowers  2. .2 1.2 . . . 1. .
Tuberose 12.7 43.2 5.5 32.0 1.8 47.4 6.5 39.7
Chrysanthemum 16.6 56.8 11.7 68.0 2.0 52.6 9.9 60.3
Other crops 0. 2. 2.0 10. .0 1. 2. 12.
Rice 0.0 0.0 0.8 39.8 2.5 62.7 1.1 49.0
Soybean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maize 0.3 35.8 0.6 27.3 0.5 13.4 0.5 20.0
Jute 0.5 64.2 0.7 32.9 1.0 23.8 0.7 31.1
Total 30.1 100.0 19.3 100.0 7.8 100.0 18.8 100.0
Source: Farm survey data, 2002
Table 14.  Percentage of surveyed households by province reporting restrictions on the crops 
or livestock they can grow or produce








Ha Tay (n = 99) 1 12 83 4
Yen Bai (n = 92) 0 11 75 14
Binh Duong (n = 88) 3 10 78 8
Can Tho (n = 90) 1 3 73 22
Source: Household survey data – ACIAR project ADP 1/97/92
Table 15.  Percentage of households by province reporting changes to cropping and livestock 
activities in the past 5 years
Province Percentage of households (%)
Have made 
changes
Have not made 
changes
Unsure No answer
Ha Tay (n = 99) 65 25 7 3
Yen Bai (n = 92) 37 50 1 12
Binh Duong (n = 88) 48 48 1 3
Can Tho (n = 90) 52 39 2 7
Source: Household survey data – ACIAR project ADP 1/97/92
Changing land use in upland areas: extension workers inspect young eucalypt seedlings 
planted amongst low value cassava in Phu Tho province.
Table 16.  Changes in farming activities reported by surveyed households










Change rice varieties 3 1 0 0
Change other annual crop varieties 3 0 0 0
Changes to annual crops grown
Grow different annual crops 16 0 2 0
Reduce rice area 2 0 3 0
Reduce other annual crops area 1 2 0 0
Increase rice area 1 1 0 2
Increase other annual crops area 4 5 1 1
Change from rice to flowers, vegetables 8 2 0 0
Change from annual to perennial crops
Change from rice to perennial crops 6 0 0 7
Change from annual to perennial crops 3 1 11 0
Changes to perennial crops grown
Increase area of perennial crops 13 7 4 4
Change type of perennial crops 1 5 14 29
Reduce area of perennial crop 1 1 1 2
Reduce forest area 1 0 1 0
Change to animal/aquaculture enterprises
Reduce animal enterprises 1 0 6 1
Increase animal enterprises 11 7 2 0
Change to animal enterprise (same animal) 2 1 0 1
Change animal enterprises (different animal) 0 1 2 0
Trading (animals) 1 0 0 0
Increase aquaculture  11 3 1 1
Other changes 2 3 2 0
a  Not all households reported the nature of the change and many reported more than one
Source: Household survey data – ACIAR project ADP 1/97/92
The incidence of change in varieties grown 
is underestimated. Most households did 
not recognise varietal change as a change in 
farming activities. In another survey question 
households were asked about which new 
technologies they had introduced in the last 
5 years, and many indicated they had made 
changes to varieties grown, particularly so 
in the two northern provinces Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai. There is also some overlap between 
categories in these data, as a result of farmers’ 
replies. For example, an increase in perennial 
crop area may also mean a reduction in rice 
area, but this is sometimes not stated and so 
has only been categorised as an increase in 
perennial crop area.
The role of extension services
When farming activities and markets are 
changing, as is the current situation in 
Vietnam as the rural economy is opened to 
global markets, the need for knowledge and 
information becomes critical. Ruttan (1998) 
notes that when traditional agricultural prac-
tices are followed, education is less important 
for farmers because they rely on traditional 
skills. However, when practices and concepts 
change, lack of education affects the capacity 
of people to grasp new ideas and change 
their traditional practices. The generally low 
basic education level of Vietnam’s farmers, 
combined with the changing circumstances 
faced by them, provides a challenge for 
extension services to provide appropriate 
knowledge and information to enable farmers 
to adapt to new situations and opportunities.
The household survey asked farmers if they 
wanted to change their farming activities and, 
if so, what was preventing them from doing 
so. The percentage of respondents who indi-
cated they would like to change their farming 
activities is shown in Table 17. The majority 
of households in all provinces said that they 
did not want to change their farming activi-
ties. In fact, this was the case for all communes 
except Song Phuong (Ha Tay) and Mau 
Dong (Yen Bai). Reluctance to change is 
understandable as changing activities is risky, 
especially when knowledge levels are low. 
Numerous studies have shown that farmers’ 
Table 17.  Percentage of households by province saying they would like to change their 
farming activities
Province Percentage of households (%)
Would like to 
change
Maybe would like 
to change 
Don’t want to 
change
No answer
Ha Tay (n = 99) 31 7 56 6
Yen Bai (n = 92) 32 5 52 11
Binh Duong (n = 88) 26 11 59 3
Can Tho (n = 90) 28 6 61 6
Source: Household survey data – ACIAR project ADP 1/97/92
adoption of new activities and technologies is 
dependent on obtaining sufficient knowledge 
about the activity or technology to minimise 
the perceived risk of change (eg Feder & Slade 
1984; Lindner 1987; Marra et al 2003).
Over 25% of households in all provinces 
indicated that they do wish to change their 
farming activities, and the reasons for not 
being able to do so are shown in Table 18. 
Households in all provinces consistently 
nominated ‘not sure what to do’ as a reason. 
Additionally, a considerable number of 
households said they lack the skills to change, 
or were reluctant to do so because of the 
risks involved. Lack of funds was also clearly 
identified as a significant constraint to change, 
whereas being not permitted to change only 
seemed to be of concern in Ha Tay province.
Conclusions
In order to adapt to the global market 
economy, agriculture in general and agricul-
tural land use in particular needs to be flexible. 
Flexibility of land use creates conditions that 
encourage agricultural diversification, use 
resources more efficiently and reduce risk to 
farmers. The implications from data reported 
in this chapter are that Vietnamese farmers do 
have a fair degree of land use flexibility and are 
responding to this by introducing a number 
of land use changes. Economic returns from 
different land uses vary considerably and this 
could be expected to be a driving force for 
land use changes, with caveats that need to 
Table 18.  Reasons given by surveyed households for not being able to change their farming 
activities despite wishing to do so









Not permitted to change 26 0 6 10
Other households don’t want to change 5 3 0 0
Not sure what to do 24 41 64 50
Lack skills to change 16 24 9 27
Lack sufficient funds to change 29 18 36 50
Risk in changing is too high 21 9 12 17
Not sure about markets 3 3 0 3
Not enough labour 0 3 0 3
Other reasons 8 12 15 17
a  Households could nominate more than one reason
Source: Household survey data – ACIAR project ADP 1/97/92
account for the ability of farmers to change 
(adequate knowledge and capital) and the 
risk in doing so. Many farmers indicated that 
capital and knowledge constraints prevented 
them from changing land use.
The provision of services and proximity to 
markets obviously affect land use flexibility. 
In regions with well-developed service 
activities and market proximity, such as Ha 
Tay province and some areas of Binh Duong 
province, farmers have many options for 
profitable land use (eg ornamental plants, 
flowers) compared to more remote areas with 
a less developed service sector such as Yen 
Bai province. These land use changes have 
the potential to be very profitable for farmers 
in these regions.
Land use planning is currently unspecific 
and inappropriate in many regions, especially 
at the communal level. This can cause poorly 
planned agricultural land use, hindering the 
planning of cropping patterns and affecting 
returns from production. In addition, land 
use planning is inaccurate and rigid in some 
regions and this too hinders the flexibility of 
agricultural land use.
The role of information and extension in 
promoting land use change is important. 
Many farmers say they do not want to 
change their production activities, and many 
who would like to change are unsure of what 
they could do, lack the necessary skills, or 
have concerns about the risks involved. There 
would seem to be a clear need for improved 
extension activities and market information 
to enable farmers to make informed choices 
about possible changes to production activi-
ties. This is essential if Vietnam’s farmers 
are to take advantage of opportunities and 
avoid production risks associated with the 
changing rural economy.
cHApter tHree
tHe economicS oF lAnd FrAgmentAtion 
in tHe nortH oF vietnAm 
PhaM Van hunG, T. Gordon Macaulay and Sally P. MarSh
Land fragmentation, in which a single farm household operates more than one 
separate piece of land, is a significant issue in Vietnamese agriculture, especially in 
the north of Vietnam, as it is in many other developing countries. In Vietnam there 
are about 75 million plots of land, consisting of an average of seven to eight plots 
per farm household. Such fragmentation can be seen to have negative and positive 
benefits for farm households and the community generally. Analyses of survey data 
on household farm size, structure and production have led to the conclusion that 
small-sized farms are likely to be more fragmented, and that the number of plots held 
is a significant determinant of the equivalent rice yield of a household and a factor in 
crop diversification. Policies which allow the appropriate opportunity cost of labour 
to be reflected at the farm level may provide appropriate incentives to trigger farm 
size change and land consolidation. Policies which tip the benefits in favour of fewer 
and larger plots, eg strong and effective research and development, an active extension 
system and strong administrative management, may also lead to land consolidation.0
Introduction
Land fragmentation, where a single farm has a 
number of parcels of land, is one of the impor-
tant features of agriculture in many countries, 
especially in developing countries. In Vietnam 
land fragmentation is common, especially 
in the north. For the whole country there 
are about 75 million parcels of land, with an 
average of seven to eight plots per farm house-
hold (Lan 2001; Marsh & MacAulay 2002). 
Because land fragmentation is considered 
an impediment to efficient crop production, 
many countries have implemented policies 
encouraging land consolidation. Such policies 
are in place in Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda 
(Blarel et al 1992), Albania and Bulgaria 
(Sabates-Wheeler 2002), and are now being 
considered in Vietnam. In the larger context, 
if land fragmentation means that more labour 
and other resources are used than is necessary 
and that these resources can be used more 
effectively elsewhere in the economy, then 
there is likely to be an overall economic gain 
from reduced fragmentation. However, even 
though land fragmentation may have negative 
impacts on farms and the overall economy, 
there are reasons why there may be benefits to 
farmers whereby they attempt to keep some 
degree of fragmentation.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the 
current situation of land fragmentation in 
the north of Vietnam and its effects on and 
relationship to crop productivity. An empirical 
model using data collected from farm house-
hold surveys is used to examine the relationship 
between productivity and land fragmentation 
and farm size. The role of land fragmentation 
in crop diversity is also considered.
The chapter commences with a discussion 
of Vietnamese agriculture and the issue of 
land fragmentation, followed by the causes, 
advantages and disadvantages of land 
fragmentation. Evidence from survey data of 
land fragmentation in the north of Vietnam 
and its relationship to crop productivity, 
farm size and other factors are presented. 
Empirical models are proposed which allow 
the examination of effects of land fragmenta-
tion on crop productivity and diversification. 
Conclusions and policy implications are 
drawn in the last section.
Background
Vietnam started on its path of overall 
economic reforms with the introduction of 
the doi moi (renovation) policy in 1986. The 
aim of doi moi was to shift the Vietnamese 
economy from a central planning model 
to one largely based on market principles. 
In the agricultural sector the government’s 
Resolution 10 of 1988 was a radical reform. 
The main aspects of this policy were to recog-
nise the farm household as an autonomous 
economic unit, free up markets for inputs and 
outputs as well as the means of production 
(except land), and provide longer terms for 
land use (Hung & Marata 2001; Marsh & 
MacAulay 2002; Pingali & Xuan 1992). The 
new land policy effectively resulted in the 
demise of collectivised agriculture. Under the 
policy farmers were allocated land for 15 years 
and assigned ‘contract levels’ for inputs used, 
outputs and labour, which were to be stable 
for 5 years. Moreover, most of the means of 
production (machines, buffaloes and agricul-
tural instruments) were now recognised as 1
being privately owned. Since then, Vietnam’s 
agriculture has entered a new and relatively 
more stable development stage. However, 
the duration of land allocation was short and 
other land use rights were not supported by 
the legal system (Nakachi 2001). This meant 
that farmers did not have incentives for long-
term investment in their land.
The 1993 Land Law was enacted in response 
to these problems. Under the Land Law 
farmers were allocated land for long-term 
and stable use and they were granted five 
rights of land use – the rights of transfer, 
exchange, lease, inheritance and mortgage. 
The most important principle of the 
land allocation was to maintain equality. 
Commonly, many localities in the north allo-
cated a certain amount of land to each dinh 
suat (per capita equivalent). Other conditions 
that were taken into consideration during 
land allocation were social policies, land 
quality, the irrigation system, distance to 
plots and capacity for crop rotation. Annual 
crop land in Vietnam was divided into six 
categories. Therefore, in order to maintain 
the principle of equality, each household 
may have been allocated a number of plots 
with different categories, locations and land 
quality, often scattered over a wide area.
Concern about land fragmentation resulting 
from this ‘equitable’ allocation of agricultural 
land has emerged in recent years. There are 
different degrees of land fragmentation, 
with some regions and locations being more 
seriously fragmented than others. According 
to data from the Land Management Office, 
in 1998 farms in the Red River Delta (RRD) 
and the Northern mountainous and midlands 
Farmers transplant rice seedlings in Ha Tay province. Each individual small paddy will belong 
to a different household.2
regions had, on average, 7 and 10–20 plots, 
respectively (Lan 2001). Data from 42,167 
farm households in Hung Yen province in the 
RRD show that after the land allocation was 
made in 1993, on average a farm had 7.6 plots 
(Hung Yen People’s Committee 2002).
In 1998 the government issued a policy to 
promote the exchange of land plots so as to 
encourage larger plot areas. Since then, prov-
inces in the north, especially in the RRD, have 
established steering committees for conducting 
pilot studies on plot exchange. Throughout 
the whole country there are 700 communes 
in 20 provinces where plot exchanges were 
and are being implemented, but progress is 
still slow. In these areas land was effectively 
reallocated to farmers with the aim of reducing 
the number of plots. In Thanh Hoa province, 
for example, the number of plots decreased 
by 51% after 3 years of implementation of the 
policy (1998–2001). On average, the number 
of plots per farm household decreased from 
7.8 to 3.8 (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 2002).
In reports made to the central and local 
governments, the conclusion is that 
the policy of plot exchange should be 
implemented wherever farmers realise there 
is a problem caused by fragmentation and 
where land relations are in order. This means 
that plot exchange should not lead to new 
conflicts related to land allocation. The most 
important principle is that farmers should 
voluntarily exchange land such that the 
result is larger plot areas for each individual 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 2002). However, in many 
provinces the land reallocation process occurs 
without much input from farmers, who 
are only involved in the assessment of land 
quality in order to determine the exchange 
coefficients between different classes of land. 
Because land in Vietnam is still owned by the 
whole people or state, many farmers believe 
they do not have rights to be involved in 
either the reallocation process or discussion 
about land use planning in general.
Reasons for land 
fragmentation
In the literature researchers have classified 
causes of land fragmentation into two broad 
categories: supply-side and demand-side 
(Bentley 1987; Blarel et al 1992). The 
supply-side causes refer to an exogenous 
imposition on farmers of a pattern of land 
areas, while the demand-side causes reflect 
varying degrees of fragmentation chosen by 
farmers (Blarel et al 1992).
A supply-side explanation of land fragmenta-
tion puts the view that it may happen 
involuntarily as a result of historical and 
geographical issues, population pressure 
and patterns of inheritance (Bentley 1987). 
Historical issues may be more significant 
where land is scarce. In most developing 
countries in Africa and Asia where labour 
is cheap, crop production is mainly carried 
out by hand cultivation and animal traction. 
In such cases, particularly on small-scale 
and self-sufficient farms, fragmentation 
is a certain result. Fragmentation is also 
commonly a result of geographical conditions 
where the terrain is hilly and upland areas 
exist. Historical and geographical causes of 
land fragmentation are hard to overcome and 
it may take a long time to consolidate such 
land areas. Land fragmentation can also be 
explained by pressure of high population 
growth (Bentley 1987; Blarel et al 1992) 
in regions where farmers have less off-farm 
opportunities. Another cause of land frag-
mentation can be inheritance, where farmers 
want to give their children land of similar 
quality. The above mentioned explanations 
are observed in many developing countries, 
eg China (Nguyen et al 1996), Ghana and 
Rwanda (Blarel et al 1992).
In Vietnam land fragmentation has mainly 
been caused by the land allocation process 
(Research Institute of Agricultural Planning 
2004), but also by the failure of land markets 
to operate effectively because of government 
regulations on land transactions (Bentley 
1987; Blarel et al 1992). The market for the 
exchange of land use rights in Vietnam is still 
complicated and not well developed. Farmers 
who want to use their land as collateral 
for borrowing money from banks need 
permission and the seal of authority from 
the local government. Other transactions 
such as ‘selling’ or ‘buying’ of land use rights 
are completed only if they are recorded and 
certified by the local government. In many 
cases this is not done (Kerkvliet 2000).
Demand-side causes of land fragmentation 
arise when farmers consider that land frag-
mentation may have some benefits. In this 
case it is possible for the private benefits of 
land fragmentation to exceed its private costs 
(Blarel et al 1992), and farmers may choose 
to retain certain levels of fragmentation that 
they perceive are beneficial to them. By culti-
vating plots in different geographical areas, 
variation in output may be less because the 
risks caused by drought, flood and diseases 
are spread. Another reason farmers want to 
keep fragmented farms is that they may be 
able to use their seasonal labour more effec-
tively. Although labour is generally in surplus 
in Vietnam, especially in the RRD, in peak 
times (transplanting and harvesting periods) 
and during the winter crop growing period 
more labour is demanded. Therefore, farmers 
may reduce peak-time labour periods by 
diversifying crops in different plots.
Another potential benefit is that the land 
user can mortgage or sell a portion of their 
land use rights. They may also give land to 
their children as an inheritance more easily 
when the children want to live separately. It 
is also possible that the transaction costs for 
reducing fragmentation are sufficiently high 
for farmers to decide not to undertake the set 
of land transactions that would be needed 
to reduce the degree of fragmentation. 
These benefits of land fragmentation are 
summarised in Table 1.
Land fragmentation causes many negative 
effects including higher costs, increased 
negative externalities, loss of land due to 
boundaries and a greater potential for 
disputes between neighbouring farmers 
(Blarel et al 1992; Lan 2001; Research 
Institute of Agricultural Planning 2004). 
Production costs may also be higher due to 
higher costs for labour as it takes more time 
to travel from plot to plot and to operate an 
activity such as irrigation for many small units 
of land. A major source of higher production 
costs is higher transport costs for inputs 
and outputs. Other problems caused by 
fragmentation may be higher negative exter-
nalities, resulting from farmers cultivating 
different crops or varieties (Bentley 1987) 
and leading to greater potential for disputes 
between neighbours. Land fragmentation 
also causes land loss due to plot boundaries 
or bunds and access routes, which is directly 
related to the number of plots. In addition, 
it is hard to apply new technologies when 
farms are small and fragmented, as is the 
case in Vietnam. These disadvantages of land 
fragmentation are summarised in Table 1.
Despite these disadvantages of land fragmen-
tation, farmers in many provinces, especially 
in the north and north–central regions of 
Vietnam, still retain their many parcels of 
land. This indicates that farmers may not 
want to exchange small plots for larger ones 
and probably benefit from some degree of 
land fragmentation, by reducing risks from 
flood, drought and diseases, making more 
efficient use of seasonal labour and enabling 
crop diversification.
Land fragmentation in 
the north of Vietnam: 
evidence from survey data
Measuring land fragmentation
Because there is no standard measurement 
of land fragmentation, it is difficult to 
determine when farm households are 
‘very fragmented’ or ‘less fragmented’. 
Bentley (1987) reports that most authors 
have used two simple measurements of land 
fragmentation: the number of plots per farm 
and the average farm size. Some authors have 
considered that land fragmentation should 
be measured by six parameters: farm size, 
Motorbikes, but more often bicycles, are used by farmers to travel to their land plots that are 
commonly from one to three kilometres from their houses.
the number of plots, plot size, plot shape, 
spatial distribution and the size distribution 
of the fields (Bentley 1987; King & Burton 
1982). In this chapter two main measures of 
fragmentation are used: the number of plots 
per farm household and a measure based on 
Simpson’s diversification index. Blarel et al 
(1992) have also used these two indicators 
to measure land fragmentation in Ghana and 
Rwanda. Other measures such as farm size 
and plot size are also considered. Simpson’s 
index of land fragmentation is defined as:
(1- )
where aj is the area of the j-th plot, A is the 
farm size and A = ∑aj. This index has a 
value between zero and one. A value of zero 
means that the farm household has only one 
parcel or plot of land, indicating complete 
land consolidation, while a value close to one 
means the household has numerous plots 
and the farm is ‘very fragmented’.
Evidence of fragmentation from 
survey data
Two provinces, Ha Tay and Yen Bai, in the 
north were chosen as research sites. In each 
province two districts, one where farm sizes 
were smaller than average and the other where 
farm sizes were larger than average, were 
chosen. This same procedure was followed in 
selecting two communes in each district. In 
Ha Tay province, Dai Dong and Thach Hoa 
communes in Thach That district, and Song 
Phuong and Tho Xuan communes in Dan 
Table 1.  Costs and benefits associated with land fragmentation
Benefits of having many plots Costs of having many plots









































































Phuong district, were selected. In Yen Bai 
province, the four communes were Dai Dong 
and Bao Ai in Yen Binh district, and Mau 
Dong and Dong Cuong in Van Yen district. 
Data for 2 years (2000 and 2001) were 
collected from approximately 200 households 
using prepared questionnaires. Further details 
of the survey are given in Appendix I.
Ha Tay province, located in the RRD, is 
characterised by low-lying land and a small 
farm size, while Yen Bai province is located 
in an upland region and has a larger farm 
size. Part of Ha Tay has some upland area, 
and therefore the average farm size is likely 
to be larger than that of other provinces in 
the RRD. According to data from the first 
survey, average farm sizes including settlement 
land, agricultural land, ponds and forestry 
land in Ha Tay and Yen Bai were 5,232 and 
24,337 m2, respectively, in the year 2000 
(Table 2). More than 40% of the surveyed 
farms in Ha Tay had a farm size less than 
3,000 m2, while in Yen Bai this figure was 31%. 
Only 3% of the surveyed farms in Ha Tay had 
a farm size larger than 20,000 m2, while in Yen 
Bai this figure was 37%, and even higher in 
some communes such as Dai Dong (55%).
Farm size is closely related to plot size because 
when farm size is small individual plot areas, 
on average, cannot be very large. In Ha Tay the 
average farm size and plot size in Dai Dong 
commune were 3,182 and 384 m2 respectively, 
while these figures for Thach Hoa commune 
were 9,412 and 1,263 m2. The same situation 
was also observed in Yen Bai, where the 
average farm size and plot size in Dai Dong 
commune were 46,931 and 5,364 m2, and in 
Bao Ai they were 11,661 and 1,644 m2.
The number of plots and farm size do not 
appear to be significantly related (Hung 
& MacAulay 2002), which means that 
land consolidation may occur without 
land accumulation through plot exchanges. 
In Ha Tay and Yen Bai 53% and 54%, 
respectively, of the total number of plots 
had areas of less than 400 m2, although the 
average areas of a plot in the two provinces 
were different (1,126 m2 in Ha Tay and 
3,084 m2 in Yen Bai).
Households in the surveyed areas had an 
average of 6.8 plots of land, with the figures 
for Ha Tay and Yen Bai being 6.2 and 7.6 
plots, respectively (Table 2). The average 
number of plots also varied from region to 
region and commune to commune. Only 9% 
of farms in Ha Tay had more than 11 plots, 
compared to more than 24% for Yen Bai. 
If the degree of fragmentation is measured 
by the number of plots, Yen Bai’s farms 
were ‘more fragmented’ than those in Ha 
Tay, while if the degree of fragmentation is 
measured by Simpson’s index the conclusion 
is the reverse. On average Simpson’s index 
was 0.68 for farms in Ha Tay and 0.51 for 
those in Yen Bai. More than 74% of farms 
in Ha Tay had an index value higher than 
0.6 while for Yen Bai it was only 46%. This 
means that in Yen Bai there were larger 
plots and/or smaller plots because the index 
is sensitive to the area of the largest or 
smallest plots.
Land fragmentation can be more serious 
if plots are scattered over wider areas. To 
measure this, distances from farm houses 
to all plots were estimated. In more than 
27% of farms in Ha Tay and 33% in Yen 
Bai farmers had to travel more than 5 km 
to reach their plots. According to data in 
Table 2.  Land fragmentation in Ha Tay and Yen Bai provinces, 2000
Provinces Yen Bai Ha Tay Total
Number of households 91 97 188
Farm size (m2)
Mean 24,327 5,232 14,475
Median 11,890 3,702 4,176
Areas of plot (m2)
Average plot area 3,222 847 2,116
Average area of smallest plots 211 303 258
Average area of largest plots 17,751 2,741 10,007
Simpson’s index Percentage of households
0–0.2 19.8 4.1 11.7
0.2–0.4 17.6 3.1 10.1
0.4–0.6 16.5 18.6 17.6
0.6–0.8 30.8 42.3 36.7
0.8–1.0 15.4 32.0 23.9
Meana 0.51 0.68 0.59
Mediana 0.58 0.72 0.68
Number of plots
<= 2 8.8 3.1 5.9
3–5 25.3 48.5 37.2
6–8 28.6 27.8 28.2
9–11 13.2 11.3 12.2
> 11 24.2 9.3 16.5
Meana 7.55 6.18 6.84
Mediana 7 5 6
Distance of plot from house (m) Percentage of plots
0–300 23.3 18.5 21.1
300–700 43.7 32.2 38.4
700–1,000 11.5 11.9 11.7
1,000–3,000 18.3 34.7 25.8
> 3,000 3.2 2.7 3.0
Mean (m) a 653.1 805.4 722.9
Mediana 500 600 500
a  Expressed in relevant units, not percentages
Source: Household survey data 2000: ACIAR Project ADP 1/97/92
Table 2, about 37% and 22% of the total 
number of plots in Ha Tay and Yen Bai, 
respectively, were located further than 1 km 
from the farmer’s house.
Some authors assert that fragmentation is 
a serious problem for agricultural produc-
tion in Vietnam (Lan 2001; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development 2002; 
Research Institute of Agricultural Planning 
2004). In order to investigate this, the 
correlation between fragmentation and 
costs and returns (in equivalent rice yields) 
was calculated and tested on six main crops 
(first and second rice crops, maize, soybeans, 
vegetables, and flowers and fruits). Without 
taking into account other interacting 
variables, fragmentation appeared to have 
little or no effect on land productivity of 
individual crops. However, this may not be 
the case for a combination of crops because 
the relationship between fragmentation 
and aggregate yields of crops in a rotation 
may be different to the correlation between 
fragmentation and the yield of individual 
crops. There were significant correlations 
between fragmentation levels and total 
expenses for a rice–rice crop rotation but for 
other rotations it was not significant. It was 
also found that there were significant correla-
tions between fragmentation and labour use 
in three major groups of crops (rice–rice, 
flowers and fruit). Correlations were strong 
with family labour, with correlation coef-
ficients of 0.43 for flower and fruit crops. 
Therefore, fragmentation is likely to have a 
significant effect on labour use and to some 
extent on costs related to crops. In the RRD 
agricultural labour is still in surplus; however, 
in the future when the opportunity for off-
farm jobs is greater, land fragmentation may 
become a more serious problem.
An empirical model and 
results
In this estimation of the relationship between 
productivity and fragmentation and farm size 
the production function is written as:
(1)  y = α F(lf(N), lh(N), x(N)). h(A)
  h(A) = Aµ1 eµ2A
where y is the yield, lf and lh are family and 
hired labour respectively, x is a vector of 
other variable production inputs (fertilisers, 
seed, pesticides etc), N is the number of plots 
and α is the agricultural production ability 
(Deininger & Jin 2003) of farm households. 
It is assumed that land fragmentation affects 
the level of production inputs used.
The yield function y is assumed to be sepa-
rable into functions F and h. Function F is 
the yield per unit of land area while function 
h incorporates economies of farm size 
(MacAulay & Hertzler 2000). If there are no 
economies or diseconomies of size, µ1 will 
be one, µ2 will be zero and function h will 
equal the area A. Function F can be designed 
with the variables in different forms. In order 
to examine the relationships between not 
only fragmentation and productivity but also 
fragmentation and production inputs, the 
translog form is used. However, because the 
problem of collinearity occurs for the full 
translog form, the squared terms and interac-
tive terms of variables with few observations 
are excluded from the model (eg, there are 
only 81 observations for hired labour in the 
total 508 observations).
In the model it was expected that fragmenta-
tion, represented by the number of plots, 
would have a negative sign while dummy 
variables for the number of crops per year 
(representing soil quality), cash crops and 
land use change would have positive signs. 
Land use change means that farm households 
change land use from ‘traditional crops’ (rice, 
corn, vegetables) to fruits, fish or flowers. 
Results are provided in Table 3.
The production function was estimated 
using frontier regression methods with panel 
data (508 plot-based observations over 
2 years from 188 farm households in the 
north of Vietnam). The software used was 
LIMDEP version 7.0 (Greene 1998). From 
the results it would seem that a reasonable 
response function has been estimated (tran-
scendental form in land area and translog 
form in other variable inputs except hired 
labour). The values of λ2, which is equal to 
σ2u/σ2v (where σ2u is the variance of the 
one-side error term U and σ2v is the variance 
of two-side disturbances V), were reasonable 
and significantly different from zero at 1%, 
indicating that the model disturbances 
capture technical inefficiency.
For the estimated model the coefficient of 
farm area and its exponential term were 
statistically different from zero, implying 
that farm area has an effect on productivity, 
as reflected in the equivalent rice yield. As a 
result an increase in farm area may increase 
crop yield but with decreasing rates. Thus, 
in terms of crop productivity, economies 
of farm size are likely to be present in the 
north of Vietnam.
The coefficient of the number of plots was 
statistically different from zero and negative, 
and the partial elasticity of the number of 
plots was also negative. This result suggests 
that there is a negative effect of the number of 
plots on farm performance. Wan and Cheng 
(2001) also found that there was a negative 
relationship between the number of plots and 
individual crop productivity in China. The 
coefficients of interaction terms between the 
number of plots and family labour and other 
money expenses were statistically different 
from zero and positive, supporting the idea 
that the number of plots has increased family 
labour costs and other money expenses. 
Therefore, fragmentation has an effect on not 
only crop productivity but also on labour and 
other money expenses.
The coefficient of family labour was 
statistically different from zero at 1% and 
negative. If the level of seed application 
remains constant, a reduction in the number 
of plots may cause the elasticity of family 
labour to be negative.2 This result suggests 
that the number of plots also increases the 
level of family labour used and, therefore, 
land consolidation or a reduction in the 
number of plots of the farm household 
may release more labour for other sectors 
of the economy. These empirical results are 
consistent with theoretical results derived 
from comparative statics analysis and 
reported in Hung et al (2004).
  The elasticity of the number of plots is equal 
to (–1.081 + 0.211 Ln(X5) + 0.064 Ln (X7)) 
= –0.32, which is estimated at the average 
level of X5 and X7 (where X5 is family labour 
while X7 is other money expenses).
2  The elasticity of family labour is equal to 
(–0.212 – 0.04 Ln(X1) + 0.211 Ln(X8)) = 
0.036 which is estimated at the average level of 
X1 and X8 (where X1 is expenditure of seed 
application and X8 the number of plots).0
Table 3.  Results from frontier regression analysis of annual crop yield function for Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai provinces
Estimatesa Coefficients t-value
Intercept 6.751 23.65  ***
Seed application 0.106 2.14 **
Nitrogen input –0.141 –2.08 **
Potassium input –0.034 –0.80
Phosphorus input  –0.001 –0.10
Family labour –0.212 –3.85 ***
Hired labour 0.021 1.70 *
Other money expenses –0.111 –3.13 ***
Number of plots –1.081 –5.13 ***
Farm area 0.074 2.25 **
Farm areas (exp) –0.001 –1.65 *
Seed application  ×  nitrogen 0.013 1.67 *
Seed application  ×  potassium –0.003 –1.67 *
Seed application  ×  family labour –0.040 –2.85 ***
Seed application  ×  other money expenses 0.011 1.64 *
Seed application  ×  number of plots –0.016 –1.12
Nitrogen  ×  potassium 0.021 2.59 ***
Nitrogen  ×  phosphorus –0.001 –0.27
Nitrogen  ×  family labour 0.016 0.53
Nitrogen  ×  other money expenses 0.023 1.57b
Nitrogen  ×  number of plots 0.062 1.19
Potassium  ×  phosphorus –0.002 –1.36
Potassium  ×  family labour 0.003 0.26
Potassium  ×  other money expenses –0.008 –0.94
Potassium  ×  number of plots 0.019 1.20
Family labour  ×  other money expenses 0.022 1.58b
Family labour  ×  number of plots 0.211 3.52 ***
Other money expenses  ×  number of plots 0.064 1.56b
Dummy for the number of crops (soil quality) 0.195 3.81 ***
Dummy for paddy crops –0.126 –2.62 ***
Dummy for cash crops 0.407 6.66 ***
Dummy for land use change 0.452 6.58 ***
 Sample size, n 508
 Log likelihood function –265.39
 Lambda squared (λ2 = σ2u/ σ2v) 0.464 2.85 ***
 Sigma squared (σ2v) 0.098 11.38 ***
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
a  The dependent variable is the equivalent rice yield of a crop rotation (kg/sao/year)
b  The coefficient is significant at about 12%1
Estimates of the partial elasticities of scale 
for the three fertiliser inputs, seed applica-
tion, family and hired labour, and other 
money expenses were very low, ranging from 
–0.07 to 0.07, suggesting that farmers in 
the two provinces in the north had applied 
intensive farming techniques and had 
reached a level around the maximum point 
of the production function. This leads to 
the conclusion that a change of technology 
is needed, and a policy on technological 
change should be considered for agricultural 
development in the future.
For the estimated model the coefficients of 
the dummy variables for cash crops and land 
use change were statistically different from 
zero and positive, while the coefficient of the 
dummy for paddy crops (rice, corn, cassava 
and sweet potato) was negative. This means 
that paddy crops have lower equivalent 
yields than other crops and farmers may 
increase both their crop outputs and their 
incomes by producing cash crops (vegetables, 
soybean, peanuts, flowers and fruit). Farmers’ 
crop outputs and incomes increase as crop 
patterns change from producing ‘traditional 
crops’ to other crops such as fruit, flowers 
and fish, suggesting that retaining a ‘quota’ 
policy on the area of rice land may not 
help farmers to increase their outputs 
and incomes. Under current government 
policy the area of land required to grow rice 
remains at about 4 million ha.
The relationship of land 
fragmentation to crop 
diversity
Farmers can benefit from having numerous 
parcels of land because their crop patterns can 
be more diversified and flexible on different 
land types and land qualities on scattered 
plots. In order to test the relationship between 
fragmentation and the level of crop diversity, a 
simple ‘semi-log’ model is used. In linear form 
the model proposed can be written as:
(2)  Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + β3 X3 + 
β4 Ln(X4) + β5 Ln(X5) + β6 Ln(X6)
  + δ1 D1 + δ2 D2 + δ3 D3 + δ4 D4 + ε
where
Y =  the number of land uses (no)
X1 =  Simpson’s index of land 
fragmentation of a household (%)
X2 =  the agricultural ability of the farm 
household (%)
X3 =  the education level of a household 
head (levels of X3 = 0 to 5 equivalent 
to illiterate, primary, secondary, high 
school, college and university)
X4 =  the age of a household head (years)
X5 =  the number of household members 
over 12 years old (persons)
X6 =  the farm size of a household (in sao, 
a unit of land area measurement 
commonly used in the north of 
Vietnam equal to 360 m2.)2
D1 =  the dummy variable for cash crops; 
D1 = 1 if the household cultivates 
vegetables, flowers and high-value 
cash crops for market, and D1 = 0 
otherwise
D2 =  the dummy variable for change of 
land use; D2 = 1 if the household 
changes a purpose of land use from 
‘traditional crops’ to fruit trees and 
fish, and D2 = 0 otherwise
D3 =  the dummy variable for training; D3 
= 1 if the household participates in 
at least one course of training, and 
D3 = 0 otherwise
D4 =  the dummy variable for labour working 
off-farm; D4 = 1 if the household has 
at least one member working off-farm, 
and D4 = 0 otherwise
βi (i = 0–6) and δj (j = 1–4) are coefficients 
to be estimated and ε is the 
disturbance.
Crop diversity is defined as the number 
of land uses. There are complicated crop 
patterns in the research sites such as multiple 
crops cultivated in a rotation, mixed orchards 
and perennial crops. In this model the same 
crops in different seasons are counted as 
different land uses: eg spring and summer 
rice count as two land uses, mixed orchards 
and forests are counted as one land use, 
and fish farming is also counted as a land 
use. The dependent variable is the number 
of land uses, which varies from two to ten. 
Therefore, a truncated regression method is 
applied, and results are given in Table 4.
For the estimated model the coefficient of 
land fragmentation measured by Simpson’s 
index was positive and statistically different 
from zero at 1%, implying that land fragmen-
tation has a strong effect on crop diversity 
as reflected in the number of land uses. As 
a result, at higher levels of fragmentation 
crop patterns may be more diversified. In the 
context of subsistence-oriented agricultural 
production, this may lead to security of not 
only food but also farmers’ incomes, and this 
is why in some provinces farmers may want 
to keep existing levels of land fragmentation. 
Therefore, the trade-off between the level of 
crop diversity and land fragmentation and 
commercial production should be questioned 
and is an area which needs further study.
From the results, both an increase in the 
ability of the farm household and the 
education level of the household head may 
increase the level of crop diversity. However, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable for 
training was not statistically different from 
zero. A reason could be that the proportion 
of farm households attending at least one 
course of training was only 19%. Farm size 
was statistically correlated with the number 
of land uses, implying that a larger farm may 
be more diversified. Although diversified 
crop patterns require more labour, both 
on-farm and off-farm labour were not related 
to the level of crop diversity, possibly because 
agricultural labour in the study areas is still 
in surplus. The age of the household head 
(representing experience of farm households) 
was statistically different from zero and 
positive, indicating that a farmer’s experience 
is a significant factor influencing the degree 
of crop diversity. An explanation for this 
could be that older farmers have more 
experience in farming and hence may be 
more risk-averse, while younger household 
heads may take a decision to specialise in 
cultivating few crops.
Table 4.  Crop diversity response function in the north of Vietnam

















































Log likelihood function –520.274 –535.370
Number of observations 346 346
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Numbers in parentheses are the absolute t-value
Conclusion
From a theoretical point of view fragmenta-
tion of plots on farms has both benefits and 
costs, as shown in Table 1. The relative values 
of these benefits and costs, which will be 
different for different farm households, will 
affect the economics of land fragmentation 
for individual households and for the public 
more generally. In this chapter results from 
empirical analyses of farm household survey 
data investigating the economics of land 
fragmentation in the north of Vietnam 
are reported.
Using data from 508 plot-based observations 
from 188 farm households, it was found that 
an increase in the number of plots per farm 
had a negative impact on crop productivity 
(measured in equivalent rice yield) and 
increased family labour use and other money 
expenses. Data analysis also showed that 
fragmentation was a significant factor for 
crop diversity.
As Vietnam appears to have surplus 
agricultural labour, at least for much of the 
production year, the real benefits to farm 
households from land consolidation may 
not be apparent until the real opportunity 
cost of farm labour begins to rise. This 
opportunity cost will clearly be affected by a 
number of factors such as the availability of 
employment opportunities for farm family 
members and the wage rate associated with 
these opportunities, the level of education 
and age of the rural workforce, and the time 
of year and season. The transaction costs 
involved in job searching will be an issue, as 
will the reliability of employment. Therefore, 
creation of new off-farm jobs and movement 
of the agricultural labour force to other 
sectors of the economy will be a key policy 
issue for agricultural and rural development 
in the future.
These results have much wider applicability 
than just to Vietnam. Across many 
developing countries land fragmentation is 
a significant policy issue. Clearly, there are 
tradeoffs involved but it is apparent that as 
the opportunity cost of labour rises there 
will be incentives for land consolidation. In a 
similar way, if the costs associated with land 
transactions can be reduced and productivity 
raised, then land consolidation will be more 
likely to occur. These are general findings and 
are a result of the basic economic decision-
making processes of farm households.
cHApter Four
FArm Size cHAnge And tHe mArket 
For AgriculturAl lAnd uSe rigHtS in 
vietnAm Since 1993
Sally P. MarSh, PhaM Van hunG, nGuyen TronG dac and T. Gordon Macaulay
Over the last decade the Vietnamese government has instigated land reforms 
that recognise the household as the basic unit of production and allocate land use 
rights to households. Under the 1993 Land Law these rights can be transferred, 
exchanged, leased, inherited and mortgaged. The Land Law provided the foundation 
for the development of a market for land use rights (LUR). During 2001, 400 farm 
households were surveyed in four provinces in Vietnam. Details were sought about 
the involvement of households in the LUR market, as well as evidence of land 
accumulation and consolidation. Analysis of the data shows that there is an active 
market for LUR but the level of activity varies considerably between provinces. In Ha 
Tay province there has been a steadily increasing level of land transaction activity and 
land price over time. Data from this province show that although a similar percentage 
of households from all socioeconomic groups are involved in the LUR rental market, 
the ‘above average’ group controls the majority of the land area transacted. Lack of 
available land and, in some cases, labour, inadequate credit access and reluctance to 
sell land use rights are identified as constraints to the land use rights market, rather 
than transaction costs and the limit on land holdings.
Introduction
In December 1986 at the Sixth National 
Congress the Government of Vietnam intro-
duced a wide-ranging set of reforms (known 
as doi moi) which recognised a number 
of the failures of central planning and 
were designed to gradually deregulate and 
liberalise the economy. Associated with these 
reforms the 1993 Land Law (which followed 
the 1988 Resolution 10) formalised the farm 
household as the main unit of agricultural 
production and provided for the allocation of 
land use rights (LUR) to households. LUR 
give households farm decision-making rights 
related to the purchase and use of inputs, 
the sale of outputs and, to some extent, 
the use of land. The 1993 Land Law also 
gave security of tenure over allocated land, 
with LUR granted for 20 years for annual 
crop and aquaculture land and 50 years 
for perennial crop land. Land ceilings 
were imposed of 2–3 ha for annual crop 
land and 10 ha for perennial crop land in 
delta communes and 30 ha in midland and 
mountainous communes.
Under the 1993 Land Law LUR can be 
transferred, exchanged, leased, inherited 
and mortgaged. Revisions to the Land Law 
in 1998 added two new additional rights: 
that of using LUR as capital in joint-venture 
arrangements, and the right to re-lease LUR. 
By virtue of providing increased security of 
tenure over land, facilitating access to credit 
and making LUR tradeable, the 1993 Land 
Law provided the foundations for a formal 
market for land (Do & Iyer 2003).
Land transactions for agricultural land 
in four provinces which were undertaken 
following these land reforms are investigated 
in this chapter. The purpose is to assess the 
extent of the market for LUR in various 
regions, and to identify factors either 
constraining or encouraging this market. 
Additionally, the data are used to investigate 
the extent to which different socioeconomic 
groups are involved in the land market. It 
should be stressed at the outset that this 
research is only concerned with agricultural 
land, not with land market activities in 
urban areas.
This chapter commences with background 
information on land fragmentation in 
Vietnam and constraints to the land market 
identified by previous research, followed by 
a brief review of theoretical perspectives on 
rural land markets in developing countries. 
The method used to obtain the data on land 
holdings and land transactions in four prov-
inces is then outlined and results presented. 
These data are discussed under headings of 
land holdings and land sources, the extent 
of market-based LUR transfers, the involve-
ment of households in the LUR market, 
and evidence of land consolidation and land 
loss. Conclusions and policy implications are 
drawn in the final section of the chapter.
Background
Under the Vietnamese Constitution land 
is the property of the people as a whole 
and the State administers it on their behalf. 
The new Land Law, passed by the National 
Assembly in November 2003, states that 
the government is the ‘representative of the 
people’s ownership’ (Vasavakul 2003). Since 
land is ‘owned’ by the people as a whole, it is 
not possible for individuals (or corporations) 
to own land. However, since the 1993 Land 
Law, individuals, households and organisa-
tions can hold and transfer rights to use land. 
The process of land allocation in Vietnam 
that began in 1981 and was formalised in the 
1993 Land Law is still ongoing, although it 
is largely complete for agricultural land, as 
distinct from forestry land. Approximately 
80% of the population of some 80 million 
people live in rural areas and there are over 
11 million household farms in Vietnam. 
Farm sizes vary throughout the country 
but they are typically small, around 0.2 ha 
per capita (World Bank 2001). The average 
size of farms in the Mekong Delta is 1.2 ha, 
considerably larger than average farm sizes in 
the Red River Delta.
The land allocation process varied between 
districts although equity between households 
was of primary consequence. Consideration 
was given both to land quality and the 
number of people, or more specifically labour 
equivalents, in a household. Consequently, 
the amount of land allocated varied between 
households and the land was typically split 
into a number of plots of varying land 
quality. The World Bank (1998, p 10) 
reports ‘on average, farms in the Red River 
Delta comprise eight or nine noncontiguous 
plots often no larger than 200 to 500 square 
meters each’. In mountainous areas the 
number of plots allocated to households 
tended to be even greater as the land quality 
was extremely variable. Typically, not all 
land within a commune was allocated, and a 
proportion was kept (usually between 5 and 
10%) ‘to defray public expenses or readjust 
land allocation periodically to demographic 
changes such as family members returning 
from military service’ (Chung 1994, p 4). 
Other land such as ponds, lakes and garden 
areas, which are difficult to divide, were 
often also left unallocated and then assigned 
to individual households on the basis of 
competitive bidding.
In the south of Vietnam the degree of land 
fragmentation is not so pronounced, with 
many farmers in the Mekong Delta having 
only one or two plots. There was less concern 
with equitable distribution in the south, 
and land allocation to households was also 
more likely to be based on land held prior 
to reunification in 1975 (Do & Iyer 2003; 
Luong & Unger 1999; Marsh & MacAulay 
2002; Ravallion & van de Walle 2001, 2003).
Small and fragmented land holdings are 
considered a problem for agricultural devel-
opment in Vietnam, and the government 
is actively encouraging plot consolidation 
in northern Vietnam (Hung et al 2004). 
Throughout Vietnam it is estimated that 
there are 70–100 million parcels or plots 
of land (Vy 2000, pers comm; World Bank 
2003), with around 10% of these plots 
having an area of only 100 m2 or less (Phien 
2001). Small and scattered land holdings 
hamper mechanisation and technology 
adoption, and involve additional time and 
labour for farming activities that must 
be carried out in geographically distant 
plots (Blarel et al 1992; Hung et al 2004; 
Lan 2001).
Considerable official restrictions still exist 
for LUR transfers. Official decrees restrict 
the circumstances under which, and to 
whom, LUR can be transferred (see Marsh 
& MacAulay 2002). However, following 
the 1993 Land Law many researchers have 
reported that land transfers are occurring 
(Chung 2000; Do & Iyer 2003; Fforde 1995; 
Khiem et al 1999; Ravallion & van de Walle 
2003; Deininger & Jin 2003). It has also been 
reported that many land transfers occurred 
illegally both before and after the 1993 
Land Law (Chung 1994; Do & Iyer 2003; 
Humphries 1999; Kerkvliet 2000; Vietnam 
News 2002; World Bank 2003). One main 
reason given for these illegal transactions is 
the costs associated with registering LUR 
transfers. Most households were issued with 
only one land use certificate for all their 
allocated plots (Humphries 1999). However, 
as this author points out, the consequence 
of this now is that if a household wishes to 
dispose of or exchange any one of their plots 
they must (in theory) surrender their land 
use certificate and have it reissued. There are 
transaction costs involved in doing this, and 
in practice LUR transactions occur without 
being officially registered. Other reasons for 
illegal transactions include time-consuming 
and cumbersome procedures, unclear 
regulations, and opportunistic rent-seeking 
behaviour in near-urban districts and along 
newly constructed interregional roads.
It is also widely considered that further land 
reform, particularly the need for a better 
regulatory framework, is needed to remove 
constraints and encourage the further devel-
opment of the land market (AusAID 2001; 
United Nations 1999; World Bank 1998, 
2003). Lee-Alaia et al (2002, p 28) have 
argued that ‘the government’s intervention in 
the allocation, transfer, use and valuation of 
land … seriously frustrates the development 
of a free market in land use rights.’ Based on 
an analysis using data from the 1997–98 
Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS), 
Ravallion and van de Walle (2003, p 11) 
state that ‘A more active rental market 
has clearly not emerged since the reforms’. 
However, other work by World Bank 
researchers on land rental markets using 
the 1997–98 VLSS data states the contrary 
opinion, that ‘Descriptive evidence on land 
market participation … points towards a 
rapid increase in land transactions, together 
with considerable differences across regions’ 
(Deininger & Jin 2003, p 12).
Rural land markets in 
developing countries
An essential part of development policy 
is the production of policies that will 
create and enforce efficient property rights. 
Deininger (2003, pp xix–xx) notes that 
property rights affect economic growth in 
a number of ways. First, secure property 
rights increase the incentive of households to 
invest, and provide them with better access 
to credit. Hence, secure and well-defined 
land rights are of key importance for 
households’ asset ownership, productive 
development and the functioning of factor 
markets. Secure land tenure also facilitates 
the transfer and sale of land through rentals 
and sales, which results in a more efficient 
allocation of land. Property rights in the 
form of land use certificates (LUCs) rather 
than land ownership per se have a similar 
effect. For example, Besley (1995) states 
that tradeable LUCs enable a land market 
to develop; security of tenure increases 
farmers’ willingness to undertake long-term 
investments; and if LUCs are able to be used 
as collateral, farmers can access credit and 
transform illiquid assets into money.
A market for land or LUR should theoreti-
cally translate into allocative efficiency gains, 
where better managers gain land from 
poorer managers (Bardhan & Udry 1999; 
Deininger 2003). However, low levels of 
land sales are typically observed in rural 
areas in many developing countries (Bardhan 
& Udry 1999). This occurs for a variety 
of social, cultural and political reasons, 
including limited opportunities for invest-
ments elsewhere and the fact that land is a 
comparatively risk-free form of investment. 
Multiple market imperfections in the capital, 
credit, insurance, labour and land markets 
also affect the functioning of the land market 
in developing countries (Bardhan & Udry 
1999; Deininger 2003; Ray 1998). Hence, 
if the credit market fails other markets will 
have to adjust accordingly; for example, a 
farmer without access to working capital may 
be constrained to lease out part or even all of 
his land and his labour as well (Ray 1998).
Because land rental markets typically have 
lower transaction costs and require little 
capital outlay, they operate more freely than 
land sale markets in developing countries 
(Bardhan & Udry 1999). Therefore, the land 
market should still be able to adjust towards 
allocative efficiency through a functioning 
rental market. These authors argue that 
as, in unmechanised agriculture, there is 
little empirical support for the notion that 
large farms are more efficient than smaller 
farms, then land should, theoretically, 
pass from large to smaller family-operated 
farms, although they note that this seldom 
occurs. Deininger and Jin (2003) also 
argue that land transactions should favour 
the small producer with good agricultural 
ability. However, power relations and policy 
distortions, particularly those that favour 
larger landholders, can affect the outcomes 
of land markets (Binswanger et al 1993; 
Deininger 2003). Also, superior access to 
credit available to larger landholders through 
the use of land as collateral effectively 
means that larger landholdings can be more 
productive. Many transition countries facing 
situations of multiple market imperfections 
place restrictions on the free operation 
of the land market because of the risk of 
land concentrating in the hands of larger, 
wealthier farmers, and concerns about poten-
tial negative effects on both productivity and 
equity (Deininger & Jin 2003).
The land market (in particular an active rental 
market) has been recognised as playing a 
large role in giving access to land to the more 
productive farmers in developing countries 
(Deininger 2003). In theory, an optimal farm 
size exists for each household, and factors 
such as family size, capital liquidity and tech-
nology will affect both the amount of land 
rented-in or rented-out and the optimal farm 
size (Sadoulet et al 2001). In the remainder 
of this chapter research investigating the 
type and extent of land transfers in four 
provinces in Vietnam, and the characteristics 
of the households participating in these land 
transfers, is presented and discussed.0
Method
During 2001 a household survey was 
conducted in four provinces in Vietnam: 
Ha Tay and Yen Bai in the north, and Binh 
Duong and Can Tho in the south. Four 
hundred person-to-person interviews were 
conducted in 16 communes (two districts 
in each province). The survey was repeated 
in 2002 but only data from the first survey 
is reported in this chapter. A wide range 
of mostly quantitative data were collected 
relating to land holdings and land use, assets, 
production (overall and on an individual 
plot basis), income sources, prices paid 
and received, use of credit, and percep-
tions of yield and price risk. Details were 
sought about the sources of land farmed 
by households and the involvement of 
households in the LUR market. Additionally, 
a number of qualitative questions were 
asked about changes in land holdings, land 
use and household ‘wellbeing’. More details 




To give an idea of the variability in farm size 
and plot numbers, general information on 
land holdings in four sample communes is 
shown in Table 1. For each of Ha Tay and 
Can Tho provinces, data are shown for the 
communes with larger than average farm 
size (Thach Hoa and Truong Thanh) in the 
district with larger than average farm size, 
and for the communes with smaller than 
average farm size (Song Phuong and Dong 
Thanh) in the district with smaller than 
average farm size. Farm size in the southern 
province (Can Tho) is generally larger and 
less fragmented (fewer plots) than farms in 
the northern province (Ha Tay). However, 
these averages hide a great deal of variability 
in farm size within individual communes, 
as indicated by the standard deviations 
shown in Table 1. Very few households (two 
in Thach Hoa and one in Truong Thanh) 
reported land holdings above the land limit.
Evidence of the extent of 
market-based LUR transfers
Households were asked how they had 
acquired each plot of land they currently 
farmed, and also about plots of land they 
had previously farmed. Land farmed by the 
households has been acquired in various 
ways (see Marsh & MacAulay 2003). The 
data on land sources can be assessed to 
provide an estimate of the percentage of 
households that have been involved in LUR 
transaction activities, such as buying/selling 
and leasing/renting, since 1992. It is gener-
ally accepted that under-reporting of rental 
and sale transactions occurs as households 
often bypass official procedures (Do & Iyer 
2003; Humphries 1999; Kerkvliet 2000), 
but there is no way of knowing whether the 
survey data on land sources (from rental and 
purchases) are similarly affected. However, 
many households reported having land 
(rented land in particular) for which they 
didn’t have the Red Book, so it is reasonable 
to assume that the survey captured many 
‘unofficial’ land transfers.1
Table 1.  Description of land holdings in four communes in Ha Tay and Can Tho provinces
Province Ha Tay Can Tho








Commune Thach Hoa 
(l) (n = 20)
Song Phuong 
(s) (n = 2)
Truong Thanh 
(l) (n = 2)
Dong Thanh 
(s) (n = 22)
Land farmed in 2000 (m2)
Average total area farmed/hh 9,412 (9,772)b 5,310 (4,191) 15,943 (8,718) 9,082 (4,111)
Average number of plots/hh 7 5 2.2 2.4
Average plot size (commune) 1,263 (3,683) 1,096 (2,144) 7,358 (5,925) 3,770 (2,972)
Median plot size (commune) 360 480 6,500 3,000
Avg size of smallest plot/hh 206 324 5,192 3,223
Avg size of largest plot/hh 5,475 3,064 10,148 5,905
a  The letters S and L and s and l indicate districts and communes with smaller or larger than 
average farm size
b  Standard deviations are in italics
Data for the four provinces are shown in 
Table 2. Note that these data do not neces-
sarily show the percentage of households 
with net land gains or losses, but simply 
reflect the percentage that have engaged 
in these types of transactions in any year 
since 1992. Similarly, these data do not 
indicate the number of transactions that 
have occurred, as households may have 
been involved in multiple transactions for 
a specific transaction activity. LUR bought 
or sold are often recorded as having been 
‘bought/sold for x years’. This is in effect a 
rent but the rental money is paid up front as 
a lump sum. If the household reports they 
have either rented-in or rented-out land then 
the rental is paid either per season or per 
year. In this analysis land recorded as having 
been bought or sold for a specified time is 
treated as a sale or purchase because this is 
how farmers talk about these transactions.
Of all provinces a higher percentage of 
households in Ha Tay have been engaged in 
LUR transactions (see Marsh & MacAulay 
2003). Aside from Ha Tay, the percentage 
of households reporting that they have been 
involved in LUR transactions is quite low. 
Renting and auctioning of land is more 
common in the northern provinces and 
buying/selling more common in the southern 
provinces. This has been noted by other 
researchers (eg Kerkvliet 2000). Far fewer 
households report having rented-out or 
sold LUR than those who have rented-in or 
bought LUR. In Ha Tay many households 2
report losing land by exchange (although 
few reported obtaining land by exchange) 
and returning land to the Cooperative (hop 
tac xa). The low reported LUR activity in 
Binh Duong province is surprising given its 
close proximity to Ho Chi Minh City, and by 
comparison to Ha Tay province which is in 
close proximity to Hanoi.
The data for LUR transfer activities shown 
in Table 2 underestimates the amount of 
market-oriented activity, as some households 
rent-in/rent-out, buy/lease or bid for LUR 
many times over. The number of reported 
LUR transactions by surveyed households 
is shown in Table 3 by province. Ha Tay has 
by far the highest rent-in/rent-out activity, 
with a recorded 42 transactions compared to 
5 or less in other provinces. The number of 
rent-in/rent-out transactions in Ha Tay has 
increased since 1997. Ha Tay, Binh Duong 
and Can Tho all record considerable buy/sell 
activities (ranging from 16 to 28) but there is 
a distinct difference between Ha Tay and the 
southern provinces. More buy/sell transac-
tions took place prior to 1997 in Can Tho 
and Binh Duong, whereas in Ha Tay more 
transactions have taken place from 1997 
onwards. Most auction transactions take 
place in Ha Tay (53) and Yen Bai (14), and 
in Ha Tay the number of these transactions 
has also increased from 1997.
Table 2.  Percentage of surveyed households involved in LUR transaction activities since 1992: 
data from Ha Tay, Yen Bai, Binh Duong and Can Tho provinces








Percentage (%) of h/holds engaged in:
Borrowing land 11 4 3 0
Renting-in land 19 5 3 0
Auctioning-in land 37 12 2 0
Exchanging-in land 4 0 0 0
Buying landa 8 0 10 14
Lending land 2 1 1 0
Renting-out land 5 0 0 1
Selling landa 2 0 3 4
Losing land by exchange 18 0 0 0
Giving land back to the HTXb 22 0 0 0
Giving land to offspring/relatives 3 4 0 1
a  Note that these figures could be underestimates because some purchases or sales may be 
included in ‘land acquired or lost by other means’ (percentages not shown)
b  HTX = hop tac xa (cooperative)
Market-oriented land-use-rights 
transactions in Ha Tay province
Given the extent of LUR transaction 
activity reported by surveyed households in 
Ha Tay province, this section investigates 
these transactions in more detail, looking 
at activity over time and the characteristics 
of households involved in market-based 
LUR activity (ie renting-in/renting-out, 
buying/selling, auctioning).
Table 3.  Number of reported LUR transactions by category of transaction and province










Prior to 1997 7 2 1 0
1997 and after 20 2 2 0
Year unknown 3 1 0 0
Rent-out
Prior to 1997 3 0 0 0
1997 and after 9 0 0 1
Year unknown 0 0 0 0
Buy
Prior to 1997 4 0 5 12
1997 and after 13 0 1 2
Year unknown 0 0 2 8
Sell
Prior to 1997 0 0 5 2
1997 and after 3 0 3 2
Year unknown 0 0 0 2
Auction
Prior to 1997 16 3 0 0
1997 and after 32 5 0 0
Year unknown 5 6 2 0
Total transactions 11 1 21 2
Land use rights transactions – renting-in, 
buying and auctioning
Land use rights reported by the surveyed 
households in 2000 in Ha Tay province as 
being acquired by either renting, buying or 
auction since 1992 are shown in Table 4 
and in Figure 1. In these four communes 
the majority of LUR transactions were land 
acquired by bidding at auction rather than 
by renting-in or purchase. Many households 
in these communes reported returning land 
to the cooperative (see Table 2); large areas 
were made available for auction in both 
1995 and 1997, possibly after land had been 
returned to cooperatives. Another factor 
affecting the availability of auction land is 
that one of these communes (Song Phuong) 
had extensive areas of riverbank land 
adjacent to the Red River that were made 
available for auction.
Over the years 1993–2000, 51% of 
households reported no LUR transactions, 
39% reported a transaction in one year 
only (which may or may not have involved 
multiple plots) and 10% reported transac-
tions in more than one year, usually two. 
Only two households reported transactions 
in each of three years. These multiple year 
transactions provide some indication of land 
accumulation by households, as all the LUR 
acquired in these transactions were still held 
at the time of the survey, even if the rental or 
auction arrangement commenced in 1994.
Trends in the ‘real’ LUR market (ie LUR 
acquired by either renting or buying) since 
1992 are shown in Figure 2. There was an 
initial small steady increase in area rented 
or bought from 1995 to 1998, and then a 
rapid increase in LUR traded in 1999 and 
2000. The number of households involved 
in buying and renting has also increased, 
with the majority of these transactions being 
rental arrangements (as can be seen in Table 
4). While many households have acquired 
LUR by both renting and auction, a small 
number have acquired them by renting 
and/or auction and buying.
In Table 5 data are compared between 
households based on the commune’s 
classification of each household as being in 
the ‘above average’, ‘average’ or ‘poor’ socio-
economic group. The actual classification of 
households produced by village assemblies, 
under the leadership of elected village chiefs 
and with assistance from local authorities, 
is recognised as being remarkably accurate. 
At the village level people know who is poor 
without having to compute income and 
expenditure measures (ADB et al 2004). 
Average estimates for net value of produc-
tion (NVP) are very variable, particularly 
in the above average and poor groups. In 
each case this variability is caused by one 
household that reports a NVP far in excess 
of other households. The median estimates 
for both NVP and land area present a 
more realistic picture of the relative income 
and land situation in each of these socio-
economic groups.
Around 50% of households in all socio-
economic groups have rented-in or obtained 
land by auction since 1992. However, it 
is clear that although involvement in the 
rent-in and auction markets is consistent 
across socioeconomic groups, the above 
average group has transacted the majority 
of the land area, both in terms of area 
per transaction and total area involved 
in renting and auction transactions. 
Figure 1  LUR transactions reported by surveyed households (n = 97) in Ha Tay province 








































































Figure 2.  LUR transactions reported by surveyed households (n = 97) in Ha Tay province 







































































This in itself is not really surprising, given 
their superior ability to pay. The above 
average group, representing 29% of the 
surveyed households, holds 58% of the total 
land area acquired by renting and auction; 
the average group, representing 54%, holds 
34%; and the poor group, representing 18% 
of the sample, holds 8% of this land area.
LUR indicated as being bought present 
a slightly different picture. Only eight 
households (note that this figure is less than 
reported in Table 4 as some households 
bought land in more than one year) reported 
they had ‘bought’ LUR since 1992, and most 
of these are reported as ‘bought for x years’, 
with x ranging from 5 to 11 years. As noted 
earlier, what distinguishes these transactions 
from LUR rental is that a single amount 
has been paid for the LUR, rather than an 
amount per year. The households report the 
transaction as buying rather than renting. 
Categorised by socioeconomic group, 14% 
of households in the above average group 
reported buying LUR, compared with 6% 
of households in both the average and poor 
groups. Given that large sums of money are 
required to buy LUR, it is not surprising 
that the majority of transactions occurred in 
the higher socioeconomic group. While most 
Table 4.  LUR farmed by the surveyed households in Ha Tay province (n = 97) in 2000 
reported as being acquired by either renting, buying or auction since 1992
Year LUR rent-in transactions LUR buy transactions LUR bid-in transactions
H/holds Plots Area 
(m2)
H/holds Plots Area 
(m2)
H/holds Plots Area 
(m2)
<=1992 1 1 204 1 1 192
1993
1994 2 2 3,720 2 2 3,240
1995 1 4 696 1 1 360 7 11 38,100
1996 1 4 1,224 2 2 504
1997 3 3 14,16 6 9 74,014
1998 2 3 1,680 1 2 552 7 7 22,200
1999 4 6 4,260 4 8 2,416 7 10 6,760
2000 6 7 9,216 2 2 744 3 6 6,480
2001a 1 1 456 1 1 408
Unknown 3 3 4,416 5 8 2,491
Total 21 31 23,364 12 17 8,404 40 56 153,981
a  Survey was conducted in March–April 2001
of the LUR reported as bought (17 plots) are 
for small areas of cultivated land, LUR for 
one perennial plot and two settlement plots 
were also bought.
Land use rights transactions – renting-out 
and selling
The surveyed households reported far less 
renting-out and selling than renting-in, 
buying and auctioning of LUR transactions, 
as shown in Table 6. Twelve plots (4,908 m2) 
are reported as rented-out since 1992, and 
although nine households have been involved 
on a yearly basis, only five households in total 
have rented-out land (ie some households have 
rented-out land in more than one year). LUR 
areas being rented-out do not show the same 
increasing trend over time as those rented-in. 
Only two households report selling LUR.
All LUR sold have been from households 
in the poor economic status group. One 
of these households has either sold or 
rented-out land in 3 years since 1992. LUR 
have been rented-out by 18% of households 
from the poor group, 2% of the average 
group and 4% of the above average group. 
Table 5.  Comparison of households in Ha Tay province classified by commune-based socio-
economic status – production value, area farmed, and rent-in and auction LUR transactions 
between 1993 and 2000

















NVP in 2000 (mill. VND) – median 16.2 9.8 4.0 8.6








Land area in 2000 (m2) – median 6,166 4,150 3,363 4,393
% households rent-in or auction 50 50 47 49








Median area per transaction (m2) 1,800 720 395 538
Total area transacted (m2) 103,687 59,608 14,050 177,345
% of total area 58 34 8
a  NVP = net value of production includes production sold and consumed by the household minus 
variable cash costs of production
b  Standard deviations are shown in (parenthesis)
However, some of these households have 
also rented-in or auctioned-in land. For 
example, the household in the above average 
group has rented-out cultivated land and 
acquired perennial land by auction. Similarly, 
two households in the poor group who 
have rented-out land have also rented-in or 
acquired land by auction. Renting-out may 
not necessarily reflect economic hardship or 
inability to farm, but rather an exchange of 
land types by households.
Reported interest in the land 
rental market
Households were asked if they wanted to 
rent more land and, if so, what prevented 
them from doing so (Tables 7 and 8). Most 
households had a firm opinion on this 
question, with only a few in most communes 
answering ‘maybe’. The desire to rent more 
land is markedly different in the southern 
and northern communes. Only 20% of 
surveyed households in Can Tho and 13% 
in Binh Duong said that they wanted to rent 
more land, compared to 42% in Yen Bai and 
57% in Ha Tay provinces.
‘Lack of available land’, ‘lack of funds’ and 
‘not having enough labour’ were reasons 
given for not being able to rent more land, 
but generally ‘lack of available land’ appears 
to be a greater issue in the northern than the 
southern communes, and ‘lack of funds’ more 
an issue in the southern than the northern 
communes (Table 8). Procedures for renting 
land were only perceived as a problem by 
two households, and the land limit was 
not perceived as a problem by any of the 
surveyed households.
Table 6.  LUR previously held by the surveyed households in Ha Tay province (n = 97) reported 
as being either rented-out or sold since 1992
Year LUR rent-out transactions LUR sell transactions
H/holds Plots Area (m2) H/holds Plots Area (m2)
<=1992 1 1 720
1993 1 1 156
1994
1995
1996 1 1 216
1997 2 4 2,340 2 3 532
1998 1 1 360
1999 2 2 432
2000 1 2 684
Total  12 ,0 2  2
In the survey overall, few households said 
they were interested in ‘selling’ (chuyen 
nhuong) their LUR. Of those who were 
interested, the most common reason given 
for not selling was ‘high risks’. Other reasons 
given include ‘complicated procedure’, ‘don’t 
have another job’, and ‘unable to leave’.
Prices paid and received for LUR 
transactions
Of the reported LUR transactions, only 
households in Ha Tay province reported a 
price for a significant number of the transac-
tions. Generally, fewer prices were recorded 
for land acquired by auction. In the southern 
provinces, if a price was given for land 
bought or sold it was usually stated in gold, 
whereas in the northern provinces prices 
were always reported in VND (Vietnamese 
Table 7.  Percentage of households reporting that they would like to rent more land
Province Percentage of households (%)a
Yes No Maybe
Ha Tay (n = 99) 57 41 1
Yen Bai (n = 92) 42 46 10
Binh Duong (n = 88) 13 81 5
Can Tho (n = 90) 20 68 11
a  Percentages may not add to 100% because some households did not answer the question
Table 8.  Reasons given by farm households for not being able to rent more land

















Ha Tay (n = 57) 91 14 7 2 0 5
Yen Bai ( n = 48) 75 19 8 0 0 6
Binh Duong (n = 15) 67 60 27 7 0 13
Can Tho (n = 28)  39 82 11 0 0 11
a  Percentages may add to more than 100% because some households nominated more than one 
reason100
dong). Many prices for renting-in and 
renting-out were given in kilograms of rice 
per year or season. Average prices for various 
LUR transactions in Ha Tay, as shown in 
Table 9, assume a price for paddy rice (thoc) 
of VND1200/kg.
There are insufficient data to comment on 
price differentials over time for many of the 
transactions, but it appears that for cultivated 
land there has been a significant price 
increase for both land rented-in and land 
obtained by auction since 1997. Standard 
deviations are large in many cases but this 
probably reflects different land classes within 
the broad overall classification of cultivated 
land. In fact, the data show that this land is 
used to grow a range of crops, from low-value 
cassava and rice to higher value vegetables 
and flowers. The prices paid for rented-in and 
auctioned land appear to be similar, given the 
limitations of the data. Statistical tests for 
differences were not conducted because of the 
limited data and the likelihood that land class 
differences confound the data.
Table 9.  Average prices for LUR transactions in Ha Tay province by land type
LUR transaction Cultivated land Perennial land Pond
No Price (VND/m2) No Price (VND/m2) No Price (VND/m2)
Rent-in
Prior to 1997 7 219 (24.5)a 1 673
1997 and after 19 584 (311)
Rent-out
Prior to 1997 2 500 (236)
1997 and after 10 509 (118)
Buy
Prior to 1997 1 4,167
1997 and after 13 5,092 (2,376)
Sell
Prior to 1997 - -
1997 and after 3 8,222 (10,200)
Auction
Prior to 1997 2 221 (65) 4 606 (128) 3 315 (210)
1997 and after 4 476 (318) 1 667 6 278 (61)
a  Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis
Note: To obtain these prices paid and received the price of paddy rice (thoc) has been valued at 
VND1200/kg101
Similarly, the price received for rented-out 
land appears to be consistent with the price 
paid for rented-in land. The auction price paid 
for a pond does not appear to have increased 
since 1997 and is now considerably below 
that for cultivated land, which is surprising 
given the potential profitability of aquaculture 
enterprises. The price for perennial land is 
higher than for cultivated land, reflecting its 
potentially higher earning capacity. The prices 
reported for buying land after 1997 appear to 
reflect a capitalisation of the rental rate over 
about 10 years, and suggest that there is a very 
rational market for LUR in operation.
Evidence of land consolidation 
and land loss
Surveyed households were asked how the 
amount of land farmed by the household had 
changed in the last 5 years (Table 10). In all 
but Ha Tay province, over 70% of surveyed 
households reported that the land area they 
farmed had stayed ‘about the same’. However, 
many households, especially so in Ha Tay, 
reported an increase in farmed area. Only 
in two communes in Can Tho province, 
Dong Thuan and Dong Hiep, did a greater 
percentage of households report decreased 
rather than increased farmed area (Marsh & 
MacAulay 2003).
Households were asked the reason for any 
land area change. Some households who 
had increased their land area said that the 
reason was ‘to increase income’ or ‘use available 
labour more efficiently’, while others said that 
they had ‘rented, borrowed and/or bought 
land’, ‘been allocated more land’ or ‘inherited 
land’. In Ha Tay the majority of households 
reporting less land gave the reason as having 
to return land to the cooperative or army, or 
as the result of ‘adjustment by the commune’ 
or land exchange. In Yen Bai the majority of 
households reporting less land said that it 
was the result of distributing land to family 
members. In Binh Duong households with 
less land reported the main reasons as ‘unprof-
itable production’ and ‘insufficient labour’. A 
variety of reasons were given for having less 
land by households in Can Tho, including 
having to sell land to cover bank debts and 
distributing land to family members. A 
small number of households in all provinces 
Table 10.  Percentage of surveyed households reporting increases or decreases in land area 
farmed in the last 5 years











Ha Tay (n = 99) 21 28 32 15 2
Yen Bai (n = 92) 7 13 73 8 0
Binh Duong (n = 88) 3 13 74 3 6
Can Tho (n = 90) 4 8 74 10 3
a  Percentages may not add to 100% because some households did not answer the question102
reported having less land because of renting-
out or selling land, and sometimes stated 
that this was to meet other expenses, most 
usually production, education and medical 
expenses. Although no landless households 
were interviewed in the survey, 12 households 
in total reported having less than 1000 m2 
of land, making them effectively landless. Of 
these households, eight had not lost land in 
the last 5 years.
Land loss is an issue of concern in Vietnam 
as landlessness or near landlessness is often 
associated with poverty (ADB et al 2004; 
Lan 2001; World Bank 2000). The data 
on changes in land holdings were related to 
self-assessment of change in household living 
standards, as shown in Tables 11 and 12 
for Can Tho and Ha Tay, the two surveyed 
provinces with the greatest percentage of 
households reporting land loss. Land gain is 
always associated with an increase or stability 
in living standards over the last 5 years, 
whereas land loss can be associated with 
either a decrease or increase in wellbeing. 
In Ha Tay more households reported being 
‘better off’ than ‘worse off’ after land farmed 
had ‘decreased a little’ and the living standard 
was consistently reported as being ‘better off’ 
if the land holdings were unchanged, but in 
Can Tho the replies were divided between 
being ‘better off’ and ‘worse off’.
Discussion
Land holdings and land sources
In both the north and the south, farm 
size varies greatly between households 
and there is more variability in farm size 
within communes with larger than average 
Urbanisation and the growth of industrial parks are influencing the land market in provinces 
such as Ha Tay and Binh Duong which are close to major cities: this photo shows housing 
developments encroaching on rice fields in Gia Lam district close to Ha Noi.10
farm size. In the northern provinces a high 
percentage of both the land area and the 
plots are reported as having been allocated. 
However, in the southern provinces more 
land has been inherited or been in the family 
for a long time. These data are consistent 
with reported research into differences in 
the land allocation process in the north 
and the south (Luong & Unger 1999; 
Marsh & MacAulay 2002; Ravallion & 
van de Walle 2001).
There is considerable evidence of land having 
been rented, either from private sources or 
the commune, and bought. The reported 
percentage of land having been bought is 
highest (at more than 10%) in the southern 
provinces, particularly in all four communes 
in Can Tho. By far the largest percentage of 
land and plots obtained by rent was found 
in Ha Tay province, where up to 10% of the 
land area in surveyed communes was rented 
from the private market, and up to 55% 
Table 11.  Relationship between land gain/loss and living standard change in Ha Tay province 
(percentage of households (%), n = 95)
Change in living 
standard in last 5 yrs











A lot worse off 0 0 0 1 1
Worse off 0 0 0 0 0
About the same 1 3 0 1 0
Better off 8 22 20 5 1
A lot better off 13 4 14 5 0
Table 12.  Relationship between land gain/loss and living standard change in Can Tho 
province (percentage of households (%), n = 89)
Change in living 
standard in last 5 yrs











A lot worse off 0 0 3 0 0
Worse off 0 0 25 6 1
About the same 2 2 19 0 1
Better off 2 4 26 4 0
A lot better off 0 1 2 0 010
obtained through auction for land controlled 
by the communes or the army. These figures 
are in excess of those quoted by Ravallion 
and van de Walle (2003), who give figures 
based on the 1997–98 VLSS of 5.1% for 
the private market and 2.2% for the ‘auction 
market’. Their figures, however, are for annual 
crop land only, whereas the survey data 
reported in this study are for all land clas-
sifications. In other provinces the percentage 
of land obtained by renting is generally low 
and virtually zero in the southern provinces.
There was also evidence of high individual 
percentages of land rented, obtained by 
auction or bought by some households. In Ha 
Tay some individual households had obtained 
up to 65% of their land by private rental and 
up to 100% by auction. These figures are 
much larger than those reported by Chung 
(1994), whose 1993 survey work in the Red 
River Delta found that leased-in areas were 
small, less than 3% of total holdings. In Can 
Tho and Binh Duong some households have 
bought LUR for all of the land they farm. 
Generally, with a few exceptions, households 
in Yen Bai province do not have similar large 
percentages of rented or auctioned land.
From these data it is reasonable to suggest 
that there is probably a considerable and 
active market for LUR in some regions, and 
the evidence for this is discussed further in 
the next section.
The extent of market-based LUR 
transfers
The data summarised in Tables 2 to 6 and 
Figures 1 and 2 give an indication of the 
extent of involvement of households in 
market-based LUR transactions. These data 
generally reflect an active market for LUR 
and support other reports of increases in 
LUR transactions since 1993 (eg Chung 
2000; Deininger & Jin 2003; Do & Iyer 
2003). In Ha Tay province the number of 
recorded LUR transactions has increased 
since 1997; however, this is not apparent 
in the southern communes, possibly 
reflecting the more developed market 
economy that existed in the southern areas 
before the 1993 land reforms (Ravallion & 
van de Walle 2003).
In Ha Tay province the figures for 
involvement in the rental (19% of surveyed 
households) and auction (37% of surveyed 
households) markets are high, and certainly 
don’t portray the ‘thin’ rental markets 
described by Ravallion and van de Walle 
(2003). They are more in line with figures 
taken from ADB et al (2004), who reported 
that 15% of rural households had some land 
leased-in or leased-out in 2002 compared 
to 10% in 1998 and 5% in 1993. From the 
survey data it is clear that LUR transactions 
in Ha Tay have increased sharply since the 
1997–98 VLSS, on which the conclusions 
drawn by Ravallion and van de Walle (2003) 
are based. Even in Yen Bai province, where 
the land area involved in transactions is 
reportedly low, the percentage of households 
involved in renting land and obtaining land 
by auction is sometimes more than 10% 
among those surveyed in each commune.10
In Binh Duong province the level of involve-
ment by households in LUR transactions 
is generally low, except for two communes. 
This is surprising given the location of this 
province adjacent to Ho Chi Minh City, 
and the consequent off-farm employment 
opportunities that might be expected to 
provide an incentive for some households 
to rent-out or sell land. This lack of LUR 
activity in Binh Duong is likely to be because 
much of the land use is under perennial 
crops, such as established fruit tree orchards 
and industrial trees, and hence more difficult 
to both lease and sell.
Many households in Ha Tay reported 
returning land to the cooperative. This is 
indicative of some land allocation adjustment 
processes carried out by local authorities 
in these districts, and also may provide an 
explanation for why there appears to be such 
a large amount of land available for auction. 
There is some concern that land for auction 
might bypass the market system and be made 
available to households through a commune 
controlled preferential system, and whether 
this ‘continuing exercise of communal control 
over land (is) synergistic with market forces 
or opposed to them’ (Ravallion & van de 
Walle 2003, p 1). However, data from the 
survey show that many households have 
successfully obtained land through the 
auction process, and that the prices paid 
for this land are comparable to prices paid 
on the private rental market. This supports 
conclusions drawn by Ravallion and van 
de Walle (2003) that non-market forces 
affecting LUR transactions are tending to 
work in cooperation with market forces.
There is a clear demand for rental land, 
particularly so in the communes surveyed in 
the north. There is also a clear indication of 
constraints on the rental market but these 
are not procedural constraints. It is not unex-
pected that lack of available land is a serious 
constraint, and overcoming this will eventu-
ally be dependent on off-farm opportunities 
and the freedom of rural people to move 
freely and without substantial risk into other 
regions and occupations. Finance is perceived 
as a significant constraint, particularly in 
the south, and this raises concerns about 
credit availability for farm households. 
Credit constraints affect the productivity of 
farm households (Ray 1998), and research 
reported by Duong and Izumida (2002) 
has shown that credit-constrained farm 
households in Vietnam cannot optimise 
their production. Despite economists having 
written much about constraints on the land 
market and the need for further reform 
(eg AusAID 2001; United Nations 1999; 
World Bank in Vietnam 1998), farmers do 
not perceive procedures and the land limit as 
constraints. In practice, for the rental market 
at least, these seem to be secondary issues to 
land availability and finance.
Ha Tay province shows the greatest amount 
of LUR transaction activity and also the 
greatest amount of reported land use change 
(Marsh & MacAulay 2003). This province is 
close to Hanoi and there are opportunities to 
provide products such as fish, meat, vegeta-
bles, flowers and fruit for the increasingly 
affluent Hanoi population. A sharp rise in 
LUR transactions in Ha Tay since 1997 and 
an increase in the rental price being paid for 
land suggests that profitable land use change 
is driving LUR transaction activity. Ensuring 
that land or LUR are tradeable is necessary 10
but not sufficient for a land market to 
develop; there needs to be actual or perceived 
profitable production opportunities as well. 
Ravallion and van de Walle (2003, p 6) note 
that, given the complexities of the initial land 
allocation and the multiple market imperfec-
tions in those sectors (eg labour markets, 
credit and information) affecting agricultural 
production, ‘…it would be naïve to think 
that simply legislating the pre-requisites for 
a competitive land market in this setting 
would make it happen’.
Involvement of households in the LUR 
market
Analysis of the data from Ha Tay province 
shows that a similar percentage of 
households from all socioeconomic groups 
are involved in the LUR rental market. 
However, the above average group holds 
the majority of the land area transacted, 
both in terms of area per transaction and 
total area involved in rental and auction 
transactions. The majority of LUR bought 
have also been acquired by households in 
the above average socioeconomic group. 
Conversely, the majority of LUR rented-out 
or sold have been by households in the poor 
socioeconomic group. Nevertheless, renting-
out transactions may not necessarily reflect 
economic hardship, as some households 
rent-out one land type and rent-in a 
different land type, and renting-out can also 
provide an income and free up labour for 
off-farm work.
The incidence of households involved 
in multiple LUR transactions over time 
suggest that some households are steadily 
accumulating land. Dieninger and Jin (2003) 
suggest that a functioning LUR market 
should result in land being transferred to 
small but efficient producers as well as 
households with larger endowments. Data 
from the survey for this study illustrate 
that this is indeed occurring but the effect 
is only minimal, and larger more wealthy 
households are obtaining the most land 
from the LUR rental market. This is 
possibly a desirable result in terms of 
allocative efficiency and the development of 
a commercial agriculture, but raises poverty 
and equity concerns when few off-farm 
opportunities are available in rural areas. In 
Ha Tay, however, where this trend has been 
reported, off-farm opportunities could be 
expected to be higher than in other provinces 
further from major cities. The World Bank 
(2003, p 44) also notes that further land 
reforms will not result in changes that can be 
expected to bias benefits towards the poor, 
but rather land ownership ‘could become 
gradually more concentrated in the hands of 
wealthier households’.
Evidence of land consolidation 
and land loss
More of the surveyed households said they 
had gained land in the last 5 years than 
lost land, which may indicate a sample bias 
towards wealthier or more efficient farmers. 
Many households said they had more land 
because they had leased or bought land 
in the last 5 years. Some reported land 
loss is a result of distribution of land to 
family members, which, in the long run, 
has the potential to further fragment land 
holdings. There is also some evidence of 
households leasing-out or selling land as 
a result of making a choice to move out 
of farming. In the survey three instances 10
were recorded of households having to sell 
land to cover hospital expenses (two in 
Can Tho province), and two instances of 
land being sold after banks foreclosed on 
mortgages (again both in Can Tho). Other 
research has shown that a high percentage 
of households in the Mekong region are 
losing land (Lan 2001), and that some of the 
most common reasons are health expenses 
and indebtedness.
Analysis of reported land losses/gains 
related to household wellbeing (Tables 11 
and 12) show that not all households report 
a loss in living standard after losing land. 
Lan (2001) made a similar observation 
about some households in the Mekong 
Delta after survey work in 2000. This may 
indicate that some households are indeed 
moving successfully out of farming activity 
into other pursuits, but it should be noted 
that replies could be simply reflecting the 
immediate financial gains that result from 
sale of LUR.
Ravallion and van de Walle (2003) report 
from their analysis of 1998 compared 
to 1993 VLSS data that there is some 
evidence that a gradual concentration of 
land ownership is occurring, tending to 
favour households with long-term roots in 
their communities, male heads and better 
education. The ADB et al (2004) also report 
that a tendency towards the concentration 
of land is clearly visible in the data from 
the 2002 VLSS. Overall, 18.9% of rural 
households were landless in 2002 compared 
to 9.2% in 1998 and 8.2% in 1993, with 
a consistent tendency across regions. Part 
of the increased landlessness is due to 
the fact that the better-off do not rely on 
land as a source of income: landlessness is 
more prevalent among the rich than the 
poor, except in the Mekong Delta. In this 
region, which has the second highest level 
of landlessness (and a very rapid increase 
in landlessness among the rural poor), it 
is those in the poorest fifth of the rural 
population who lack access to land.
Conclusions
Research and observation support the fact 
that an active LUR market for agricultural 
land exists in Vietnam but that it is more 
developed in some regions than others. 
There are distinct differences between the 
northern and southern provinces surveyed, 
with both the private and communal rental 
markets being more active in the north than 
in the south. In the south LUR tend to be 
sold rather than rented, with some individual 
households in all provinces acquiring a large 
percentage of their land holdings either by 
buying LUR or renting though the private 
or communal market. This suggests that a 
reallocation of land is occurring following the 
initial land allocation and the introduction 
of the 1993 Land Law that enabled LUR to 
be traded.
The research results from these data suggest 
the following policy implications:
Credit availability is affecting the ability 
of households to rent and buy land, 
especially in the south. Households need 
access to adequate credit to enable them 
to take advantage of market opportunities 
and expand their production.
10
Land availability affects the ability 
of households to rent and buy land. 
Households will not lease-out or sell 
their LUR unless there are opportunities 
for them to move freely, and without 
overwhelming financial risk, to other 
regions and employment.
There is a need for increased research 
and extension activities to foster and 
encourage profitable land use change. 
Such change, combined with increased 
off-farm opportunities, will drive the 
development of the market for LUR and 
result in allocative efficiency gains.
The results of this research indicate 
that an active LUR market, as appears 
to exist in Ha Tay province, will tend 
to concentrate land in the hands of 
the more wealthy farmers. This will 
assist with the commercialisation 
of Vietnamese agriculture but will 
inevitably raise poverty and equity 
concerns as long as off-farm employment 




The process of land reform in Vietnam 
is ongoing, with a new Land Law being 
passed in November 2003. Considerable 
pressure is being exerted on the government 
in relation to: the completion of allocation 
and registration of LUR, issues related to 
compensation, difficulties associated with 
using LUR as collateral for loans, problems 
of land fragmentation, the desirability of 
stable and long-term tenure, and the need 
for a better regulatory framework. There is 
also continuing debate about the appropriate 
length of tenure, ceiling levels for land 
holdings, restrictions on the transfer and 
use of land, and the extent of land property 
rights that should be held by individuals. 
Although there is a need to address these 
issues, development of the agricultural land 
market in Vietnam is possibly now more 
dependent on adequate credit availability, off-
farm employment opportunities, improved 
market information and rural infrastructure 
than on further land reform.10
cHApter Five
tAx policieS And AgriculturAl 
lAnd uSe 
le huu anh
Tax policy is an important supportive policy for agricultural production. Farm house-
holds involved in production face taxes which affect the decision-making processes 
of the household. In this chapter tax policies relevant to agricultural production in 
Vietnam are outlined and discussed in this context. Three general types of taxes may 
be distinguished: (a) sales or output taxes, (b) input taxes and (c) value-added taxes, 
each having a different impact on the household. The impact of the agricultural land 
use tax prior to 2003 at the farm household level is investigated using survey data. 
The data show that the amount of tax was low compared to production value but it 
could be a significant proportion of the cash costs. Recent changes to the policy on 
agricultural land use tax are outlined, and advantages and disadvantages of the new 
policy are discussed, along with issues emerging from these changes.110
Tax policies and the farm 
household
Tax policy is an important supportive 
policy for agricultural production, and can 
be used by governments as an intervention 
aiming to reallocate benefits at the macro 
level. In agricultural production tax policy 
is directly related to the amount of tax 
contributions made by farmers, as well as the 
investment and consumption of farmers and 
the agricultural sector as a whole. For farm 
households tax affects not only the price 
paid for production inputs but also the price 
received for outputs.
Farm households involved in agricultural 
production face taxes which affect the 
decision-making processes of the household. 
Three general types of taxes may be distin-
guished: (a) sales or output taxes, (b) input 
taxes and (c) value-added taxes, each having 
a different impact on the household. Sales 
taxes and value-added taxes have an impact 
on consumption and marketing decisions 
through changes in the effective output price. 
Input taxes such as land tax or tax on the use 
of inputs directly affect input use through 
changes in the returns to land or the input 
price. For example, an increase in the rate of 
taxation on an input such as fertiliser will 
cause a reduction in its use. Thus tax policy 
can have a bearing on the effective use of 
resources by the household.
Tax policies in Vietnam
Tax policy related to agriculture
Current taxes related to agriculture in 
Vietnam include a tax on agricultural land 
use, a tax on land use rights transfer, an 
additional tax on land over the land limit, 
a value-added tax (VAT), and import and 
export taxes.
Tax on agricultural land use
This tax, which is related to land resource 
management, is a mixed tax combining 
the characteristics of assets, income and 
value-added (VAT) taxes. The amount of 
tax is calculated based on areas and land 
class, and is dependent on five factors (land 
fertility, location, topography, climate and 
irrigation conditions). The tax is calculated 
in quantity of rice per unit area for each land 
class (see Table 1), and is collected in cash by 
using a rice price regulated by the provincial 
government which is equivalent to market 
price (National Assembly 1993). Hence, 
land use tax paid per unit area can vary 
between provinces. In 2003 the Government 
of Vietnam passed legislation exempting 
most farmers from paying agricultural land 
use tax until 2010. This policy development 
is discussed later in this paper.
Tax on land use rights transfer
The exchange and transfer of land use rights 
to other land users is taxed. This tax aims 
to improve land management. The amount 
of tax is calculated based on areas, the land 
price for tax calculation, and the tax rate. 111
The land price for tax calculation is regulated 
by the provincial government based on the 
price framework determined by the central 
government. The tax rate varies within the 
range 0–40% and is dependent on the land 
type and the specific transfer. For example, 
for agricultural and forestry land the transfer 
tax rate is 10% (and 5% for the second 
transfer), for housing land 20%, for a transfer 
from agricultural to non-agricultural land 
40%, and for a transfer from non-agricultural 
to agricultural land 0%.
Additional tax on land over the 
land limit
This tax aims to dissuade accumulation of 
land over the land use limit specified by the 
Land Law. The land limits are dependent on 
the type of crops and on specific regions. The 
amount of additional tax on land held over 
the land limit is 20% of the tax on agricul-
tural land use (National Assembly 1994a).
Value-added tax (VAT)
The VAT mainly affects the price of 
materials and inputs for production and 
processing of agricultural products.
Import and export taxes
Import taxes affecting agriculture are 
those on imported materials needed for 
agricultural production such as gasoline, 
petrol, fertiliser and machines. Export taxes 
affecting agriculture are those imposed on 
the export of agricultural products. Current 
policy encourages the export of agricultural 
products, so the export tax rate is 0%.
Tax policy purposes
The current tax policy is designed for 
different purposes but the main effects are:
The policy does not encourage the 
accumulation of land over the land limit
In Vietnam land per capita is small, and 
maintenance of the agricultural land limit is 
therefore an issue debated by economists and 
policy makers. For farmers land is considered 
to be a major ‘production material’ and the 
source of their main income, because the 
off-farm income of farmers is still modest. 
Moreover, land for farmers is also a political 
issue in agrarian countries such as Vietnam. 
This tax aims to limit income disparity and 
avoid social problems in rural areas.
The policy encourages intensification 
and land protection (land class is fixed 
for 10 years)
Although land class may change during a 
period of cultivation, the land class for tax 
calculation purposes is fixed for 10 years. 
This encourages farmers to confidently 
invest in and protect their land, and avoid 
a situation of land exhaustion (land is 
considered to be a renewable resource). The 
tax rates on annual and perennial crops 
are presented in Table 1. In the process of 
intensification, the level of land fertility may 
increase. Therefore, land class may actually 
change but the tax rate is fixed.112
The policy encourages an increase in 
production outputs (fixed tax rate)
In Vietnam the tax on agricultural land use 
has a fixed rate, which means that the tax 
is independent of both production output 
and the value of production from a unit 
area. This may be an important factor in 
encouraging farmers to use land so as to 
increase its productivity.
This policy helps to improve land 
resource management for maintenance of 
agricultural land
Land is the most important ‘production 
instrument’ of farmers. The tax policy 
focuses on the improvement of land 
management and the efficient use of the 
land resource, with the aim of increasing 
agricultural production and ensuring food 
security. In addition, it also limits mass 
urbanisation, which would result in less area 
being available for agriculture.
The policy guarantees stable and long-
term use but allows transfer
The tax policy is designed to guarantee the 
stable and long-term use of land as well as the 
investment in land regulated by the Land Law, 
but it does allow the transfer of land assets. 
The tax rate on the transfer of land use rights 
is dependent on the change of purpose of land 
use. When the purpose of land use change 
is from farm land to non-farm land, the tax 
rate is at least 40%; when the purpose is the 
reverse (ie from non-farm to farm land), the 
tax rate is 0% (National Assembly 1994b).
The current tax policy is a clear 
combination of both economic and 
social aspects
Tax policy in Vietnam combines economic 
policy and supportive social policy because all 
tax policies give priority to rural people who 
have difficulties or are in a specific situation. 
Poor households, regional areas, areas with 
special difficulties and minority groups are 
allowed tax exemption and/or tax reductions.
Table 1  The tax rate for agricultural land use
Land class Land for annual crops 
and aquaculture 
(kg of rice/ha/year)
Land class Land for perennial crops 
(kg of rice/ha/year) 
1 550 1 650
2 460 2 550
3 370 3 400
4 280 4 200
5 180 5 80
6 50
Source: National Assembly (1993)11
Impacts of tax policy
The tax on agricultural land use in Vietnam 
is fixed and is not dependent on outputs 
produced on that land. Therefore, the ratios 
of tax to production outputs, costs related 
to intensification, yields and income are 
different between regions. By using indica-
tors such as gross revenue, gross margin 
and cash costs (expenses) the impact of tax 
on household production can be assessed. 
Gross revenue is calculated as output 
multiplied by its price. Gross margin is the 
production value made by the household 
minus cash costs used for buying materials, 
hiring machines and paying land rental 
(effectively equivalent to household income 
from production).
The tax ratio calculated as a percentage of 
total cash costs is higher if the cash costs 
of the household are low. That is, if the tax 
ratio is high then the tax is a relatively high 
percentage of costs. The tax ratio calculated 
as a percentage of gross revenue is higher 
as gross revenue is lower, and similarly the 
tax ratio calculated as a percentage of gross 
margin is higher for lower gross margins.
Data from household surveys
In 2001 a household survey was conducted 
in four provinces in Vietnam: Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai in the north, and Binh Duong and 
Can Tho in the south (see Appendix I). 
Data collected from the approximately 400 
surveyed households included questions 
about land holdings and the level of, 
and costs and revenue associated with, 
production activities. The survey was 
repeated in 2002 using a smaller sample of 
the same farmers in the four provinces.
Data relating tax rates to cash costs, gross 
revenues and gross margins obtained from 
the household surveys are shown in Table 
2. In Ha Tay annual crop land was mainly 
used for rice cultivation. Thus, the value of 
output produced and cash costs were small. 
Some communes with diversified crops and a 
higher level of agricultural commercialisation 
(eg Song Phuong and Tho Xuan) had high 
cash costs and gross revenues as well as high 
gross margins, and their tax ratio was lower.
In Yen Bai the high tax ratio for cash costs 
reflected lower cash expenses and low 
intensification. The low tax ratios for gross 
revenues and gross margins also suggest 
that the actual tax amount was very small. 
This means that high-value crops could be 
cultivated in mountainous areas but the tax 
rate was low because the land is less fertile 
(low land class).
A similar picture was observed in the south. 
In Can Tho cash costs and gross revenues 
were high (high intensification) but the 
gross margins were not high. In Binh 
Duong different annual crops cultivated by 
farmers were also reflected in the differing 
tax ratios. In An Son commune the amount 
of rice grown was small, and most of the 
commercial crops led to high gross revenues 
and gross margins. In An Tay commune 
gross margins were low because farmers had 
off-farm jobs (An Tay is located close to 
industrial zones), and the amount of land left 
fallow by farmers was increasing.11
Table 2  Tax rates on agricultural land use (annual crop land) as a percentage of cash costs, 
gross revenue and gross margin
Commune Tax rates as a percentage of
Cash costs Gross revenue Gross margin
Ha Tay
Dai Dong (n = 154) 7.4 2.5 3.7
Thach Hoa (n = 58) 6.4 1.7 2.3
Song Phuong (n = 105) 3.3 1.1 1.7
Tho Xuan (n = 130) 2.8 0.9 1.3
Yen Bai
Dai Dong (n = 49) 9.3 1.6 2.0
Bao Ai (n = 61) 9.9 2.1 2.4
Mau Dong (n = 76) 5.7 1.3 1.7
Dong Cuong (n = 65) 4.6 1.5 2.2
Binh Duong
Vinh Phu (n = 27) 5.9 2.5 4.3
An Son (n = 13) 5.8 0.5 0.5
Lai Uyen (n = 7) 6.1 3.0 6.0
An Tay (n = 22) 3.9 3.4 25.9a
Can Tho
Dong Thanh (n = 15) 3.5 1.8 3.6
Dong Phuoc (n = 48) 6.2 3.4 7.4
Truong Thanh (n = 58) 3.6 1.8 3.7
Dong Hiep (n = 59) 3.1 1.4 2.6
Note: n is the number of plots surveyed of annual crop land
a  Data includes annual crops only, whereas the major source of income in An Tay commune is 
from perennial crops11
The tax rate data for plots used for cultivating 
only rice are shown in Table 3. In Ha Tay 
cash costs invested in rice cropping were low. 
Although rice yield was stable, the income 
from cultivating rice crops was not high. In 
Dai Dong and Song Phuong communes, 
where the level of intensification was high, 
the tax ratios of all three indicators were 
higher than in Thach Hoa and Tho Xuan. 
This means that rice production may not be 
attractive for farmers in these communes and 
they may not consider rice production as a 
main income source, preferring to cultivate 
other more profitable cash crops.
In mountainous communes in Yen Bai the 
tax ratio to cash costs also shows that cash 
expenses were low and the tax levels lower 
than for flat field areas (less fertile land). 
Thus, cash costs invested in these areas were 
not significant. The tax ratios to cash costs, 
gross revenues and gross margins in Dai 
Dong and Bao Ai (Yen Binh district) were 
higher than in Mau Dong and Dong Cuong 
(Van Yen district). This means that cash 
costs, yields and gross margins in Yen Binh 
were lower than in Van Yen. Because farm 
households in Van Yen had more suitable 
Table 3  Tax rates on rice land as a percentage of cash costs, gross revenue and gross margin
Commune Tax rates as a percentage of
Cash costs Gross revenue Gross margin
Ha Tay
Dai Dong (n = 108) 9.4 3.1 4.6
Thach Hoa (n =4 8) 6.7 2.3 3.4
Song Phuong (n = 64) 11.4 4.4 7.2
Tho Xuan (n = 42) 8.1 2.5 3.6
Yen Bai
Dai Dong (n = 43) 11.6 2.6 3.4
Bao Ai (n = 48) 11.7 2.2 2.7
Mau Dong (n = 55) 6.1 1.4 1.8
Dong Cuong (n = 55) 6.6 1.9 2.6
Can Tho
Dong Thanh (n = 9) 3.2 1.6 3.2
Dong Phuoc (n = 30) 6.2 3.4 7.4
Truong Thanh (n = 36) 3.6 1.9 3.8
Dong Hiep (n = 30) 3.1 1.4 2.6
Note: n is the number of plots surveyed classified as rice land11
conditions for rice production, they had 
higher gross revenues as well as gross margins 
but they also invested more in rice crops.
In Can Tho the tax ratio to cash costs was 
lower than in the north. This means that 
expenses for rice production (eg costs of 
buying materials, hiring machines and 
labour) were higher in Can Tho. Although 
the gross revenues from rice production were 
higher than in the north, the gross margins 
were not high. At current costs and produc-
tion levels, rice production in the Mekong 
Delta is less efficient in comparison with that 
in the north. This conclusion is consistent 
with results reported by Hung & MacAulay 
(2005), who found that farmers in the south 
had lower technical efficiency than those 
in the north and that, in terms of outputs, 
economies of size existed in the south.
The survey data show that the amount of 
tax was low compared to production value 
but it was a significant proportion of the 
cash costs. This means that if the tax is 
removed, farmers may have more money 
to invest in their production. Humphries 
(1999) also concluded that ‘… there is a merit 
in abolishing the agricultural land use tax’, 
although his reason for saying this was more 
related to cadastral problems associated 
with calculating tax liabilities for individual 
households. Because farmers are amongst 
the poorest in Vietnamese society and their 
incomes come mainly from land use, tax 
reduction and exemption for agricultural 
land use may increase equity by providing 
incentives for farmers to increase their 
consumption and investment.
Tax policy changes
Recent changes to the 
agricultural land use tax
The agricultural land use tax in Vietnam was 
based on Decree 031/SL (1951) and was 
designed as a tax on the benefits arising from 
land use. This has changed to be a tax on 
both land and land use benefits (ie a tax on 
‘property’ and ‘income’) since the Ordinance 
on Agricultural Tax (1983) and the Tax on 
Agricultural Land Use Law (1993) were 
issued. The agricultural land use tax was 
recognised as a complex mixed tax effectively 
replacing taxes on profits, revenues, natural 
resource use and assets. There has been 
extensive debate in recent years about the 
agricultural land use tax and its effects on 
land use and land consolidation. Its contribu-
tion to government revenue was argued to be 
low (see Table 4).
In order to encourage agricultural produc-
tion and support farmers, exemptions and 
reductions to the agricultural land use tax 
were announced in June and November 
2003 under Resolution 15/2003/QH11 
(National Assembly, 17 June 2003) 
and Ordinance 129/2003/ND-CP 
(Government of Vietnam, 3 November 
2003). This policy change will affect 
12 million tax payers in rural areas, and 
will result in most farm households and 
organisations either being exempt from 
paying agricultural land use tax or having the 
amount they pay reduced.11
Tax exemptions under the new policy 
include:
agricultural land under the land limits 
for both farm households and individuals
agro-forestry land under the land limits 
allocated to households from state-
owned enterprises
agricultural land, both under and above 
the land limits, for ‘poor’ households 
and households located in areas 
classified as having ‘special difficulties’. 
‘Poor’ households are determined on 
criteria set by the Ministry of Labour, 
Invalids and Social Affairs. Areas with 
‘special difficulties’ are based on the 
Government’s Poverty Alleviation 
Program 135.
Reductions of 50% in the agricultural land 
use tax apply to:
economic, political, sociopolitical, 
socioprofessional, armed forces and 
administrative organisations which 
manage and use agricultural land
land holdings in excess of the land 
limits which are used for agriculture and 
forestry by households and individuals, 
including land allocated by state-owned 
enterprises.
These exemptions and reductions will 
apply from 2003 to 2010. However, there is 
considerable debate on this issue, including 
opinions both supporting and contesting 







Opinions supporting land use tax 
exemption
The policy will affect 12 million 
farm households who are land users 
throughout the whole country, and 
effectively is seen as state support for 
farmers to develop their production 
activities. The tax exemption is 
considered as being an investment now 
available to farmers for intensification, 
savings and consumption.
The policy will improve the balance 
between taxation and income for all 
land users, most of whom are farmers. 
Farmers are the poorest class in society, 
and the majority of ethnic minority 
people in remote areas are farmers.
The policy reduces the difficulties and 
inequities associated with a tax based 
on a standard rice quantity and where 
payments in cash are determined by the 
rice price. In poor-yield years or when 
the rice price is high, the tax collection 
is high relative to those years with a 
good harvest or a lower rice price. In 
some poor regions the rice price may be 
higher, and therefore the tax amount will 
be higher, than in richer regions for the 
same land class.
Generally, the removal or reduction of 
the agricultural land use tax had been 
welcomed by farmers.
Researchers believe that because this tax 
only occupies a small part of the annual 
national budget (see Table 4), its removal 
does not significantly affect the budget. 
Moreover, the expenses associated with 






In summary, those supporting the new policy 
believe that the tax exemption will not affect 
the national budget, and that it has signifi-
cant and wide positive sociopolitical effects 
and will result in farmers having confidence 
in the state.
Opinions against land tax exemption
The budget revenue of local governments 
(commune, district and provincial levels) 
will be reduced as all of the agricultural 
land use tax was collected and used by 
local governments. The tax is the income 
source for the salaries of many local 
government staff.
Some commentators believe that the 
tax on agricultural land use is related to 
the principle of good management of 
the land resource. The existence of an 
agricultural land use tax reinforces the 
responsibility of land users to improve 
the land resource, protect unused land 
and use land for the correct purpose.
There are still equity issues associated 
with the policy change. In areas where 
land is less fertile, and in mountainous 
areas, farms tend to be larger and farmers 
are more likely to have to pay the reduced 




productivity tends to be high and land 
areas are generally under the land limits, 
so the tax is exempted. Thus, there 
continues to be an inequity where users 
of less fertile land may pay tax while 
users of more fertile land may not.
Furthermore, there is now a big gap in 
the amount of land use tax paid between 
urban and agricultural land users 
because the value of urban land is much 
higher in comparison with the value of 
agricultural land.
In summary, those raising concerns about 
the new policy believe that the tax exemption 
will lead to a relaxed approach to land 
management and to negative impacts on land 
use, whereas land is a valuable resource of the 
country that should be protected by policy.
Issues emerging from changes 
to the agricultural land tax
A number of issues are emerging for 
consideration by policy makers in response 
to the policy which exempts and reduces 
farmers’ liability to pay agricultural land use 
tax. Compensation of local governments in 
agricultural areas may be appropriate for the 
loss of agricultural land use tax revenues; 

Table 4  The tax on agricultural land use as a percentage of GDP and the national budget
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002a 2003a
Percentage of GDP (%) 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 – –




otherwise, in order to cover their budgets, 
local governments may need to ask farmers 
to pay additional fees or face a reduction in 
service provision. Farm communities may 
wish to pay for community services which 
relate to the value of land and which cannot 
be provided without the collection of taxes.
Although the land use tax exemption 
provides some relief for poor farmers, the 
actual amounts of production income saved 
are only small and this policy should not be 
viewed as a substitute for more substantive 
poverty alleviation strategies.
The new policy could also affect land transfer 
and land accumulation. There are three 
ways of considering the effects of the tax 
exemption policy, none of which encourage 
land accumulation. First, it could be argued 
that the tax exemption is a form of direct 
assistance to farmers, and will encourage 
them to keep their land rather than transfer 
land. Second, as the tax exemption is 
calculated only on land under the land limit, 
this discourages land accumulation over the 
land limit. Finally, land prices tend to rise in 
the absence of a property tax (Keith 1999).
Impacts of tax policies on poor 
people
Land tax
More than 90% of poor people in Vietnam 
live in rural areas and their main income 
comes from land use. Poor farming house-
holds tend to exhaust and exploit land, and 
there are conflicting opinions on the effect 
of land use tax exemption on this tendency. 
It is argued that exemption will assist poor 
farmers to invest in production. Because 
the ratio of tax to income for poor people is 
high, and their costs low, the tax exemption 
will result in them having more income 
and they may increase their investment in 
agriculture. A contrary argument suggests 
that the tax exemption may encourage poor 
farmers to think that land is not valued, 
and they may exhaust the land or use it for 
wrong purposes.
Keith (1999) notes that property tax tends 
to make access to land easier for the less 
wealthy because the ultimate burden of 
the tax falls on the owner. Theoretically, a 
property tax has the effect of reducing the 
market value of land and thus making it 
easier to purchase – however, in practice 
this effect is usually not very noticeable. The 
converse is more apparent – where there 
is no tax on property there seems to be a 
tendency for land ownership to become more 
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy.
Value added tax (VAT)
VAT is a tax which increases the costs of 
inputs of agricultural production such as 
materials, electricity, gasoline or petrol. 
Although VAT is an important revenue 
source for both the state and national 
budgets, it increases the costs of agricultural 
production, thus decreasing the ability of 
poorer households to invest in production.
Import and export taxes
Import and export taxes are also related 
to agriculture and rural development. 
The government encourages the export 
of agricultural products, which are then 
exempted from VAT. This benefits larger 
commercial farmers more than smaller 
subsistence-oriented households. Import 120
taxes are applied to imported commodities 
for the purpose of supporting and protecting 
domestic production. Import taxes apply 
to many inputs imported for agricultural 
production, such as fertiliser. Like the VAT, 
import taxes increase agricultural production 
costs, and thus decrease the ability of poor 
households to invest in production.
Conclusion
Tax and credit policy have significant 
impacts on the whole economy in general, 
and on agricultural land use in particular. 
Vietnam is still a poor country, and is in 
the process of transforming from a central 
planning to a market-oriented economy 
under management of the government. 
Tax policies are part of the active reform 
process leading to economic development 
and encouraging appropriate and efficient 
land use. Tax reforms are needed to make 
Vietnam more competitive as it integrates 
into regional and international markets.
Flat tax rates mean that farmers effectively 
pay different rates, with the poorest carrying 
a comparatively larger tax burden. The survey 
data show that the amount of agricultural 
land use tax was low compared to produc-
tion value but it was a significant proportion 
of cash costs in some regions. Policy changes 
in 2003 have resulted in most farmers being 
exempt from agricultural land use tax, and 
the advantages and disadvantages of this 
policy change are being actively debated 
in Vietnam.
In the longer term a new policy on taxing of 
agriculture land will be needed after 2010. 
The use of rice quantities and payments 
dependent on the rice price is inequitable in 
relation to either income or the value of the 
land used. In the years between 2003 and 
2010 there is a window of opportunity for the 
government to give consideration to policy 
regarding market-based land valuation.121
cHApter Six
credit uSe in FArm HouSeHoldS in 
vietnAm: implicAtionS For rurAl 
credit policy
Sally P. MarSh, le huu anh and T. Gordon Macaulay
Despite a number of recent policy changes designed to improve their access to credit, 
small household farms, and the rural sector in general, in Vietnam are recognised 
as facing severe credit restrictions. Limited access to working capital credit for farm 
households with seasonal production expenses and returns is known to result from 
market failure in the credit markets. In this chapter results from a household survey 
are reported. As part of this survey, conducted in four provinces in northern and 
southern Vietnam in 2000 and 2001, credit use in 400 farm households was inves-
tigated. These data are described and analysed with regard to implications for rural 
credit policy in Vietnam. Generally, there is widespread use of credit in households 
with both above and below average incomes and farm size, but amounts borrowed 
are small, usually less than VND10 million (approximately AUD$1000), and often 
less than the amount requested from the lender. This suggests that substantial credit 
constraints exist, although the data from 2001 indicated that credit constraints 
might be lessening. Significant regional differences were observed in the use of credit 
from formal and informal sources, with more households in the northern provinces 
accessing credit through informal and semi-formal sources. The use of informal 
credit sources was less in 2001 than in 2000, particularly in the northern provinces.122
Introduction
As pointed out by Sadoulet and de Janvry 
(1995, p 150) a frequent cause of market 
failure is limited access to working capital 
credit. Problems faced by the agricultural 
household include a seasonal pattern of 
production in which expenses must be 
incurred before income can be earned, and 
a requirement to balance the budget over a 
seasonal or yearly cycle. Thus, because credit 
is an essential input, its limited availability 
becomes an effective constraint to activity 
in that expenditures must be limited to the 
available cash rather than to the productive 
potential. In effect, the prices for goods a 
household purchases or sells (ie both inputs 
and outputs) are increased by the effective 
value of the credit constraint (Sadoulet & 
de Janvry 1995). This value is the worth of 
one unit of credit to the household in terms 
of income. Thus, the value of earning wage 
income, as well as the effective cost of fertiliser 
or other inputs, is increased by the restricted 
availability of credit. This restriction limits the 
ability of the household to make the best use 
possible of its available resources.
The lag between expenses and income 
means that agricultural credit is used to 
finance production and, in poorer countries 
particularly, to smooth consumption in the 
period before the harvest (Bardhan & Udry 
1999). Additionally, Krause et al (1990, p 
913) report that small farmers ‘primarily 
view credit as a form of insurance in times 
of distress where production risks are severe’, 
making them reluctant to default on loans 
in order to avoid the loss of future access to 
credit. Bardhan and Udry (1999, p 76) note 
that ‘seasonal credit transactions are common 
in virtually all poor agricultural economies’ 
and that ‘the institutional arrangements 
through which these transactions are effected 
are varied and often complex’. Furthermore, 
in many of these economies the degree of 
information asymmetry that exists between 
borrower and lender is substantial, which 
makes the liberalisation of credit markets 
particularly difficult.
Vietnam is in the process of implementing 
reforms to the banking system and 
undertaking a gradual liberalisation of credit 
markets (World Bank 2003). However, small 
household farms, and in the rural sector in 
general, in Vietnam are recognised as facing 
credit constraints (Duong & Izumida 2002; 
Wolz 1997; World Bank 1998). Historically, 
the credit market in Vietnam has been 
seriously distorted by government interven-
tion including priority credit given to state 
owned enterprises and various commodity 
production programs (World Bank 1998). 
Additionally, agricultural credit policy in 
Vietnam is often used as an instrument of 
social welfare policy, targeting finance to 
poorer regions and households, through 
the activities of the Bank for Social Policy 
(previously known as the Vietnamese Bank 
for the Poor).
Commercial credit availability for farm 
households commenced in 1993. Decree No 
14/CP (1993) gave farm households access 
to credit, whereas previously loans had only 
been available to households through institu-
tions. Following this reform, credit could be 
provided direct to households by commercial 
banks and financial organisations. The 1993 
Land Law allocated land use rights (LUR) 
to households and gave them the right to use 12
these as collateral for bank loans. However, 
there are continuing issues with the use of 
LUR as collateral, and these will be discussed 
later in this chapter.
The objectives of this chapter are to review 
credit use at the farm household level in 
Vietnam using data from household surveys 
conducted in 2001 and 2002 and relate this 
to ongoing changes in credit policy. The 
survey data are disaggregated by region, loan 
source and socioeconomic group in order to 
investigate the effects of current credit policy, 
identify problems and suggest policy needs.
A brief overview of agricultural credit 
sources and credit policy in Vietnam is given, 
followed by description of the survey method 
and survey results. The results are discussed 
under the headings: use of credit sources, size 
of loans and credit constraints, loan terms 
and interest rates, use of collateral, savings, 
and households accessing credit. Conclusions 
are drawn and policy implications listed in 
the final section of the chapter.
Agricultural credit in 
Vietnam
The banking sector in Vietnam was 
one of the first areas of the economy to 
be deregulated and opened up to the 
private sector. Changes were made to the 
structure, regulations and operations of the 
Vietnamese banking sector from the late 
1980s (World Bank 2003), such that Wolz 
(1997, p 5) comments that ‘in 1997 the insti-
tutional set-up looks quite heterogeneous’. 
Despite these changes, the Government of 
Vietnam has controlled credit availability 
and interest rates in all sectors of the 
financial market through the activities and 
regulation of the State Bank, and through 
regulations controlling subject access to 
credit (Duong & Izumida 2002; Wolz 1997; 
World Bank 2003).
Agricultural credit providers
Formal, semi-formal and informal credit 
providers operate together in the rural credit 
market in Vietnam, as is typical in many 
developing countries. However, in Vietnam 
the formal banking sector, and particularly 
the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD), is now responsible 
for the bulk of the loans made to rural 
households (Anh 2002; Duong & Izumida 
2002). This was not always the case, with 
data from the 1993–94 Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey (VLSS) showing that 
40% of loans in rural areas were from private 
individuals, 33% from private moneylenders 
and 25% from banks or other sources (Wolz 
1997). Entities operating in the formal, 
semi-formal and informal credit markets are 
as follows.
The formal credit sector
In Vietnam commercial financial sources 
include commercial banks, branches of 
foreign banks, joint-stock banks and joint 
venture banks. The four state-owned 
commercial banks (the Vietnamese Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development, 
the Vietnamese Bank for Foreign Trade, 
the Vietnamese Bank for Industrial Trade 
and the Vietnamese Bank for Investment 
and Development) play a key role, with the 
VBARD being the major commercial source 
of credit for rural households.12
The Bank for Social Policy (BSP) is a 
government-owned non-profit bank estab-
lished in 1995 with objectives ‘to contribute 
to hunger eradication and poverty alleviation’ 
(Wolz 1997, p 9). Loan eligibility is strictly 
controlled, and this bank is a major credit 
source for households who are in poverty, are 
members of minority ethnic groups or are 
eligible for special social policies (eg those 
households with family members wounded 
or killed during the wars, and households 
recognised as having rendered services to 
the country). As poverty is concentrated in 
rural areas, the BSP is the commercial credit 
source available to many rural households. 
Loans from the BSP are subsidised with low 
interest rates (around 0.8% per month) and 
are generally for small amounts.
The semi-formal credit sector
The semi-formal sector provides loans 
through sociopolitical unions in rural areas, 
and the level of activity of this sector in a 
region is related to priority programs of the 
government, consignment services of the 
banks and the activity of unions. The interest 
rate charged by these groups is often lower 
than that of the commercial banks.
Since 1997 the People’s Credit Funds (PCF) 
have been established by the State Bank of 
Vietnam. These are commune-level savings 
and credit cooperatives, established with 
the aim of promoting ‘self help and mutual 
assistance’, which are under the jurisdiction 
of the Cooperative Law (Wolz 1997, p 11). 
Initially they expanded rapidly, with the 
World Bank (1998) reporting that over 900 
were operating at the commune level in 51 of 
Vietnam’s 61 provinces. Interest rates reflect 
commercial lending rates and loans are 
generally for the short term.
Credit associated with some government 
and foreign country programs is entrusted 
to the banks to implement projects such 
as the National Program for Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty Reduction, and the 
National Project for Jobs and Employment. 
These programs provide credit to groups of 
farmers through sociopolitical groups (eg the 
Women’s Union or Farmers’ Association) 
or local governments, which are considered 
as semi-formal sources. This credit comes 
from the national budget or from overseas 
development aid of foreign countries and 
international financial organisations. Such 
group-based or mediated finance is recog-
nised as helping overcome problems of infor-
mation asymmetry in that loan applications 
for individuals are vetted through credible 
organisations (Duong & Izumida 2002).
Since the early 1990s the mass organisa-
tions (eg the Women’s Union or Farmers’ 
Association), supported by foreign NGOs, 
have also encouraged micro-finance schemes 
based on non-profit principles. This credit 
is mainly available for community develop-
ment, gender equality, hunger eradication 
and poverty reduction, and households or 
individuals with special circumstances (eg 
minorities, people in mountainous and 
remote areas, poor households and women). 
Although these micro-finance schemes can 
be important in specific areas and have been 
the subject of considerable research, they 
are not a focus of the work presented in 
this chapter.12
Informal credit sources
Informal sources have been traditional 
providers of credit in rural areas and are the 
result of an underdeveloped formal credit 
market. Wolz (1997) identifies four forms of 
informal credit sources as:
mutual lending among friends and 
neighbours
rotating savings and credit associations 
promoting periodic savings which are 
rotated as a fund among a limited group 
of people who trust each other (generally 
from the same hamlet)
specialised moneylenders including 
pawnbrokers
traders giving advances in cash or in kind 
(for the rights to buy the harvest).
Interest rates associated with informal 
finance can vary from being very high to 
none at all, and loan amounts are also highly 
variable. Informal finance has played a major 
role in providing credit to rural households 
in the past, as demonstrated by the 1993–94 
VLSS statistics mentioned earlier.
Developments in credit policy
In Vietnam there is a positive trend in credit 
policy liberalisation to be more in line with 
market economic principles.
Interest rates and loan limits
Until comparatively recently commercial 
credit sources were virtually completely 
controlled by the interest rate policies of 
the Central Bank and this had an effect on 
the competitiveness of commercial credit 





now gradually being liberalised. Changes in 
interest rate policy were implemented in May 
2002 as a result of Decision No 546/2002/
QD-NHNN of the Governor of the State 
Bank of Vietnam (State Bank 2002). This 
decision has allowed new arrangements for 
the direct negotiation of interest rates with 
borrowers for commercial credit contracts 
in Vietnamese dong. When lending the 
bank can determine interest rates based on 
the supply of and demand for capital in the 
market, and take into account the level of 
trust or confidence they have in the customer 
or customer group. Effectively, this means 
that interest rates are no longer controlled 
by direct regulation of the government, thus 
allowing the development of more liberalised 
credit markets.
Transaction costs of agricultural credit are 
high because loans in agriculture and rural 
areas are generally small and for the short 
term. The VBARD has regulated a higher 
interest rate for loans in rural areas than in 
urban areas, and higher rates for small loans 
than for large loans (eg, it has set differential 
interest rates for loans as of August 2002 
as follows: less than VND10 million, 
1%/month; less than VND50 million, 
0.9%/month; greater than VND50 million, 
0.85%/month). Investment in rural areas is 
not as attractive to banks as investment in 
urban or industrial areas.
For current interest rates there is discrimina-
tion between small and large, and short-term 
and long-term, loans as well as between 
different customers. Loan limits for farmers 
are dependent on the individual customer 
and are related to the amount and type of 
assets available for mortgage. The loan is also 
dependent on the type of household (poor 12
or rich household, and family or commercial 
farm). Because the mortgagable assets of 
farm households are generally of a low value, 
loans to farm households are usually small.
Collateral and risk
Assets available to be mortgaged in rural 
areas are mainly the house and land and 
other productive assets, particularly livestock. 
In Vietnam farmers do not actually own land 
but they can mortgage their land use rights. 
The collateral value of the Red Book (so do) 
(the name given to a household’s record of 
their land use rights entitlement) is around 
50–70% of the land value, with the value of 
land set in accordance with a government 
framework that is specific to regions (World 
Bank 1998). House values, however, are 
determined directly by bank officials. In 
the past the government-set land value has 
been well below the market value, making 
the collateral value of agricultural land in 
particular very low. Revisions to the Land 
Law made in 2003 have made provision for 
the government land value to be set closer to 
the real market value (Vietnam News 2003).
Another type of LUR mortgage called 
‘trustable mortgage’ (tin chap) can be used 
by households who have been allocated 
land and have the Red Book. In this case 
banks consider the LUR as the trust or 
guarantee for a loan that has the support of 
local government and sociopolitical groups 
in rural areas. The value of LUR is the same 
for each Red Book, and is independent of 
the land area or the value of land in the 
Red Book or the productive assets (eg tree 
crops) on the land. Using LUR as a ‘trustable 
mortgage’, a household can borrow a fixed 
amount. Based on current regulations, the 
amount that can be borrowed from the 
VBARD is not larger than VND10 million 
for household farms and VND20 million for 
family or commercial farms. The advantages 
of this arrangement are that households can 
access credit easily, and households with 
lower production levels and less capital can 
be supported. Larger loans require collateral.
Risk caused by bankruptcy is a significant 
factor for credit organisations. The lender 
needs to be ‘assured that the borrower-
operator has indeed the right to dispose of 
the land by sale or transfer or the right to 
transfer use rights’ (Feder & Feeny 1991, p 
141). Difficulties associated with using LUR 
as collateral are well documented (Duong & 
Izumida 2002; Humphries 1999; Vietnam 
Economic Times 2001; Wolz 1997). 
Although LUR are accepted as collateral, in 
many ways this is more a formality, since in 
reality if foreclosure occurs the bank cannot 
easily rent or sell the land. As noted by 
Duong and Izumida (2002 p 321), ‘There are 
few cases where land has been liquidated in 
the event of a farmer’s collapse’. In the case of 
non-payment the VBARD tries to recover 
the loan with the help of the local People’s 
Committee (Wolz 1997).
The use of LUR as the mortgage asset results 
in a high incidence of small and short-term 
loans, which constrain the development of 
the farm household economy. In addition, 
there is no discrimination between farm 
households who use loans effectively and 
those who use them ineffectively. Banks 
cannot provide incentives or encourage good 
customers because if customers have the 
same mortgage asset they are eligible for 
the same loan amount, and generally this 
amount is very small.12
Method
During 2001 a farm household survey was 
conducted in four provinces in Vietnam: 
Ha Tay and Yen Bai in the north, and Binh 
Duong and Can Tho in the south (see 
Appendix I for more details). Approximately 
400 households were surveyed in 16 
communes (two districts in each province). 
The same households were surveyed again 
in 2002 except in the southern communes, 
where only half the number of households 
was surveyed. Data from both surveys are 
reported in this chapter. A wide range of 
mostly quantitative data were collected 
relating to land holdings and land use, assets, 
production overall and on an individual 
plot basis, income sources, prices paid and 
received, use of credit, and perceptions of 
yield and price risk. The focus of this chapter 
is the data related to credit use, but the 
collection of other data allows credit use to 
be related to other variables such as farm 
size, income level and household structure.
As the survey was conducted for the years 
2000 and 2001, the credit data do not reflect 
the recent government decision (discussed 
in the previous section) in 2003 that has 
allowed for a liberalisation of interest rates.
To establish perennial crops, such as this mixed fruit tree orchard in Ha Tay province, farmers 
need access to long-term credit, but long-term loans are often difficult for farmers to obtain.12
Results from the survey 
data
Characteristics of loans from 
different sources
The number of loans from different sources 
in 2000, and the average amounts and 
interest rates for these loans, for the surveyed 
households are shown in Table 1.
Overall, 55% of the 346 surveyed households 
had a loan in 2000. Formal loan sources 
accounted for the bulk of loans to these 
households in four provinces, with 30% 
of the households having a loan from the 
VBARD. Loans from the formal sector 
accounted for 70% of the total number of 
loans whereas loans from the semi-formal 
and informal sectors accounted for 9% 
and 14% of the total respectively (Figure 
1). Of loans made from the formal sector, 
those from the VBARD accounted for 
72% of the total. Loan amounts from the 
Table 1  Number of loans, loan amounts and interest rates from different loan sources in 2000 
for surveyed households in four provinces (number of households = 346)
Loan source No of loans in 
2000a
Avg loan amount 
(mill VND)
Avg interest rate 
(%/mth)
Formal sources
VBARD 109 9.3 (9.0)b 1.04 (0.23)
VBP 26 2.5 (1.4) 0.79 (0.27)
Other banks 14 8.2 (5.3) 1.11 (0.19)
Semi-formal sources
Farmers’ Association 6 2.6 (0.6) 0.79 (0.14)
Women’s Association 13 2.7 (1.6) 0.79 (0.15)
People’s Credit Funds 3 2.7 (2.1) 1.18 (0.18)
Informal sources
Relatives 10 11.4 (15.9) 0.35 (0.75)
Friends 7 6.4 (7.1) 0.13 (0.34)
Local moneylenders 13 10.6 (14.0) 3.47 (3.14)
Unknown loan source
Loan source not given 26 7.1 (10.9) 1.00 (0.88)
Total loans 22
a  Some households had more than one loan
b  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses12
semi-formal sector are on average small 
(around VND2.5 million), as are loans 
from the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) 
and People’s Credit Funds. Interest rates, 
however, are much lower for loans from 
semi-formal sources and the VBP. Loan 
amounts from informal sources can be either 
comparatively high or low (as indicated by 
the standard deviations for loan amounts), 
but interest rates charged by local money-
lenders are considerably higher than those 
charged by other lenders.
Credit use, loan sources and 
loan characteristics by province
Credit use and loan amounts
A summary of some credit details for the 
four provinces is shown in Table 2. Most 
households were aware of a wide range of 
credit sources and over 50% of surveyed 
households in all provinces except Yen Bai 
had borrowed money in the last 5 years 
(1995–99). The percentage of households 
having loans (either new or existing) in 2000 
was also high, ranging from 47% in Yen 
Bai to 61% in Ha Tay. The percentages of 
households taking out loans in 2001 is still 
quite high, considering that some loans taken 
out earlier would still have been current.
Average loan amounts (from all sources) 
for loans held in 2000 appear to be similar 
across provinces, except for Yen Bai where 
the average loan amount is much lower. 
Median loan amounts are lower than average 
amounts in all provinces, particularly so in 
Ha Tay and Binh Duong. Generally, median 
loan amounts are higher in the two southern 
provinces than the two northern provinces 
for loans held in 2000. For loans taken out 
in 2001 both the average and median loan 
amounts appear to be higher in the southern 
provinces and lower in the northern 
provinces (Figure 2). One interpretation of 
this difference is that the naturally larger 
farm size in the southern communes is 
being reflected in the higher average loan 
amounts in 2001. Another interpretation is 
that higher average loan amounts reflect the 
higher percentage of loans that come from 
the formal sector in the southern provinces 
(see Table 3).
Generally, the average difference in the size 
of the loan asked for and the size of the loan 
granted is not large and is fairly consistent 
across districts, with the exception of Ha 
Tay province. In this province a small 
number of farmers requested large loans 
(VND50 million or more) that were not 
granted in full. The percentages of loans 
requested that were not granted in full, 
as shown in Figure 3, are one measure 
Figure 1.  The distribution of loans held 
by surveyed households in 2000 between 
formal, semi-formal and informal sources 

































of the degree of credit constraint facing 
households in the different provinces. Some 
households were able to access extra credit 
through second and even third loans from 
other sources, so were not effectively credit 
constrained, but the extra credit was often 
obtained at higher interest rates than their 
first loans. Generally, credit constraints seem 
to be highest in Ha Tay and Binh Duong, 
with more than 20% of households not 
receiving their requested credit amounts, 
and consistently low in Can Tho. Credit 
constraints, as assessed by the difference 
between the amount asked for and the 
amount loaned, appear to be less for loans 
taken out in 2001 in all provinces except 
Binh Duong, and particularly so in Yen Bai.
Loans by credit source
The percentage of loans from different loan 
sources and average loan amounts for loans 
held in 2000 are shown in Table 3. The 
major lender in all provinces was the Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD), particularly in Can Tho province 
where over 80% of the loans were made from 
the VBARD. Loans from other commercial 
Table 2  Summary of some credit details for districts in the four surveyed provinces – loans 
from all sources








Percentage of households taking loans 
- last 5 yrs (1995–99) (%)
67 44 56 68
Loans held in 2000
Percentage of households having loan in 2000 (%) 61 47 51 59
Average loan amount in 2000 (mill VND) 7.7 3.9 10.1 8.6
Median loan amount in 2000 (mill VND) 4.5 2.5 6.5 7.5
Average difference between loan request & 
actual loan (mill VND)
4.1 1.0 1.7 1.5
Loans taken in 2001 (n = 109) (n = 102) (n = 48) (n = 49)
Percentage of households taking loan in 2001 (%) 38 46a 35 39
Average loan amount in 2001 (mill VND) 5.6 2.7 16.7 11.8
Median loan amount in 2001 (mill VND) 3.0 2.5 10.0 10.0
Average difference between loan request & 
actual loan (mill VND)
2.7 0.4 2.7 0.3
a  ‘Date of loan’ data is missing, so these data may include loans taken out before 2001 but still 
current in 200111
Figure 2  Average and median loan amounts for loans held in 2000, and new loans accessed 
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Figure 3  Percentage of loans held in the year 2000 and taken out in the year 2001 that were 
































banks were also common in the southern 
provinces but virtually absent from the 
northern provinces. The percentage of loans 
from the Bank for the Poor (VBP) was 
highest in Yen Bai and no loans from this 
source are recorded in Can Tho.
The surveyed households in both Binh 
Duong and Can Tho provinces had over 
80% of loans in 2000 made from the 
formal banking sector. This is strikingly 
different from the two northern communes 
where a considerable percentage of loans 
were made from the semi-formal and 
informal sectors. The semi-formal sector 
was almost completely absent from the 
southern communes, whereas households 
in the northern communes used a diverse 
range of semi-formal and informal credit 
sources, including credit funds and local 
mass organisations (Farmers’ and Women’s 
Associations). Agriculture in the south is 
more commercial than in the north and also 
traditional family and community ties in 
the north are stronger. The absence of loans 
from other commercial banks in Ha Tay is 
surprising, given its proximity to banking 
services in Hanoi.
The average amount of money loaned 
to households from the VBARD was 
quite similar in Can Tho and Ha Tay 
(VND9 million), higher in Binh Duong 
(VND12 million) and lower in Yen Bai 
(VND5.6 million). However, the median 
level of loans from the VBARD is lower in 
the northern provinces (VND5 million in 
both Ha Tay and Yen Bai) than the southern 
provinces (VND9 million in Binh Duong 
and VND8 million in Can Tho). Loans from 
the VBP, credit funds and mass organisations 
tended to be much less, generally around 
VND2.5 million, accounting for the lower 
median overall loan amount in the northern 
communes (Table 1). Second and third loans 
obtained by households are often (but not 
always) from the informal sector and vary 
considerably in size. Local moneylenders 
charge interest rates considerably higher than 
other lending sources, in these data in the 
range 2–6% per month.
Similar data were generated for loans taken 
out in 2001 (not shown). However, a striking 
difference between 2000 and 2001 is the 
reduced use of the informal credit sector in 
Ha Tay (down from 24% to 2%) and Yen 
Bai (down from 15% to 4%). In Ha Tay this 
corresponded with an increase in the number 
of loans from the formal sector (up from 
56% to 87%), particularly from the VBARD, 
and in Yen Bai to an increase in the number 
of loans from the semi-formal sector (up 
from 19% to 31%), particularly the Women’s 
Union. A comparison of loan amounts made 
by the VBARD in these 2 years is shown in 
Figure 4. Average loans from the VBARD 
fell slightly in the northern communes, 
increased slightly in Can Tho and increased 
considerably in Binh Duong.
Loan terms and interest rates by loan 
source
Average loan terms and interest rates from 
different loan sources, broken down by 
province for the years 2000 and 2001, are 
shown in Table 4. Generally, loans from the 
formal sector rate as medium term, especially 
those from the VBARD and VBP. Other 
banks have slightly higher interest and 
shorter terms. Some loans from relatives and 
friends have ‘no set term’ but these data are 
not included in the averages.1
Table 3  Percentage of loans held in the year 2000 obtained from various credit sources and 
average loan amount from each source








No of loans held in 2000 78 47 50 50





















VBARD 40 8.9 25 5.6 50 12.0 82 9.1
VBP 12 2.8 23 2.4 12 2.2 0 -
Other banks 0 - 2 20.0 20 10.0 12 4.6
Total formal sources 2 0 2 
Semi-formal sources
Farmers’ Association 4 2.3 4 3.0 2 2.5 0 -
Women’s Association 6 2.8 15 2.3 2 5.0 0 -
People’s Credit Funds 4 2.7 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total semi-formal sources 1 1  0
Informal sources
Relatives 9 13.2 4 2.8 0 - 2 16.0
Friends 6 8.3 2 0.5 2 3.0 0 -
Local moneylenders 9 13.5 9 2.9 2 5.0 2 10.0
Total informal sources 2 1  
Unknown loan source
Unspecified 10 5.1 15 2.1 10 15.1 2 3.01
In the loan data for 2001 there is a surprising 
variation between provinces. Semi-formal 
credit sources in Ha Tay appear compara-
tively expensive and short term compared to 
both the data reported for 2000 and the data 
for Yen Bai. Loan terms in the south generally 
seem much shorter than in the north. The 
high interest rates incurred when borrowing 
from moneylenders are clearly illustrated. 
Both loans from moneylenders reported here 
were for production, and one was taken out 
after failure to access formal sector credit.
Use of land use rights as 
collateral
Households were asked what they used as 
collateral for loans. For loans held in 2000 
the Red Book was recorded as the collateral 
used to obtain loans by 49% of households in 
Ha Tay, 45% in Yen Bai, 73% in Binh Duong 
and 81% in Can Tho. Many of these loans 
were for amounts below VND5 million, 
which was the limit at this time that could be 
borrowed with ‘trustable mortgage’ if house-
holds had the Red Book. For loans taken 
out in 2001 many households in Yen Bai 
province recorded that they used a ‘trustable 
mortgage’ to obtain loans. This is likely to be 
linked to the relatively high level of activity of 
the semi-formal credit sector in this area.
Reported problems accessing 
and using credit
A number of households had complaints 
about, or problems with, loans in three 
basic areas:
loan procedures
loan amounts and the conditions of the 
loans




Figure 4  Average loan amounts from the VBARD to surveyed households for loans held in 













































Table 4  Loans held by surveyed households in 2000, and new loans in 2001, showing average 
term and interest rate by loan source

















2000 data (h/hs = 93) (h/hs = 85) (h/hs = 86) (h/hs = 82)
Formal
VBARD 21 1.1 27 1.0 16 1.0 22 1.0
VBP 23 0.7 24 0.7 12 0.8 - -
Other banks - - 12 1.1 17 1.1 8 1.6
Semi-formal
Farmers’ Assoc 28 0.7 18 0.8 36 1.1 - -
Women’s Assoc 20 0.9 33 0.7 24 0.6 - -
Credit Funds 9 1.2 - - - - - -
Informal
Relatives 6 0.2 15 0.0 na 0.0 36 2.0
Friends 7 0.0 5 0.0 na 0.9 - -
Moneylenders 11 2.0 5 4.3 6 2.1 na 12.0
2001 data  (h/hs = 109)  (h/hs = 102)  (h/hs = 48)  (h/hs = 49)
Formal
VBARD 22 1.2 28 0.8 16 0.9 18 1.0
VBP 23 0.6 25 0.9 12 0.6 - -
Other banks - - - - 12 1.0 12 1.2
Semi-formal
Farmers’ Assoc 12 1.2 27 0.8 - - - -
Women’s Assoc 9 1.2 36 0.7 - - - -
Credit Funds 24 1.1 11 1.2 na 1.2 - -
Other 
organisations
8 1.3 - - - - - -
Informal
Relatives 10 1.2 na na - - - -
Moneylenders - - - - 2 8.0 4 6.01
Generally, the number of complaints 
recorded compared to the number of loans is 
small. Some farmers reported that they had 
‘no difficulties’ with their loans.
In the year 2000, most complaints about 
loans from the VBARD (16% of loans) were 
concerned with loan procedures, including: 
complicated and/or laborious procedures, 
loans taking a long time to be approved, 
intensive and repeated checks being made, 
and approval being needed from local 
authorities. One farmer commented that 
‘a lot of time was wasted’. There were also 
complaints (5%) about the loan amount 
being too small or the interest rate too high.
Complaints about loans from the VBP (19% 
of loans) were also concerned with proce-
dures, but more farmers had complaints 
about the amount and conditions of the 
loan, with 38% of households stating that 
either the loan amount was too small or the 
loan term was too short. With the average 
loan amount being only VND2.5 million, 
this would seem to be a likely problem with 
loans from this source. There was only one 
complaint made about loans from other 
banks operating in the formal sector.
There were only six loans recorded from 
the Farmers’ Association but the complaint 
level about loan procedures was high (50%). 
Complaints about loans from the Women’s 
Association were more likely to be about 
the loan amount being too small (23%) than 
about the loan procedures (7%). Problems 
with loans obtained in the informal sector 
are clearly identified. Loans from relatives 
tend to be small and short term and loans 
from moneylenders have high interest 
rates. Loans from friends received few 
complaints but some farmers recognised 
that when borrowing from friends ‘you have 
to be reliable about repayments’. A small 
percentage of farmers had problems meeting 
the monthly repayments needed for loans, 
and this was generally the case with loans 
from all sources.
In the years 2000 and 2001 combined, 34 
households gave reasons why they were 
not able to access credit. Replies can be 
categorised into the following reasons:
difficult and cumbersome procedures 
(29%)
unable to get the necessary approval from 
the commune authorities (18%)
still in debt from previous loans so not 
allowed more credit (18%)
not having any or sufficient collateral 
(15%)
loan terms/amounts/interest rates 
offered not suitable (12%)
afraid of being unable to meet 
repayments (6%)
not knowing how to access credit (3%).
Savings
Households were asked if they had 
any savings. It was expected that many 
households would not answer this question 
or, alternatively, say that they had no 
savings. With that caveat, Table 5 shows the 
percentage of households reporting savings 
in the year 2000 and the average amount of 
those savings, if reported. Not all households 








The percentage of households reporting that 
they had savings was low, except for Ha Tay. 
In the northern communes and Binh Duong, 
most savings were reported to be in cash, 
whereas in Can Tho savings were reported 
as being in both gold and cash. Savings were 
most commonly kept at home, with only four 
households saying that they kept savings in 
the bank. Three households in the northern 
communes said they had their savings in a 
savings group (gop ho, choi ho, hui), and one 
household in Binh Duong had their savings 
available on the short-term money market 
(cho vay nong).
Households accessing credit
Surveyed households in the two northern 
communes were classified by commune 
leaders into socioeconomic groups of 
‘above average’ (ho giau), ‘average’ (ho trung 
binh) or ‘below average’ (ho ngheo). Not all 
households in the southern communes 
were classified by the commune leaders but 
reasonable data exist for Can Tho. In Table 6 
data on the net value of production (NVP), 
farm size and other household variables 
from the households in Ha Tay, Yen Bai and 
Can Tho are shown disaggregated by this 
classification at the commune level.
The data show that NVP, value of assets 
and farm size measures generally decrease, 
as might be expected, for the lower 
socioeconomic groups in all three provinces. 
Average NVP values for Can Tho for the 
above average group are noticeably lower 
than in Ha Tay. Median values, however, 
are similar and even a little higher for the 
above average group. The variation in average 
farm size in socioeconomic groups is not so 
pronounced in Can Tho as in the northern 
communes, but the median farm size for 
the poor group is half that of the above 
average and average groups. In all provinces 
and particularly in Ha Tay, the poor group 
has a lower percentage of male household 
heads. In Can Tho the education level of the 
household head for the poor group is also 
noticeably less than for the above average and 
average groups.
The percentage of households accessing 
loans is actually lower in the above average 
group than both the average and poor groups 
in all provinces. For example, in Yen Bai 67% 
of the poor households had accessed credit 
in 2000, compared to 41% of the average 
group and 34% of the above average group. 
Average loan amounts, however, reflected the 
socioeconomic rankings, being higher in the 
Table 5  Percentage of households reporting savings and average amount of savings
Percentage of households Average savings (mill VND)
Ha Tay (n = 93) 22  4.2 (5.3)a
Yen Bai (n = 85) 1  n/a
Binh Duong (n = 86) 9  26.1 (34.1)
Can Tho (n = 82) 7  2.5 (0.5)
a  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses1
above average group, particularly in Ha Tay. 
Compared to Ha Tay average loan amounts 
were considerably lower for the above average 
group but considerably higher for the poor 
group in Can Tho.
Calculated for households with loans, the 
total loan amount as a percentage of the total 
NVP is generally high, and much higher 
in Can Tho than in Ha Tay. The ratio for 
above average and average households in Ha 
Tay is comparatively low compared to the 
other provinces, and households in Ha Tay 
are the most likely to complain about credit 
restrictions. By comparison, total lending 
to poor households in Ha Tay seems very 
high in relation to the total farm income 
of this group. However, net value of farm 
production does not take into account the 
off-farm income of households, and off-farm 
opportunities are relatively high in Ha Tay 
because of its location close to Hanoi.
Discussion
Use of credit sources
Credit use by the surveyed households 
appears to be generally fairly high. The 
VBARD is a major lender for farm house-
holds in all four provinces and particularly 
in the two southern provinces. This research 
confirms results reported by Duong and 
Izumida (2002), who used household survey 
data to investigate credit provision and use 
and concluded that the bulk of rural credit 
was supplied to their surveyed households by 
the formal sector, particularly the VBARD. 
The use of both informal and semi-formal 
credit sources appears to be decreasing in 
all the surveyed provinces except Yen Bai. In 
this province the use of semi-formal credit 
accessed with ‘trustable mortgages’ through 
the mass organisations was evident.
The VBP seems to be virtually absent from 
the southern provinces, and this might 
be thought surprising given the reported 
increase in poorer households in the Mekong 
Delta area (World Bank 2000). Along with 
the virtual absence of the semi-formal credit 
sector, this means that there are few credit 
sources available for poorer households to 
access small amounts of credit at low interest 
rates, and there would seem to be a role 
for a more diverse range of credit sources 
in the south. The mass organisations are 
better developed in the north than the south 
because traditionally they have been more 
active in northern communities. The ability 
of households to obtain credit from these 
semi-formal sources is dependent on the 
role played by unions and associations in 
their region.
At the time of the survey commercial banks, 
with the exception of the VBARD, didn’t 
seem to be operating extensively in the rural 
credit market in the northern communes, 
even in a province close to Hanoi. If the data 
from Ha Tay is representative, there would 
seem to be a clear role for more finance to 
be offered to the rural sector in the north 
by other commercial banks operating in the 
formal banking sector.
From the 2000 data, borrowing from the 
informal sector was high in both Ha Tay 
and Yen Bai. Many of these loans were for 
production purposes, sometimes after credit 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































formal sources. The use of informal credit to 
meet shortfalls in credit from other sources is 
also reported by Duong and Izumida (2002). 
The use of informal credit sources dropped 
dramatically in both Ha Tay and Yen Bai for 
loans taken out in 2001.
Size of loans and credit 
constraints
Generally, loans from the formal sector, 
excluding the VBP and People’s Credit 
Funds, are higher than loans from the semi-
formal sector, and loans from the informal 
sector can be extremely variable in amount. 
Taken overall, average loans are small, at 
around VND5–10 million, in all districts 
for all loans held in 2000. In 2000 more 
than 25% of households in the northern 
provinces reported that they had not received 
all the credit they had requested. This is 
commensurate with the figure of 30% for 
credit-constrained households reported by 
Duong and Izumida (2002). Estimates of 
credit constraints were lower in the southern 
provinces, with around 20% of households 
in Binh Duong and 15% in Can Tho 
saying they had failed to obtain the credit 
they requested.
These data would suggest that many 
farmers face credit constraints, a view that 
is reinforced by farmer complaints that 
loans are too small or they are unable to 
borrow enough money, especially from 
the semi-formal sector. A number of 
other households reported that they were 
unable to access credit or additional credit, 
which adds to the number of effectively 
credit-constrained households. In answers 
to other sections of the survey households 
identified lack of finance as a constraint 
to both land leasing and land use change 
(Marsh & MacAulay 2003).
For loans taken out in 2001 average loan 
amounts were generally higher in the 
southern communes and slightly lower in the 
northern communes (Figure 2). However, 
the percentage of households reporting that 
they had not obtained all the credit they had 
requested fell from 2000 to 2001 in all prov-
inces except Binh Duong, despite average 
loan amounts increasing substantially in this 
province. Despite generally fewer reports 
of credit restrictions, credit-constrained 
households remained high at above 20% 
in Ha Tay and Binh Duong, and around 
10% in Yen Bai and Can Tho. The data for 
2001 loans for Yen Binh district in Yen Bai 
show that a high percentage of loans (50%) 
were taken out using a ‘trustable mortgage’, 
which may account for the reduction in 
credit constraints. However, loan amounts 
in Yen Bai province are much lower than 
in the other surveyed provinces (Figure 2), 
and this could have a bearing on the degree 
of credit restriction reported relative to 
other provinces.
Loan terms and interest rates
Agricultural loans have often been reported 
as mainly short term and this has been iden-
tified as a constraint to agricultural develop-
ment. The data from this survey show that 
there are a large percentage of medium-term 
loans (12–36 months) for credit from the 
formal and semi-formal sectors, particularly 
in the northern communes. In the southern 
communes, because the loan term is gener-
ally shorter (12–20 months), the credit can 
really only be used for immediate production 11
expenses. The short- to medium-term 
nature of credit is likely to be related to the 
problems associated with collateral, which 
make long-term lending risky for lenders.
Interest rates from the formal credit 
sector seem reasonably consistent across 
the provinces, although there were some 
differences. Interest rate liberalisation has 
resulted in higher interest rates; for example, 
the interest rate for short-term loans before 
31 May 2002 was 0.9% per month but it 
was increased to 1% per month from July 
2002. Some commentators have argued that 
the recent liberalisation of interest rates will 
result in higher interest rates and that ‘the 
interest rate race coupled with rapid credit 
growth threatens the fragile banking system’ 
(Tran 2003, p 30).
Although the use of credit obtained from the 
informal sector at high interest rates appears 
to be decreasing, it is still a concern. Of the 
13 loans taken out from local moneylenders 
(see Table 1), seven were for investment in 
production (eg buying a thresher, investment 
in livestock), four to pay expenses related to 
illness, and one each to pay back a debt, pay 
for education and build a house. Duong and 
Izumida (2002) also found that 74% of loans 
from informal sources were used for produc-
tion. Loans at high interest rates are inap-
propriate for most of the above-mentioned 
activities, pointing to deficiencies in both 
available lending for production purposes 
and ‘safety net’ finance for households in 
difficulties. Anecdotal evidence suggests it 
is possible that some loans for production 
from moneylenders may be ‘bridging finance’ 
needed while waiting for approval for loans 
from formal lending sources.
The dual nature of rural credit in Vietnam 
is also illustrated by the data: commercial 
lending for production through the VBARD 
and other commercial banks, and subsidised 
lending at interest rates roughly 60–70% 
of commercial rates through the VBP and 
the semi-formal credit sector. It is argued by 
some researchers (eg World Bank 1998) that 
credit subsidisation is an inefficient form of 
addressing welfare issues in that it directs 
scarce capital into inefficient sectors of the 
economy, and by others that it is at times 
unhelpful for the recipients. For example, 
Krause et al (1990) note that poor and 
small farmers in developing countries have 
limited means to insure against crop failure, 
especially when production risk will probably 
affect everyone in the same location.
In Vietnam poor and small farmers have 
a reputation for meeting loan repayments. 
However, it is noticeable that subsidised 
credit provided in the northern provinces 
to low income farmers through the VBP 
and the semi-formal sector is for much 
smaller amounts than commercial credit 
provided in Can Tho province to farmers 
with similar income levels (but a larger 
farm size). A common complaint made by 
households about credit from subsidised 
sources is that the loan amount is too small. 
Larger loans bring the risk of repayment 
difficulties, and some cases were noted in 
the southern communes where households 
had sold land because of production failures 
and repayment commitments (Marsh & 
MacAulay 2003).12
Use of land as collateral
Many households report using the Red Book 
as collateral for loans, either directly or by 
using ‘trustable mortgage’. Loans using LUR 
as collateral are generally low and seemingly 
unrelated to farm size (Anh 2004). The 
data presented in Table 6 could lead to the 
conclusion that loan size is more related 
to the household net value of production 
(NVP) than farm size. Despite farm size 
being much larger in Can Tho than Ha 
Tay, average loan amounts to the above 
average socioeconomic group are lower than 
in Ha Tay. The average NVP for above 
average households in Ha Tay, however, is 
much higher than for similar households in 
Can Tho.
This would be a rational response by banks 
when making loans given the difficulties in 
using LUR as collateral. When taking LUR 
as collateral, the lender is mainly interested 
in the efficient transfer of property rights 
as this is the means by which the lender 
can foreclose if necessary. Therefore, the 
cadastral system has to be reliable and the 
LUR transfer possible, but because both 
these issues are problematic in Vietnam 
(Humphries 1999), there could be expected 
to be a link between low loan amounts and 
the unsatisfactory collateral arrangements 
using LUR from the lender’s point of view. 
Lenders then make the rational move to base 
loan amounts on other criteria, eg produc-
tion level, which is related to ability to repay 
in the short term. Long-term loans are not 
possible because the collateral is not reliable.
Recent changes to the Land Law in 2003 
will address some of the issues facing credit 
providers with regard to using LUR as 
collateral (Vietnam Economic Times 2003). 
But some commentators have argued that 
it is hard to imagine that Western concepts 
of land ownership, that would give lenders 
rights to dispose freely of property in the 
event of foreclosure, will sit easily with 
Vietnamese traditional and cultural attitudes 
that take account of the communal nature of 
land ownership (Fforde 1995).
Savings
Few households reported having any savings 
although there is no way of knowing if this 
is an accurate reflection of reality. What does 
seem certain is that few savings are kept 
in banks. Most are kept at home and it is 
likely that some of these savings are used for 
lending to others, presumably at high interest 
rates. As noted by Adams (1988, cited in 
Krause et al 1990) policies or institutions 
that increase the accumulation of capital, 
such as providing savings deposits in rural 
areas, would increase technological adoption 
through capital accumulation. In Vietnam 
the shortage of commercial credit in rural 
areas is exacerbated by the common practice 
of keeping savings out of the commercial 
financial sector.
Households accessing credit
A higher percentage of poorer farmers access 
credit than do wealthier farmers, although 
the credit amounts obtained by poorer 
farmers are lower. This somewhat surprising 
finding is consistent across all provinces. It 
may indicate that there is a lack of commer-
cial credit, or that wealthier farmers do not 
need credit as they see no way of increasing 
their production. Lack of available land for 
expansion could be one significant constraint.1
Loans as a percentage of gross farm returns 
are generally high, and higher in Can Tho 
than in the northern provinces. It is likely 
that off-farm income plays a role in loan 
repayment. This bears further investigation 
as off-farm wages could also be significant 
in the ability to access credit. In relation to 
their production levels, farmers in Ha Tay 
are more credit constrained than farmers in 
other provinces, and this is consistent with 
the higher incidence of credit rationing to 
farmers in this province.
Conclusions
Based on the analysis of the survey data 
several conclusions can be drawn with regard 
to rural credit use in these four provinces. 
Many results are consistent with the 
results of Duong and Izumida (2002), who 
surveyed farmers in three different provinces 
located in the northern, central and southern 
regions of Vietnam.
Most rural credit is supplied by the 
formal sector, particularly the VBARD. 
Semi-formal sources are significant credit 
providers, as is the VBP, in the northern 
communes but not in the southern 
communes. This effectively means that poor 
farmers in northern provinces have greater 
access to subsidised credit than poor farmers 
in southern provinces. Households also 
used informal credit sources but less so for 
loans taken out in 2001 than for loans held 
in 2000, which may indicate a lessening of 
credit constraints as a result of policy change. 
Informal credit is often used for production, 
and this is a concern as interest rates for 
informal credit are often high.
Credit use is widespread across all socio-
economic groups. In fact, wealthier farmers 
access credit less than poorer farmers, 
which may indicate credit constraints in 
the commercial sector or lack of produc-
tion opportunities for wealthier farmers. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers are 
reluctant to borrow as agricultural returns 
are low. It also illustrates the high priority 
placed on enabling poorer farmers to have 
access to credit. It would appear that this 
policy has been successful but it is a concern 
that this may be at the expense of commer-
cial agricultural development. Balancing 
poverty concerns with the development of 
commercial agriculture is a complex issue.
The high ratio of loan value to net value of 
production indicates that off-farm income 
may be critical in both accessing credit and 
making loan repayments. In comparison 
to other provinces wealthier farmers in Ha 
Tay have low credit:production ratios, and 
farmers in this province are also more likely 
to be credit rationed by credit providers. 
Commercial banks other than the VBARD 
would seem to be missing an opportunity by 
not investing in this region.
Encouraging investment of savings in the 
commercial financial sector should be a 
priority for government. The existence of 
large savings outside the banking system 
adds to the shortage of development and 
investment funds, and potentially promotes 
the informal credit sector.1
Uncertainty regarding the value and 
effectiveness of agricultural LUR as collateral 
is probably restricting loan amounts and the 
availability of long-term loans suitable for 
development projects. Currently LUR as 
collateral don’t allow lenders to feel confident 
about lending against the risks associated 
with long-term loans to agriculture. Given 
the complex nature of land ownership, 
management and use in Vietnam, this will 
not be an easy problem to solve.
There is a need for further investigation of 
the rural credit situation at the household 
level as interest rate liberalisation policies 
take effect. There are concerns that less 
money will be made available to the rural 
sector in favour of investment in the more 
profitable and less risky services and indus-
trial sectors. If this were the case it would 
further constrain household production.1
cHApter Seven
input And output price policy And itS 
impActS on AgriculturAl production 
nGuyen huy cuonG
In a market economy price is considered an important and efficient signal for 
resource allocation. The price of agricultural products is significant not only in 
economic terms, but also from a political aspect because it affects the income of farm 
households, the prices paid by consumers, and export earnings. In this chapter price 
policy in Vietnam is reviewed and discussed in the context of Vietnam’s domestic, 
regional and international markets, and price trends for major commodities are 
presented. Household survey data are used to comment on input sources and price 
levels, and the possible response of farm households to changes in input prices.1
Introduction
In a market economy price is considered 
an important and efficient signal for social 
resource allocation. It is also a major 
factor in assessing the opportunity cost 
of commodities and services. Under the 
market mechanism, price is the engine which 
stimulates not only production but also 
other economic relations in order to meet 
consumer demands. Based on the price, the 
scarce resources of a society will be used in 
whichever industry would be more profitable.
The price of agricultural products is 
significant not only in economic terms, but 
also from a political aspect because it affects 
the income of farm households, the prices 
paid by consumers, and export earnings. The 
income of almost half the world’s population 
is dependent on agricultural production, 
which is affected by the prices of agricultural 
products. A small decline in the price of agri-
cultural products may have serious impacts 
on the economic and political situation in a 
country: for example, decreases in the prices 
of sugar, coffee and cocoa in the world market 
have led to problems in Mauritius, Colombia 
and Ghana, respectively. Although agriculture 
generates a very small proportion of gross 
national product in the US, the price of 
agricultural products as well as other inputs is 
also a sensitive political issue in that country.
In a market-driven economy price is 
considered to be a major mechanism of 
resource allocation, helping to answer 
questions such as:
What commodity and services should be 
produced?

How should they be produced?
How should benefits be distributed 
between production factor owners?
When a relative price reflects the economic 
scarcity of inputs and outputs, resource allo-
cation resulting from producer and consumer 
behaviour will be efficient and suitable for 
sustainable growth. For commodities that are 
non-tradeable in international markets (eg 
land – an immobile commodity, labour – due 
to international migration constraints, easily 
broken commodities, and commodities with 
high transportation costs), ‘scarcity value’ is 
determined by domestic supply and demand. 
For commodities tradable in international 
markets in which a country is a price taker, 
‘scarcity value’ (or opportunity cost) is deter-
mined by the border price of that commodity.
However, the price mechanism does not 
always operate well, especially in developing 
countries. In the presence of market failure 
the market price does not guarantee that 
targets of both efficiency and equity will be 
obtained. Therefore, government intervention 
on price can be used to: i) increase the output 
of agricultural production, ii) stabilise the 
price of agricultural products, iii) guarantee 
national food security and iv) provide food 
and other raw materials for an industry.
The Vietnamese Government wants price 
policy to be an engine for agricultural 
production, and to result in relative prices 
which are beneficial for producers of food 
and other crops. Since the doi moi policy 
was introduced in 1986, the government 
has oriented price policy in this direction 
and Vietnamese agriculture has generally 
reached higher production levels. The price 
of agricultural products has increased (or 

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decreased) to the level of international prices, 
and the price of production inputs has also 
moved to more closely reflect world market 
prices. The price policy of the government 
has provided more equitable prices for 
consumers and reduced the impact of crises 
that have occurred in the world market, 
especially for sensitive commodities such as 
food. The government has controlled prices 
by applying measures such as quotas and 
regulating the number of exporters.
Overview of price policy 
in Vietnam
General policy on prices
A number of government regulations set out 
controls on prices.
1.  Ordinance 33/HDBT of the Committee 
of Ministers (now known as the 
government) dated 17/2/1984 on ‘the 
regulation on price management’. Under 
this policy, violations of state pricing 
policy have been stipulated, eg:
price determination by authorities 
without the jurisdiction and 
regulatory authority to set prices
changes made to price levels, 
commodity quality and the delivery 
of goods that have not been 
determined by the correct authority
dishonest reports of production 
and transportation costs that lead 
to a loss for the state and consumers 





provision of incomplete, inaccurate, 
untimely data and materials for 
the determination, control and 
inspection of prices
delaying the process of price 
determination and the implementation 
of price policy
failure to implement a price registry 
and post a price, or selling with 
unposted prices
corruption in the calculation and 
determination of prices, and failing to 
provide price information
revealing a secret document on prices 
set by the state/government.
2.  Ordinance 09/HDBT of the Committee 
of Ministers dated 04/8/1986 on ‘the 
regulation of price implementation and 
control, and dealing with violations 
of price policy’ (price policy violations 
are as outlined in the above mentioned 
Ordinance 33/HDBT).
3.  Decision 137/HDBT of the Committee 
of Ministers dated 27/4/1992 on ‘price 
management’, making changes to the way 
price management was implemented 
by the government. The number of 
commodities for which prices were 
to be determined by the government 
decreased. Price was to be determined 
by the government only for commodities 
that had large effects on the whole 
economy, and the government should 
issue the price frame, floor and ceiling 
prices only. However, options for price 
management by the government in the 







regulation of the price management 
mechanism by the state/government
the right of the state/government to 
implement economic measures to 
stabilise prices in the economy, and 
to introduce specific price policies if 
necessary (eg price subsidies, support 
transportation costs, and additional 
fees based on the balance of export 
and domestic prices)
the assessment of price 
determination
regulation of the price registry and 
posted prices.
With implementation of this decision, 
prices of most commodities and services 
were free to be determined by enterprises. 





using price policy and macromanagement 
mechanisms to stabilise market prices. 
The government determined the prices 
of monopoly commodities and services, 
and of the most important commodities 
for production and maintenance of living 
standards (such as petrol, gasoline, iron and 
steel, fertiliser, paper for newspapers), and a 
minimum price for rice.
4.  Instruction 09/1998/TT-BVGCP of 
the Price Committee of the Government 
dated 31/12/1998 on ‘the guidance of 
price management and stabilisation’. This 
policy included the following points:
For commodities and services where 
prices are determined by enterprises, 
prices should remain at the level 
occurring in the market at the end 
of 1998.

Children enjoying the rice harvest in Bac Ninh province, Red River Delta. Policies affecting 
the price, purchase, storage and export of rice are an important part of the Government’s 
price policies.1
The government must control the 
costs and prices of commodities 
and services provided by monopoly 
enterprises, the state-owned 
enterprises, and enterprises with 
foreign direct investment producing 
significant commodities and 
services. These commodities and 
services, which could affect both 
the prices of other goods and the 
national budget, included electricity, 
telecommunications, sea ports, rice, 
sugar, fertiliser, cement, iron and 
steel, petrol, paper, beer and tobacco; 
and factories assembling motorcycles, 
cars and electronics.
Management should include 
strengthening of price control, posted 
prices, and selling of posted and 
registered prices.
These government price policies are summa-
rised in Table 1.
Policy for domestic markets and 
integration
Domestic markets
The major policy focus has been on the 
provision of subsidies for material trans-
portation, as well as on tax reduction and 
exemption, to encourage the development of 
trade in the mountainous areas in order to 
reduce the price gap between regions. Other 
policies concentrated on determination of 
the floor price for rice, encouragement of 
exports, establishment of a fund for price 




The main policies affecting prices on the 
domestic market include the following:
Decision 752/TTg of the Prime 
Minister dated 10/12/1994 on ‘cash aid 
for minority groups for commodities 
determined by the government’
Ordinances 46/CP and 47/CP of 
the government dated 17/7/1995 on 
‘the establishment of the North and 
South General Food Corporations 
(VINAFOOD I and II, respectively) 
for the purposes of setting up food 
businesses, buying farmers’ produce, 
regional food balance, and contribution 
to the stabilisation of food prices’
Decision 151/TTg of the Prime Minister 
dated 12/4/1996 on ‘the use of the price 
stabilisation fund to support enterprises 
having seasonal characteristics and in 
cases of sudden price changes ’
Decision 140/TTg of the Prime Minister 
dated 7/3/1997 on ‘the announcement of 
the price of raw rice purchases as from the 
beginning of crop seasons, the expansion 
of export markets and food storage’
Introduction 112/BTC of the Ministry of 
Finance dated 4/8/1998 on ‘tax reduction 
and exemption for development of trade 
in the mountainous areas’
Decision 35/TTg of the Prime Minister 
dated 21/3/2000 on ‘100% interest rate 
support for enterprises to buy rice at the 
market price for temporary storage, the 
encouragement of enterprises exporting 
rice, and the provision of loans to 



















Regulation on price management




Prices of most 
goods and services 







Regulation on the 
implementation, control and 
treatment of cases in violation of 
price management
Cases of price violation as 
determined by Ordinance 33


Prices of most 
goods and services 







Decision on price management
The government determines price 
level, price frame, standard price 
or price limits for major goods and 
services
New regulation on price 





Prices of most 












Introduction of price management 
for price stabilisation
Price of goods and services 
determined by the state kept 
stable as at the levels in 1998
Price of goods and services 
determined by enterprises kept at 
the levels as at the end of 1998
The state controls the price 
of monopoly enterprises, 
state-owned enterprises, and 
enterprises with foreign capital 
which have the capacity to affect 





To stabilise prices 
in the market11
Gradual integration into regional and 
international markets
Vietnam established financial relationships 
with a number of international financial 
organisations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, at the end of 1993. It 
also entered the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1995. Since 
1 January 1996 Vietnam has implemented the 
Import and Export Tax Incentive Agreement 
as required for ASEAN members, and 
will enter the Asia Free Trade Association 
(AFTA) in 2006. Vietnam was a founder 
member of the Asia–Europe Cooperation 
Forum in March 1996, has officially attended 
OPEC since November 1998, and applied for 
membership of the WTO in December 1994.
On 13 July 2000 Vietnam and the United 
States signed a bilateral trade agreement 
which was implemented in December 2001. 
This was a significant step for the integration 
of the Vietnamese economy into the world 
economy. However, enterprises and domestic 
producers face challenges in obtaining a level 
of competitiveness that will enable them to 
compete effectively in global markets.
Import and export taxes
The export tax on most agricultural 
commodities is generally low, and there is 
no export tax on some commodities such as 
rice, coffee, natural rubber, tea and pepper. 
However, the import tax on processed goods 
is high, eg milled rice (15%), roasted coffee 
(75%), tea (5%) and fruits and vegetables 
(45%). The government has set high import 
tax rates on processed goods to protect 
domestic processing industries. However, 
Vietnam is a member of AFTA and the 
schedule for removing import taxes under 
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme is close; therefore, domestic 
processing industries will face significant 
challenges in order to compete successfully 
with those in other ASEAN countries. Under 
CEPT the import tax on most commodities 
will be in the range 0–5% by 2006.
In order to protect domestic production, 
Vietnam has increased the import tax on 
some products: for example, the tax on meat 
increased from 10% in 1992 to 30% in 1999, 
and for sugar from 10% in 1992 to 45% in 
1999. The reasons for the increases included 
targeting the creation of new jobs, poverty 
reduction and protection of the domestic 
sugar industry. However, this policy seems 
to be inefficient because there is now a big 
gap between international and domestic 
prices which has led to smuggling of sugar 
from countries neighbouring Vietnam. 
Although sugar is included in the sensitive 
list of CEPT, the removal or lowering of the 
import tax for sugar in 2004 may lead to 
difficulties for the domestic sugar industry.
The import tax is 0% for most imported 
materials and inputs associated with agricul-
tural production, such as fertilisers and corn 
and rice seeds. The tax rate for imported 
machines such as combine harvesters 
and tractors is 7.5%. The government has 
implemented these low import taxes for 
agricultural inputs with the purpose of 
supporting farmers in agricultural produc-
tion. The imported volume of fertilisers 
increased each year from 1.3 million tonnes 
(m t) in 1995 to 2.74m t in 1998.
A summary of some import and export taxes 
is given in Table 2.12
Non-tariff barriers
Besides import and export taxes, non-tariff 
barriers also have a significant effect on prices 
in domestic markets, and most developing 
countries use non-tariff barriers as a means 
of intervention in import and export activity. 
These measures include quotas, control 
on the number of exporters/importers, 
requirements for import and export permis-
sion, and export and import subsidies. This 
intervention can create an invisible tax on 
agricultural products exported and may 
reduce the competitiveness of agriculture.
In order to integrate into AFTA, and 
in line with the application for WTO 
entry, Vietnam is required to remove 
non-tariff barriers. Under AFTA the 
volume constraints on products included in 
the list for tax exemption will be removed 
immediately after the permitted time delay 
for conforming to AFTA requirements for 
these products has expired. Other non-tariff 
barriers, such as custom fees and technical 
constraints, must be removed 5 years after 
the time delay for these products has expired.
Table 2  Import and export tax of some commodities
Commodity Tax rate (%) Commodity Tax rate (%)
Export tax Import tax
1. Rice 0 1. Processed rice 15
2. Maize 0 2. Wheat 30
3. Natural rubber 0 3. Roasted coffee 75
4. Coffee 0 4. Tea 75
5. Tea 0 5. Sugar 45
6. Pepper 0 6. Meat 30




11. Machines for 
agricultural production
7.5
a  The export of whole wood is prohibited; the tax rate is applied on the export of wood which is 
used as material for handicrafts.
Source: Customs Department: Import, export and value-added taxes, 19991
Since 1989 the Vietnamese Government has 
implemented significant steps to liberalise 
trade, and the monopoly previously held 
by state-owned enterprises in export and 
import activities has been terminated. As a 
result, in recent years enterprises managed by 
provincial or district authorities and private 
companies have entered into export and 
import activities. For example, the regulation 
on the number of exporters of coffee and 
rubber has been removed. A company that 
wants to export coffee needs only to have 
permission from the Department of Trade 
and Industry. For rubber, regulation on the 
number of exporters was applied to exporters 
to China only, but this regulation was also 
removed in 1998. In 1999 the government 
allowed companies to directly export/import 
all products listed in their business licence 
without the company having an export/
import licence as previously required. Today, 
most agricultural products are generally 
not affected by non-tariff barriers, with the 
exceptions of rice, sugar and fertilisers.
Rice is the most important staple crop in 
Vietnam. During the 1990s rice exports 
from the country increased continuously and 
now Vietnam is the second largest exporter 
of rice in the world behind Thailand. The 
volume of rice exports increased from 1.7m t 
in 1990 to 2.8m t in 1993 and 4.5m t in 
1999. The price of rice in the world market 
decreased in 2000 and 2001, and as a result 
the volume of rice exports decreased. For 
example, these volumes in 2001 and 2003 
were 3.7 m t and 3.8m t, respectively. In 
order to guarantee food security in the past 
the government intervened strongly in rice 
export activities, including a monopoly 
held on rice exports by the state-owned 
enterprises (VINAFOOD I in the north 
and VINAFOOD II in the south) and 
the use of export quotas. This caused 
inefficiencies in the state-owned enterprises, 
such as low prices, high marketing costs and 
corruption. As a result the domestic price of 
rice was lower than the international price by 
25–30% and farmers’ incomes decreased at 
that time. In recent years the government has 
implemented a trade liberalisation policy for 
rice exports, with the result that in 1997 the 
number of rice exporters was 23 companies, 
increasing to 33 in 1998 and 47 in 1999. 
Rice export quotas also increased year by 
year and were able to be adjusted (3.5m t 
in 1997, increasing to 4.0m t in 1998 and 
5.2m t in 1999).
In 1994 the national sugar program was set 
up in order that domestic production should 
meet domestic demand, with the result that 
42 factories were established to produce 
sugar. However, the international price of 
sugar has declined in recent years; therefore, 
increased government intervention has been 
granted to protect domestic production. The 
importing of sugar is controlled by a quota 
system and the government determines the 
number of importers. In Vietnam there is a 
limited regional area which has international 
competitiveness in sugar production, whereas 
most areas have no comparative advantage 
due to low yields of sugarcane and small and 
inefficient factories/companies. The removal 
of sugar quotas and other non-tariff barriers 
in the next 10 years will be a challenge not 
only for sugar companies but also for farmers 
who produce sugarcane.1
Prices over time and 
space
Before the reform period the government 
intervened strongly in the agricultural sector 
with the aim of providing cheap inputs for 
the industrial sector. This led to a ‘two price 
system’: the free market price and the price 
determined by the government. Relative 
prices gave benefits for industry but not for 
agriculture, and as a result resources were 
transferred from the rural to the industrial 
sector. In Vietnam the sustainable develop-
ment of the whole economy depends on 
the agricultural sector because it generates 
a quarter of total GDP and employs about 
70% of the labour force.
Since the introduction of the doi moi policies 
(1986), and especially since Resolution 10 
(1988), prices have generally been advanta-
geous for agriculture. In the period 1990–99 
the prices of agricultural products generally 
increased faster than average prices in the 
whole economy, but not faster than the 
prices of foods. The average prices received 
for the whole economy increased by 318%; 
376% for the foodstuff sector (foods such as 
meats, eggs and tofu, as distinct from staple 
foods such as rice and corn), 269% for the 
food sector and 273% for other goods and 
services. This meant that the competitiveness 
of rice producers decreased in comparison 
with other products such as the foodstuffs.
Details of price changes over time for a 
number of agricultural commodities are 
given in Table 3. In general, prices of most 
agricultural products decreased, especially for 
sugar and coffee. The price of coffee in 2000 
was only 37% of that in 1995. Since 1998 the 
price of rice has also followed a decreasing 
trend, while the prices of peanuts, cashew nuts 
and beef have shown an increasing trend.
Fluctuations in the price of raw rice in the 
period 1991–2000 are shown in Figure 1. 
Prices generally increased in the 1990s but 
fell substantially in 2000. The changes in 
rice prices between regions were similar to 
those of the whole country (Table 4), leading 
to the conclusion that the rice market was 
reasonably integrated and consistent across 
the whole country.
The relative prices of industrial and 
agricultural products (eg the price ratio of 
nitrogen fertiliser to rice) were high during 
the 1980s – this ratio was 3.0 in 1982 and 
2.24 in 1985 (Table 5). Since the agricultural 
reforms introduced in 1988, the change from 
a pricing system based on central planning 
to one driven by a market-oriented economy 
has given benefits to farmers, and the relative 
price of industrial and agricultural products 
has better reflected the actual opportunity 
cost of their use in the economy. Although 
the government still controls the import of 
nitrogen fertiliser, the new regulations are 
more flexible. As a result the domestic price 
of nitrogen fertiliser is closer to the interna-
tional price. In addition, liberalisation of rice 
exports has also contributed to a decrease in 
the relative price ratio of nitrogen fertiliser 
to rice, and farmers have benefited from this 
trend – the ratio decreased from 1.02 in 1996 
to only 0.50 in 1999. The trade liberalisation 
policy led to a decrease in the gap between 
not only domestic and international prices 
but also export and international prices 1




1 2 3 4 5 6
1995 1,883 2,290 2,120 1,880 1,890 1,860 1,720
1996 1,841 2,280 2,220 2,040 1,830 1,770 1,590
1997 1,655 1,895 1,787 1,676 1,667 1,714 1,552
1998 2,090 2,233 2,208 2,235 2,221 2,101 1,974
1999 1,944 2,428 2,187 2,069 1,933 1,961 1,741
2000 1,640 1,960 1,794 1,719 1,772 1,684 1,492
a  1 = northern mountainous region, 2 = Red River Delta, 3 = north central region, 4 = south central 
region, 5 = southeast region and 6 = Mekong Delta
Source: Price Committee of the Government
Table 3  Prices of agricultural products in free markets 1995–2000 in VND/kg
Products 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Raw rice 1,883 1,841 1,655 2,090 1,944 1,640
Maize – – 2,110 2,281 2,231 2,079
Sugar 6,887 6,502 7,067 7,209 6,753 5,098
Peanuts – 8,423 8,737 9,063 9,037 9,257
Cashew nuts 8,834 9,382 9,286 10,787 11,589 –
Tea – – 39,457 39,678 41,623 38,785
Coffee 24,000 15,500 14,500 17,500 15,600 8,958a
Live-weight pigs 12,125 12,112 10,832 10,820 12,671 10,646
Beef – 32,617 33,322 33,312 34,271 36,226
a  Robusta coffee
Source: Price Committee of the Government: Various reports on market prices
Table 5  The price ratio of nitrogen fertiliser to rice 1982–99
Year 1982 1985 1987 1990 1996 1999
Price ratio (N fertiliser/rice) 3.00 2.24 2.00 1.51 1.02 0.50
Sources: Cristina C. David and the Price Committee of the Government1
(Table 6). As a result this has given impetus 
to agricultural production and agricultural 
output has increased continuously.
Government intervention using rice quotas 
and control over the number of rice exporters 
has resulted in the domestic market and 
export prices being lower than world market 
prices. For example, in 1995 the price of 
rice on the domestic market and the export 
price were US$250 and US$280 per tonne 
respectively, while the price for Thai rice 
exports was US$300 per tonne. In 1998 
policy changes such as the increase in quotas 
and allowing more companies, including 
private companies, to export resulted in an 
increase in both the domestic market and 
export prices. In 1999 the domestic market 
price and rice export price were US$226 
and US$228 per tonne respectively, while 
the price of rice exports from Thailand was 
US$239 per tonne (Table 6).
Government intervention in sugar produc-
tion still remains, resulting in a gap between 
the domestic and international prices (Table 
7). In order to protect the domestic produc-
tion of sugar, a high tax rate and quota on 
the import of sugar remains in place, which 
results in the domestic price of sugar being 
much higher than the international price. 
For example, the domestic and international 
prices of sugar were US$624 and US$425 
per tonne respectively in 1995, but US$484 
and US$202 per tonne respectively in 
1999; therefore, the gap has increased from 
US$199 to US$282 per tonne.



























agricultural products in 
a global context
The process of tariff reduction and removal 
of non-tariff barriers is being implemented 
under a strict schedule in accordance with 
agreements between Vietnam and other 
countries, particularly other ASEAN coun-
tries under the framework of AFTA and 
CEPT. Thus, in the near future agricultural 
production in Vietnam will have to compete 
not only in the international market but 
also in the domestic market. In order to 
survive and grow, Vietnamese agriculture 
should focus on and increase its comparative 
advantages, and limits and constraints should 
be removed. In the development process the 
relative advantages and/or disadvantages of 
marketing Vietnamese agricultural products 
may change, ie a product may have a market 
today but not tomorrow and vice versa.
The advantages include the following:
In general, input costs in Vietnam are low.
Agriculture is a labour intensive industry 
(eg the cultivation of one hectare of 
pineapple or mulberry requires the work 
of 20 labourers a year). In Vietnam about 
1.4 million people enter the labour force 
each year. In addition, the wage rate 
in Vietnam is generally low, at about 
US$1–2 per working day, and cheaper 
than in many other countries in the 
region (in Thailand this figure is 2–3 
times higher (Vu Trong Khai 2001)).


Table 6  The domestic, export and international price of rice 1995–2000 in US$/tonne
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Domestic price of rice 250 253 227 253 226 191
Export price (5% broken) 280 300 260 284 228 184
Export price of Thailand (5% broken) 320 364 329 302 239 201
Source: Price Committee of the Government
Table 7  Trends in sugar price in domestic and international markets (US$/tonne)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Domestic price 624 589 594 535 484 357
International price 397 367 316 255 202 222
Source: FAO (1999) and the Price Committee of the Government1
Vietnam has good climatic conditions 
suited to the production of a wide range 
of agricultural products, and Vietnamese 
agricultural labour is very diligent.
The disadvantages include the following:
In general, most crop and animal 
production activities have both low 
productivity and quality in comparison 
with that of competitors in the world and 
region. For example, the yield of tomato 
cultivated by farmers in the Red River 
Delta is equivalent to 65% of the world 
average, and the productivity of rubber is 
1.1 tonnes per hectare compared to world 
figures of 1.5–1.8 tonnes per hectare (Vu 
Trong Khai 2001). A reliable system of 
good seed suppliers is not yet established; 
therefore, most farmers use seeds they 
produce themselves or buy in the market.


Concentrated zones of commercial 
production are not yet well established, 
and processing technology is 
underdeveloped. As a result the quality 
of export products is not high enough 
for markets with high quality standard 
requirements. For example, Vietnam is 
a large rice exporter but the quality of 
consignments is not consistent. Therefore, 
Vietnamese rice and other products are 
generally unbranded and sold as bulk 
commodities, and hence the price of 
exported Vietnamese products is often 
lower than that of other countries.
Management and economic relationships 
between production, processing, export 
and input supply have not been established 
in a stable and consistent way.


A woman dries paddy rice in Bac Ninh province in the Red River Delta. The low cost of labour 
contributes to Vietnam’s comparative advantage in agricultural production, but the poor 
standard of post-harvest and processing technology in many industries results in products 
with low quality.1
Supply sources 
and prices of main 
agricultural inputs
In 2001 a household survey was conducted 
in four provinces in Vietnam: Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai in the north, and Binh Duong and 
Can Tho in the south (see Appendix I). 
Data collected from the approximately 400 
surveyed households included questions 
about actual prices paid to and received from 
different sources, and perceptions about the 
level of input and output prices. The survey 
was repeated in 2002 using a smaller sample 
of the same farmers in the four provinces. In 
addition, the perceptions of farm households 
about the supply of services from agricultural 
cooperatives are also reported in this section.
This system of services, which provides input 
supplies for agricultural production and 
helps farmers to sell their products, includes 
state-owned and private companies and the 
commune-based agricultural cooperatives. 
Since the reforms of the doi moi period, 
the agricultural cooperatives now focus on 
supplying services. Under the Cooperative 
Law (1996), the existing agricultural coopera-
tives were to be ‘transformed’ to independent 
economic entities from which the members 
were to receive joint benefits, and voluntarily 
contribute their capital and labour. The 
agricultural cooperative was established by 
the legal system to strengthen collective power 
and for individual members to help each 
other; to implement more efficient produc-
tion, business and service activities; to improve 
living standards; and to contribute to the 
socioeconomic development of the country.
A summary of the opinions of farm 
households on the ‘transformed agricultural 
cooperatives’ and the services and quality of 
services provided by them is given in Table 8. 
Overall, more than 80% of households rated 
the results of the ‘transformed’ cooperative as 
‘good’. More than 60% of farm households 
classified four services (irrigation, electricity 
supply, seed supply and pest forecasting) 
as good. On the other hand, services such 
as selling products, handicrafts, credit and 
veterinary services were generally given 
‘poor’ ratings, and all farm households rated 
processing as poor. These results suggest 
that services which have been traditionally 
performed by agricultural cooperatives, such 
as irrigation and seed supply, are still the 
dominant activities of cooperatives and are 
rated as good by farmers. For services not 
traditionally performed by cooperatives and 
where the private sector can be involved, such 
as veterinary services and sale of produce, it is 
likely that there will be competition between 
cooperatives and private sector organisations, 
and agricultural cooperatives may not be 
efficient enough to compete effectively.
Supply sources and the prices of the 
main agricultural inputs bought by farm 
households in the research sites are shown in 
Tables 9 and 10. In general, inputs and mate-
rials supplied to farmers came from different 
sources (state-owned and private companies, 
cooperatives, traders, and exchange between 
farmers). Supply to households from the 
agricultural cooperatives increased between 
2000 and 2001. The agricultural cooperatives 
sold inputs to farmers at lower prices in 
comparison with other sources (traders and 
private companies), even when taking account 
of the interest rate levied for late payment.10
In the survey, farmers were asked whether 
prices of agricultural inputs were ‘too high’, 
‘high’, ‘average’, ‘low’ or ‘very low’. Few farmers 
answered that prices were low or very low. 
The percentage of farm households who 
answered that prices were high or very high 
is shown in Table 11. Judging by cases of 
non-reply, fertiliser and pesticides are inputs 
used by most farmers, while the use of 
seed, labour and machinery hire was more 
commune- and district-specific.
Generally, more farmers in the north 
assessed the price of seeds as high compared 
to southern farmers. Most farmers believed 
that the prices of fertiliser and pesticides 
were high except for some households in 
Binh Duong. This may reflect an actual 
price paid by farmers, but it is more likely 
that fertilisers and pesticides are not such 
important inputs for these farmers who tend 
to grow fruit trees or industrial crops.
Generally, farmers assessed that wages were 
at an average level, but in absolute value 
terms wage rates in the south were higher 
than in the north, and more households in 
the south said that wage rates were high or 
very high. Farmers in Ha Tay often hired 
machines for land preparation and threshing, 
so they were interested in the price of hiring 
machines, and more than 40% of surveyed 
farm households in this province answered 
that the price was high.





1. Opinion of the new ‘transformed’ cooperative 82.8 17.2
2. Assessment of each service
Irrigation 60.0 34.0 6.0
Electricity 63.3 24.3 12.5
Seed supply 61.3 29.3 9.5
Materials/inputs 37.5 33.5 29.0
Pest forecasting 64.8 25.8 9.4
Veterinary 28.7 33.6 37.7
Land preparation 23.5 2.6 4.9
Credit 33.3 22.3 44.5
Processing 100.0
Selling products 11.0 16.5 75.5
Handicrafts 10.8 18.3 70.9
Source: Nguyen Thai Van (1999)11











Rice seed 13.0 6.4 9.4 2.6 22.4 10.7 13.9 3.1
Nitrogen 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.6 2.5 –
Phosphorus 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 –
Potassium 2.3 2.1 2.4 – 2.5 2.3 2.5 –
Source: Household survey data 2000 and 2001, ACIAR Project ADP 1/97/092











Rice seed 4.0 11.4 16.8 67.6 3.9 18.4 47.4 30.3
Nitrogen 29.8 15.4 31.5 23.4 11.1 40.9 48.0 –
Phosphorus 41.0 14.6 43.8 0.6 7.7 29.4 63.0 –
Potassium 35.7 25.0 39.3 – 10.1 31.5 58.4 –
Source: Household survey data 2000 and 2001, ACIAR Project ADP 1/97/092
Table 11  Percentage of farm households nominating input prices as ‘high’ or ‘very high’ in the 
year 2000
Province % of households nominating input prices as ‘high’ or ‘very high’
Seed Fertilisers Pesticides Labour Machine rent
Ha Tay (n = 99) 45 72 76 6 41
Yen Bai (n = 97) 59 75 55 4 9
Binh Duong (n = 88) 9 40 32 17 8
Can Tho (n = 90) 20 79 68 12 20
Source: Household survey data 2000, ACIAR Project ADP 1/97/09212
In addition to the question about input 
prices, farmers were asked whether they 
would use more inputs if the price of inputs 
decreased. The percentage of farmers 
answering ‘yes’ is presented in Table 12. Many 
farmers believed they would invest more 
on inputs if the price of inputs decreased, 
suggesting that a financial constraint is one of 
the barriers to increased agricultural produc-
tion on small household farms in Vietnam.
There was a difference in the response to a 
hypothetical decrease in the price of seed 
between farmers in the north and south 
– more farmers in the northern provinces 
said they would increase the level of seed 
used if the price decreased. The data from 
Table 11 also show that more farmers in the 
north assessed the price of seed inputs as 
high or very high. The price of fertiliser may 
also be a constraint for agricultural produc-
tion in both the north and south – more 
than 40% of households in all provinces 
believed they would apply more fertiliser if 
the price decreased. The data from Table 11 
also show that many farmers believed the 
price of fertilisers was high or very high.
The level of pesticide use may not be 
dependent on the price – less than 20% of 
farmers said they would use more pesticides 
if the price decreased, while others said 
they were ‘unsure’. For hired labour the 
percentage of farmers answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
was similar, but more farmers in the north 
said they would use more labour if the wage 
rate decreased. However, it is unlikely that 
wage rates will decrease as rural wage rates 
in the north are already very low and the 
opportunity for off-farm jobs should increase 
in the future; therefore, the wage rate will 
be more likely to increase. There were very 
few households interested in the price of 
machine rental, except for farmers in Ha Tay 
and some in Yen Bai. This may indicate that 
many households cannot perceive themselves 
moving to a more industrialised agriculture. 
Alternatively, particularly in the south, 
farmers may perceive that they are already 
mechanised as much as practically possible 
(ie they don’t imagine using mechanical 
planting and harvesting).
Table 12  Percentage of farm households who would increase the level of inputs if input prices 
decreased
Percentage of households answering ‘yes’
Seed Fertilisers Pesticides Labour Machine rent
Ha Tay (n = 99) 31 47 10 30 35
Yen Bai (n = 97) 32 60 11 15 16
Binh Duong (n = 88) 9 52 10 25 10
Can Tho (n = 90) 9 43 20 18 41
Conclusions
In the last 10 years price policies of the 
Vietnamese Government have changed 
towards providing more benefits for agricul-
tural production and farmers, especially in 
relation to food production. The prices of 
both agricultural products and production 
inputs have been trending closer to interna-
tional prices. Under the trade liberalisation 
policy the price gap between regions has 
steadily decreased, and therefore agricultural 
production has been more stable than before.
In the context of global integration 
Vietnamese agricultural products have 
advantages and also many disadvantages in 
the marketplace which need to be studied 
seriously. It is likely that conformity with 
both AFTA and WTO requirements will 
put pressure on some agricultural sectors. 
The removal of protection in a number 
of areas, albeit gradually, will increase the 
pressure for more efficient production, 
particularly in the commodities in which 
there is a comparative advantage.
Input supply sources for farmers are now 
diversified, and the purchase of inputs by 
farmers is also easier because the prices are 
more or less in line with what farmers can 
afford to pay. Although the agricultural 
cooperatives are now playing a significant 
role in providing an increasing number of 
services for farmers, farmers mainly sell 
their agricultural products to private traders. 
There would seem to be a role for the 
agricultural cooperatives to be more actively 
involved in the marketing of products grown 
or produced in the commune.
Machinery, such as this thresher being used by farmers in Bac Ninh province, Red River Delta, 
is commonly hired. Farmers who were surveyed didn’t consider the cost of machinery hire to 
be as high as other production inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides.1
Based on the analysis of input and output 
price policy, some recommendations are 
as follows:
As information is important for 
household decision-making, there is 
an opportunity for the government to 
focus on market research as well as price 
forecasting, and provide farmers with 
sufficient information on the demand 
for, supply of and prices of agricultural 
products not only in the domestic market 
but also for international markets. 
This might include information on the 
risks faced by farmers so that choices 
of more stable products can be made 
and the risk of major price changes (eg 
recent decreases in the prices of coffee, 
plum and litchi) can be minimised. 
Helpful information about where and 
what to produce (eg products with 
high quality, low production cost and 
high comparative advantage) could also 
be provided.

Where advantageous, the government 
may find ways to change policies to 
strengthen cooperatives so that they can 
serve farmers not only in the supply of 
production inputs but also by selling 
their outputs. Raising the efficiency and 
effectiveness of cooperatives may mean 
that they can have a more effective role 
in the sale of products, and use their 
marketing skills to achieve better and 
timelier sales, possibly through a wider 
use of contracts.
As price subsidies and other forms 
of support distort the real expression 
of comparative advantage and lead 
to inefficient use of resources, such 
mechanisms should be gradually reduced 
and removed in a way which allows 
for the necessary resource adjustment 
to take place. A focus on providing for 
macroeconomic stability and a stable set 
of international trading relationships will 
greatly enhance the domestic stability of 





tHe rurAl lAnd reSource And poverty 
in vietnAm 
do KiM chunG
Vietnam is still predominantly a rural country, and the rural economy will play an 
important role in the future industrialisation and modernisation of the national 
economy. During recent years poverty has been reduced at an impressive rate, from 
58% in 1993 to 37% in 1998 (World Bank 1999). However, the poverty incidence 
still stood at 17% in 2001 by the national poverty standard. Land resources are 
one of the key determinants of poverty. Land is a primary means for generating a 
livelihood, and a main vehicle for investment, accumulating wealth and transferring 
wealth between generations. Over the last two decades, the Government of Vietnam 
has reviewed land policies to move from a collectivised agricultural production to 
one based on individual farm households in the market place. New land policies 
have granted land use rights to individual farmers and, given the property rights 
attached to land use rights, this is effectively land ownership. Land policies can affect: 
i) the household’s ability to produce for their subsistence and generate a marketable 
surplus; ii) farmers’ socioeconomic status; and iii) farmers’ incentives to invest in 
using land in a sustainable manner. In this chapter information is provided on rural 
land resources and poverty, and land policy issues for sustainable poverty reduction 
and rural development are discussed.1
The rural land resource
Rural livelihoods consist of six types of 
capital: natural, human, financial, social, 
physical infrastructure and fiscal (Chung 
2002a, 2002b), and the rural land resource is 
one of the key elements of rural livelihoods. 
From 1930 to 1995 the annual rural popula-
tion growth rate of Vietnam was 1.6%, while 
that of China was 0.4%, Thailand was 1.0%, 
Indonesia 0.4% and all of South-East Asia 
had a growth rate of 1.6% (World Bank 
2002). As the rural population has increased 
over time, the arable land per capita has 
declined, and at present arable land per 
capita in Vietnam is about one-quarter of 
that in 1930 (Table 1).
Vietnam has one of the highest rural popula-
tion densities in the world (Table 2). High 
population density in the rural sector creates 
significant pressure on the land resource and 
has caused serious degradation of forestlands 
and water resources. Forest cover declined 
from 43% in 1943 to 27.8% in 1990 and 
33.2% in 1999 (Table 3). Water availability 
in cubic metres per capita declined from 
12,800 in 1990 to 10,900 in 2000, and is 
predicted to be 8500 by 2020 (Institute of 
Water Resources Research 2002). However, 
water availability per capita in Vietnam is 
still high at about 2.7 and 1.4 times that of 
Asia and the world average, respectively. The 
scarcity of land and water resources also 
causes serious degradation of biodiversity 
and other natural resources.
Rural poverty
In recent years Vietnam’s poverty rate has 
been significantly reduced (Figure 1). The 
rural poverty rate decreased from 66% in 
1993 to 45% in 1998 and 19.7% in 2000, 
and the food poverty rate in rural areas 
improved from 29% in 1993 to 14.5% in 
2000. However, the rural poverty rate as 
measured by the food poverty line in 2000 
was three times higher than that of the 
urban areas.
Table 1  Rural population and arable land per capita in Vietnam, 1930–2000




Arable land per 
capita (m2 per 
person)
1930 16,375 93.1 2,542
1960 25,615 84.8 1,671
1990 45,143 80.5 829
2000 59,065 76.5 680
Source: Government of Vietnam ‘Statistical Year Books’, various years1
Table 2  Countries with highest and lowest rural population density
Countries with highest rural population 
density (persons/km2)
Countries with lowest rural population 
density (persons/km2)
Puerto Rico 2,798 US 36
Oman 2,595 Belgium 35
Sri Lanka 1,600 Demark 35
Egypt 1,217 New Zealand 33
Bangladesh 1,209 Russia 31
Vietnam 1,031 Uruguay 23
Haiti 905 Kazakstan 22
Rwanda 901 Argentina 16
Liberia 892 Canada 15
Yemen 833 Australia 6
Source: World Bank 2002
Table 3  Forest areas and forest cover in Vietnam, 1943–1999








1943 14,300 0 14,300 43.0
1976 11,077 92 11,169 33.8
1980 10,860 422 10,908 32.1
1985 9,308 584 9,892 30.1
1990 8,430 745 9,175 27.8
1995 8,252 1,050 9,305 28.2
1999 9,444 1,471 10,915 33.2
Source: Chung 2002b1






































Rural Urban Rural Urban
General Poverty Line Food Poverty Line
The population density in Vietnam is such that, even in remote areas, intensive agricultural 
production puts pressure on land and water resources. Here, ethnic Thai people 
transplant rice along a terraced river valley in Tan Uyen, Lao Cai province in the northwest 
mountainous region.1
A large proportion (80%) of the poor 
are farmers who lack skills and technical 
know-how, and have low accessibility 
to development efforts (Government of 
Vietnam 2002). Less than 10% of the poor 
are landless farmers, mainly concentrated 
in the Mekong Delta. The main reasons 
for landlessness are debt, illness and lack 
of skills (Chung 2003; National Center 
for Social Sciences and Humanities 2001). 
In 2001 there were about 2.8 million poor 
households, of which 90.5% lived in rural 
areas, 28% in the mountainous regions and 
62.5% in the delta regions (Table 4). The 
distribution of the incidence of poverty 
among regions was uneven, with poverty 
concentrated mostly in the northwestern and 
northeastern regions, northern central and 
coastal central regions, and western central 
highlands (Table 5).




Share of total poor and 
non-poor households in 
the region (%)
Share of total poor 
households in the 
country (%)
Rural: 2,535 19.7 90.5
mountainous region 785 31.3 28.0
deltas 1,750 16.9 62.5
Urban 265 7.8 9.5
All 2,800 17.2 100
Source: Government of Vietnam 2002
Table 5  Number of poor households by region in 2001
Region Number of poor 
households 
(‘000)
Share of total poor and 
non-poor households in 
the region (%)
Share of total poor 
households in the 
country (%)
Northwestern region 146 33.9 5.2
Northeastern region 511 22.3 18.2
Red River Delta 537 9.8 12.0
Northern central region 554 25.6 19.8
Central coastal region 389 22.4 13.9
Western highlands 190 24.9 6.8
Southeastern region 183 8.9 6.6
Mekong Delta 490 14.4 17.5
Source: Government of Vietnam 200210
Of the poor, 64% live in the remote areas 
and/or areas recognised by the government 
as having special difficulties. There are 
2720 poor communes, of which 30% have 
no roads suitable for automobiles into the 
commune centres, 40% have inadequate 
schools, 55% have no access to safe water, 
50% have inadequate irrigation systems 
and 20% have inadequate access to markets 
(Government of Vietnam 2002). Many 
poor households belong to ethnic minority 
groups, which make up about 14% of the 
total population but 29% of the total poor of 
the country (Government of Vietnam 2002). 
Although much effort has been devoted to 
hunger eradication in mountainous regions, 
the rate of poverty reduction in the minority 
groups has been slower than that in the 
majority Kinh group (Table 6).
Land policies and 
poverty reduction
The role of land use property 
rights in poverty reduction
One of the key elements of doi moi (renova-
tion) was a reform in land policies that was 
initiated in 1981, and extensively implemented 
in 1988 and through enactment of the Land 
Law in 1993 and renewals of the Land Laws 
in 1998 and 2003. The basic features of the 
renovation of land policies were:
establishment of land use property rights 
for farm households and individual land 
users
creation of freedom of choice for crop 
decisions
allowing land transfer among land users 
(via inheritance, mortgage, collateral, 
lease-in, lease-out).
At present lands have been allocated to 
12.6 million farm households, with an 
average farm size ranging from 0.4 to 1.2 ha. 
As outcomes of the land transfer policies, 
the poverty rate has been reduced sharply, 
as indicated in Figure 1, and the agriculture 
sector has developed at an impressive 
growth rate of about 4.0–4.2% per annum 
during the 1990s.
Land property rights have the following 
important influences on economic growth. 
Secure land rights increase incentives for 
households and individuals to invest. At 
present 69% of Vietnam’s 55,882 large-scale 
commercial farms have invested in land 
improvements for horticulture, aquaculture 




Table 6  Vietnam’s poverty rates in 1993 and 1998 by ethnic groups (percentage of households)
Ethnic group 1993 1998 Reduction
Kinh group 54 31 –23
Ethnic minority groups 86 75 –6
Source: Government of Vietnam 200211
Land use property rights often also provide 
households with better access to credit and 
an insurance substitute in the case of shocks 
such as death or illness. The World Bank 
noted that 65% of surveyed poor households 
in the Mekong Delta and 23% in the Red 
River Delta reported that the Red Book 
(the land use certificate) helped them obtain 
credit for their households more easily 
(World Bank 2001b).
Security of land tenure facilitates the transfer 
of land at low cost through rentals and 
sales, improving allocation of land while at 
the same time supporting development of 
financial markets. This result is visible in the 
Mekong Delta.
Secure land property rights have an important 
role in poverty reduction. In rural areas land is 
the primary means for generating a livelihood 
and the main vehicle for investing, accumu-
lating wealth and transferring wealth between 
generations. Land is a key element of house-
hold wealth, with 91% of surveyed farmers in 
the Red River Delta and 70% in the Mekong 
Delta listing land as the most important family 
asset (Chung 2000a). Land accounted for 
55–65% of household asset endowment in 
the Mekong Delta and the southeastern and 
mountainous regions. Wealthy households 
often have larger and better lands compared 
to the poor, although criteria for good land 
differed from region to region (Table 7).
Table 7  Land characteristics determining wealth of households in some selected provinces

































Ho Chi Minh City
(southeastern region)
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Source: World Bank 199912
Given the property rights now associated 
with land, households can obtain ownership 
and conflicts pertaining to such ownership 
can be resolved. Evidence from surveys 
conducted in March and April 2003 
showed that with land property rights, 
farm households were able to produce for 
their subsistence and generate a marketable 
surplus (Chung 2003). Their socioeconomic 
status has improved directly from having 
property land use rights. The ability of 
women to have control over land resources 
has also improved as an outcome of the new 
Land Laws enacted in 2003, which stipu-
lated that the names of the wife and husband 
must both be on the certificate of land use 
rights (Red Book). In Bac Giang, Can Tho 
and Dong Thap provinces 40% of women 
reported that land certificates bearing their 
names enabled them to have better access to 
credit from formal credit providers (World 
Bank 2001b). Furthermore, land use rights 
have supplied farmers with more incentives 
to invest and use land in a sustainable 
manner, and enabled them to self-insure and 
get access to financial resources.
Agricultural land markets
Agricultural land markets appeared even 
before the enactment of the 1993 Land Law 
(Chung 2000a), with rural land markets 
occurring in all regions. In the less populated 
areas such as the mountainous, midland, 
Mekong Delta and central highlands, rural 
land market transactions were less developed 
than in the densely populated regions 
including the Red River Delta and the 
The rate of poverty reduction has been slower among the ethnic groups than for the majority 
Kinh group. These ethnic H’mong women are from Can Cau, Lao Cai province in the north-
west mountainous area where poverty is still widespread.1
northern central region. This differentiation 
is due to variations in the land:person ratio 
and also job opportunities in different 
regions of the country. Land market transac-
tions were in different forms: leasing-in or 
leasing-out, borrowing, selling or buying, 
bidding for and exchanging land.
Market transactions are important as the 
existence of the land market helps farmers 
overcome problems of land fragmentation 
and maximise the farm operation. By the 
early 1990s the whole country had about 
7 million ha of arable land and about 
75 million plots, and the average farm 
household cultivated about five to ten 
plots (Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment 2002). However, future growth 
in agriculture cannot be sustained with 
such fragmentation of arable land. The land 
market helps farmers transfer land, consoli-
date land into larger plots and farm more 
efficiently. There is a tendency for households 
who are only engaged in farming to try to 
have more land so as to make full use of 
their labour endowment; and for households 
engaged in rural industries or handicrafts to 
transfer their lands to farmers who are only 
engaged in farming. The medium-income 
farmers are able to obtain more land than the 
low-income farmers because of differences in 
their respective behaviours. The poor house-
holds often have lower land productivity, 
and hence lower rental fees or selling prices 
for land. As a result, 60% of transferred land 
has come into the medium-income farmer 
group and 25% into the wealthy farmer 
group (Chung 2000a). This has contributed 
to the establishment and operation of 55,882 
large-scale commercial farms throughout the 
country by early 2001 (MARD 2002).
Land transfer, landless farmers 
and poverty
Land transfer, of course, may create landless 
farmers in rural areas. During 1999–2000 
there were 80,000 landless farmers in the 
Mekong Delta. A number of landless farmers 
have also recently appeared in the north, 
especially in areas with high industrialisation 
and urbanisation growth. There are five main 
reasons why farmers become landless:
Farmers may transfer land because they 
move to non-farm jobs due to illness or 
because of heavy debt and failure to meet 
mortgage requirements.
Farmers may lose land because of high 
population growth rates and increasing 
numbers of households in rural areas, 
combined with a decreasing land 
resource because of urbanisation and 
industrialisation.
Farmers can lose land because of the 
collapse of cooperatives and production 
teams, requiring them to return land to 
its former owners.
Farmers who left their hamlets to build 
a new economic zone may be forced 
to return to their hamlet because of 
poor livelihoods in the new living areas 
(Chung 2000a)
Farmers may lose their land for estab-
lishment of an industrialised zone and 
receive compensation for their land, but 
fail to find a sustainable job alternative.
Is landlessness closely correlated with poverty 
incidence in households? An econometric 
estimation using data from 6000 households 






showed that the percentage of arable land is 
positively related to the incidence of poverty 
(Table 8). It would be expected that in a 
largely agriculture-based economy, availability 
of arable land would positively influence 
human welfare. Their findings also indicate 
that not all landless farmers are poor. About 
20% of landless farmers in the Mekong Delta 
had left their farms to become wage-workers 
or be engaged in other non-farming activities. 
This is a new employment development and 
reflects the fact that non-farming income 
generating activities have enabled farmers 
to obtain higher incomes than if they were 
engaged only in farming. However, less than 
15% of the poor, especially in the Mekong 
Delta, were landless farmers. The main 
reasons for the poor becoming landless were 
debt, illness and poor farming skills (Chung 
2003). Thus, more effort should be made to 
help the poor improve their farming skills, 
and to provide credit to help them use their 
available land and labour resources.
Some policy issues
Although the new land policies create a 
favourable environment for growth of the rural 
economy, some policy bottlenecks still exist.
Table 8  Estimation of determinants of poverty in Vietnam
Parameter Coefficient T-value
Intercept 124.456 2.914 ***
Population density 0.000597 4.180 ***
Percentage natural forest –0.127 –5.369 ***
Percentage arable land 7.0342 3.399 ***
Percentage bare land 0.0718 1.743 ***
Market per commune –2.674 –3.844 **
Market payment to state –7.7E-07 –0.786 ***
Percentage flat land –0.332 –15.704 *
Average distance to district town 0.000665 6.507 *
Main road density –0.0115 –4.437 ***
Minor road density –0.00324 –2.696 ***
Average rainfall –0.000103 0.0905 ***
Average temperature –1.107 –2.701 ***
Annual sunshine duration –0.00253 –1.141 ***
Average humidity –0.620 –1.234 ***
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% levels.
Source: Minot et al 20031
1.  The term of land use rights is still 
short (20 years for cultivated land), 
and that may create a degree of land 
insecurity and inhibit investment in 
land improvement. In Thai Binh, Ha 
Nam, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Ha 
Tinh, Yen Bai, Tra Vinh and Dong Nai 
75% of farmers who operate large-scale 
commercial farms reported that they 
were allocated land in 1988 and now 
there are only 4–5 years left on the land 
use certificate. This time is too short 
for a sustainable long-term investment 
in land. Most of them are trying to 
exploit natural soil fertility in the 
remaining years of the land use rights 
duration. Thus, the term of land use 
should be extended for a longer period, 
eg 30–40 years for cultivated lands 
(MARD 2002).
2.  The farm size of about 65% of the 
large-scale farms exceeds the ceiling level 
on land holdings. Many farm operators 
are very concerned about the land ceiling 
policies which, in some places, seem 
ineffective and may inhibit farmers 
from consolidation and investment in 
their land. The ceiling policy should be 
reviewed in accordance with crop choice, 
technology and the socioeconomic 
situation of each region. The government 
has issued an inter-ministerial circular on 
issuing certificates to large commercial 
farms to enable farmers to obtain credit 
and market access. However, the process 
of issuing land certificates in general 
and to large-scale commercial farms in 
particular is still slow, and this acts as a 
disincentive for farmers to operate farms 
in the changing market environment.
Steep slopes contribute to both production difficulties and poor market access in mountainous 
regions such as Lao Cai province. This picture is of a busy weekly local market in Can Cau, Lao 
Cai province.1
3.  In some provinces in the Red River 
Delta, where traditional cooperatives 
exist, crop choices in land use are still 
controlled by the cooperatives or district 
authorities to achieve production targets 
set at a higher government level (eg 
VND50 million/ha). This inhibits 
incentives for and efforts of farmers to 
optimise their objectives in accordance 
with their needs, their resource 
endowment and market demands. Some 
crop choices set by outsiders can face 
a market risk that may have farmers 
fall below the poverty line again. Thus, 
individual farmers should make crop 
choices based on their own objectives 
and resource availability, with support 
from the public sector in the form of 
information on crop choice, technology 
availability, price and market demands 
which are relevant to local conditions. 
There is a need to continue the shift 
from a top-down planning approach to 
market-oriented planning, which creates 
a favourable environment for all business 
operators to be effectively and efficiently 
involved in input and output markets.
4.  Market transactions exist in many 
different forms, but information about 
market transactions is still limited and 
this sometimes causes land markets to 
be inefficient. Thus, preparation of an 
institutional framework to facilitate 
transferability and security of land use 
rights is necessary. This framework 
should recognise the reality of the 
land market and provide an efficient 
mechanism for it to operate, and specify 
the rights and obligations of people 
involved. This would help farmers to find 
a suitable party to deal with and enable 
transfer of land use rights to be made 
not only on a one-to-one basis between 
neighbours or kin, but also within an 
appropriate framework for the sake of 
better land allocation.
5.  In some northern provinces, especially in 
the Red River Delta, land exchanges have 
been administratively directed under the 
close supervision of local authorities to 
address problems of land fragmentation. 
This can create greater risks for farmers: 
for example, after land redistribution 
some farmers may be left with all their 
land holdings being infertile or prone 
to flooding. Land exchange to address 
land fragmentation would be better 
left to the market mechanism within a 
recommended institutional framework, 
so that people involved in land exchange 
can benefit from their transactions based 
on agreed market prices.
6.  A considerable number of farmers 
who are only engaged in rural cottage 
industries still keep land for farming. 
All farming activities in these cases are 
carried out by hired labour. Of these 
farmers, 75% reported that, although 
making a loss (estimated at 25–30%) 
from their farming activities, they still 
want to keep land due to the uncertainty 
associated with their rural off-farm 
industries. Thus, there is a need to help 
farmers who have left their land for other 
non-farming businesses to have access 
to both markets and suitable available 
information so that they are able to 
adjust their production response and 
improve their technology.1
7.  With the high rate of urbanisation 
and industrialisation taking place, 
more agricultural land resources will 
be converted into industrial lands and 
leave many more farmers landless. 
For example, land funds in Bac Ninh 
and Hung Yen provinces provided for 
industry zoning up to the year 2020 had 
been fully allocated by 2002. Farmers 
with money from land compensation 
often cannot run their non-farming 
activities in a sustainable manner since 
they lack the technical know-how 
needed to run the businesses or to be 
employed by entrepreneurs. This creates 
high pressure on both agricultural land 
and rural unemployment. Thus, more 
training is needed to help farmers in 
the urbanised and industrialised areas 
obtain better skills to be engaged in non-
farming activities when in the process of 
leaving their land.
8.  Landless farmers who have lost land 
because of inevitable reasons (eg zoning) 
and are interested in farming should be 
reallocated land from new land funds or 
public land, or be provided with credit to 
help them purchase or lease land.
9.  Land is not the single determinant of 
poverty. More effort should be made 
to help the poor improve their farming 
skills and access credit and markets, so 
that they can effectively use their land 
and labour resources. Credit provision 
should be closely linked with extension 
services to ensure that credit is efficiently 
used to help farmers generate income 
in a sustainable manner. Participatory 
approaches to extension should be 
adopted to involve all farmers and 
farming communities in identifying their 
own problems and solutions, which 
should then be implemented using local 
resources with considerable support from 
the public sector.1
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FArm income And income diverSity on 
vietnAm’S SmAll HouSeHold FArmS 
Sally P. MarSh, PhaM Van hunG, nGuyen Quoc chinh and T. Gordon Macaulay
Vietnam has approximately 11 million small household farms, many of which 
consist of fragmented land holdings that total less than one hectare. Rural poverty 
is a significant problem, and the income gap between rural and urban areas is 
increasing. In this chapter data obtained via a household survey of income from 
both on-farm and off-farm sources are reported. A substantial component of 
household income is provided by off-farm activities for many households in all 
provinces. However, many other households are almost totally dependent on 
income from on-farm work, including a diverse range of crop and livestock activities 
in many households. Both diversity of income sources and diversity of farm 
production can be viewed as risk aversion strategies used by small landholders. Not 
unsurprisingly, total net value of production from agricultural activities is related to 
farm size and land type, but other factors such as assets, education, family labour 
and measures of land fragmentation have a significant influence in some provinces. 
These data and results from regression analyses are discussed with reference to rural 
development and land policy in Vietnam.10
Introduction
In December 1986 at the Sixth National 
Congress, the Government of Vietnam 
introduced a wide-ranging set of reforms 
known as doi moi which recognised a 
number of the failures of central planning 
and were designed to gradually deregulate 
and liberalise the economy. Associated with 
these reforms, the 1993 Land Law (which 
followed the 1988 ‘Resolution 10’) formal-
ised the farm household as the main unit of 
agricultural production. It provided for the 
allocation of land use rights (LUR) such that 
individuals, households and organisations 
could hold and transfer rights to use land. 
The 1993 Land Law also gave security of 
tenure over allocated land, with LUR granted 
for 20 years for annual crop land and aquac-
ulture land, and 50 years for perennial crop 
land. Land ceilings were imposed of 2–3 ha 
for annual crop land and 10 ha for perennial 
crop land in delta communes and 30 ha in 
midland and mountainous communes.
The process of land allocation in Vietnam 
that began in 1981 and was formalised in the 
1993 Land Law is still on-going, although 
it is largely complete for agricultural 
land. The land allocation process varied 
between districts, although equity between 
households was of primary consequence. 
Consideration was given both to land quality 
and the number of people, or more specifi-
cally labour equivalents, in a household. 
Consequently, the amount of land allocated 
varied between households, and in the north 
and central regions of Vietnam this land 
was typically split into a number of plots of 
varying land quality. There was less concern 
with equitable distribution in the south, 
and land allocation to households was also 
more likely to be based on land held prior 
to reunification in 1975 (Do & Iyer 2003; 
Luong & Unger 1999; Ravallion & van de 
Walle 2001, 2003).
Approximately 80% of the population of 
around 80 million people lives in rural areas, 
and there are over 11 million household 
farms in Vietnam (World Bank 2003). 
Farm sizes vary throughout the country 
but are typically small, around 0.2 ha per 
capita (World Bank 2001). The average 
size of farms in the Mekong Delta is 1.2 ha, 
considerably larger than average farm sizes 
in the Red River Delta. The need to increase 
agricultural productivity (and hence farm 
income) is central to the debate on rural 
development in Vietnam. Agricultural 
productivity can be thought of in terms 
of both land and labour productivity. The 
combination of small farm sizes and the high 
proportion of the population involved in 
agriculture means that labour productivity 
is low, indicating a potential for productivity 
growth as labour moves out of agriculture 
or, alternatively, combines agriculture with 
off-farm work.
In recent years Vietnam has seen a steady 
overall reduction in poverty but a widening 
of rural–urban income gaps (UNDP 2000). 
Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, with 
an estimated four-fifths of the poor working 
mainly in agriculture (World Bank 2000). 
Poor households generally have smaller 
landholdings and landlessness is becoming 
more widespread, particularly in the Mekong 
Delta. The World Bank (2000) has reported 
that households who are unable to make a 
living from the land find few opportunities 11
for stable income generation off the farm, 
and that there is an urgent need for reforms 
to stimulate greater off-farm employment. 
Earning off-farm income is perceived as one 
way that small households can escape the 
small farm poverty trap.
In this chapter farm size and household 
income in four provinces in Vietnam are 
investigated. The purpose is to examine 
differences in farm size between households, 
differences in the value of household produc-
tion and the diversity of production sources 
between regions, and factors that influence 
the total production value of farm-based 
activities. Issues related to both farm and off-
farm income are discussed, and the method 
used to collect the farm household data is 
briefly outlined. The results of the research 
work are presented and discussed under 
headings of:
farm size distributions
net value of production from farm 
activities
income diversity
perceptions of opportunities for off-farm 
work.
The link between farm size and the value of 
farm production is explored and the effect of 
off-farm income evaluated. Finally, conclu-





Farm income and 
off-farm income 
on Vietnam’s small 
household farms
Factors limiting income from 
farm production
Vietnam has a large rural population 
and limited land, and many small farm 
households are engaged in subsistence-
oriented production. The Government of 
Vietnam is still concerned that land should 
be available for households who wish to 
engage in farming (Vasavakul 2003). In 
Vietnam farm size is limited officially by 
land holding ceilings. Land holdings over the 
land limit are subject to a land tax whereas 
land holdings under the land ceiling are now 
exempt (for further details see Anh 2006 
this volume). Despite the existence of land 
holding ceilings and a degree of restriction 
on the land rental market, a market for land 
use rights is active in some areas and there is 
evidence that land accumulation is occurring 
through land leasing and transfer (Do & 
Iyer 2003; Deininger & Jin 2003; Marsh 
et al 2005). Although land accumulation is 
not actively encouraged by the government, 
fragmented land holdings in the north 
and central areas of Vietnam are seen as 
an impediment to production and the 
government is encouraging land consolida-
tion through ‘voluntary’ plot exchange 
(Hung et al 2004).12
Whether larger farm size will increase 
land productivity on a per area basis is not 
clear. There is a considerable literature that 
indicates that productivity is higher on 
small farms than larger ones (eg Berry & 
Cline 1979, cited in Binswanger & Elgin 
1998), although some of this work has been 
critiqued for not taking account of differ-
ences in land quality. This paper does not 
explore this issue, focusing rather on total 
household income and its relationship with 
farm size. The relationship between farm 
size and productivity in Vietnam is explored 
comprehensively by Hung and MacAulay 
(2005), who suggest that in terms of farm 
area, economies of farm size are likely to be 
present in the north of Vietnam.
Improvements in rural living standards 
during 1993–98 were driven predominantly 
by a diversification in on-farm activities 
(World Bank 2000). Average household 
incomes grew by 60% in the 5 years to 1998. 
However, restrictions on land use are still 
an issue, particularly with regards to paddy 
land (wet rice land). Both land and labour 
productivity are hindered by lack of land 
use flexibility. The government’s position on 
rice policy and other commodity production 
programs (eg sugar, cotton) will continue 
to affect the flexibility of land use, and 
hence the potential of farmers to diversify 
their agricultural enterprises in response to 
market signals. Government expenditure on 
infrastructure such as roads and irrigation 
also affects land use flexibility (United 
Nations 1999). Additionally, empirical 
evidence shows that cash crop orientation in 
developing countries depends on farm size, 
with larger farms tending to devote more 
area to cash crops (Fafchamps 1992).
Risk also plays a role in restricting the land use 
choice of poor households, whose livelihoods 
are extremely vulnerable to both household-
specific (eg illness) and community-wide 
shocks. The risk of failure associated with 
on-farm investments or new enterprises can 
deter subsistence farmers from expanding 
their economic base or changing their farming 
activities. Furthermore, when marketing insti-
tutions and infrastructure such as transport 
are not well developed, a shift to non-food 
crops can make small farmers particularly 
vulnerable. Khiem et al (1999) showed that 
both land and labour productivity were higher 
in areas with better market access.
Luong and Unger (1999, pp 121–122) 
comment on the outcomes of land being 
returned to the pre-collectivisation owners in 
the south of Vietnam. They claim that differ-
entiation is greater between households, and 
the ‘main basis for socio-economic differenti-
ation today lies in the initial property owned 
by each family, in particular the amount and 
quality of farm acreage’. These authors also 
state that, in contrast, in northern Vietnam 
‘the success of some households as opposed 
to their local neighbours appears to be due to 
a combination of individual drive, skills, and 
favourable connections with the authorities’ 
(p 143). They also note that having an 
education or specific technical skills seems 
to make a difference to the household’s 
performance.
Factors limiting off-farm income
Small farm size and decreasing returns for 
agricultural products as Vietnam enters the 
global market place have put considerable 
income pressure on Vietnamese farmers. 
To some degree small farms can be viewed 1
as poverty traps. Off–farm opportunities, 
however, are limited, and the generally low 
level of education in rural areas provides a 
further constraint. Unlike the situation in 
China, the rural industrial sector that would 
supply off-farm jobs is underdeveloped 
(Luong & Unger 1999).
The Vietnamese rural non-farm sector grew 
much more slowly than the agricultural sector 
during the 5 years from 1993 to 1998, but 
incomes from non-farm self-employment still 
increased by 30% (World Bank in Vietnam 
2000). Employment and income growth in 
agriculture, off-farm enterprises and services 
in rural areas are seen as being critical for 
rapid poverty reduction in the future. Luong 
and Unger (1999) have commented that 
off-farm income is one of the major reasons 
for differentiation between households in 
Vietnam. Similarly, Van de Walle and Cratty 
(2002, cited in World Bank 2003, pp 41–42) 
suggest that ‘a strong association is observed 
between poverty and lack of diversification 
into wage and self-employment activities’.
Collection of farm 
household data
During 2001 a farm household survey was 
conducted in four provinces in Vietnam: 
Ha Tay and Yen Bai in the north, and 
Binh Duong and Can Tho in the south. 
Approximately 400 households were 
surveyed in 16 communes (two districts in 
each province). The survey provinces are 
representative of four of Vietnam’s agro-
ecological zones, namely the northern and 
southern delta areas, and the northwestern 
mountainous and southeastern regions. Two 
of the provinces are located adjacent to the 
major cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Ha Tay province is located in the Red River 
Delta adjacent to the capital Hanoi. The 
main farming activities are rice, livestock and 
vegetables, although aquaculture, flower and 
fruit production are increasing as farmers have 
good access to markets in Hanoi. Yen Bai is 
a mountainous province in the northwestern 
region, the poorest and most remote of the 
four surveyed provinces, with many house-
holds producing at subsistence level only. 
The main farming activities are rice (in river 
valleys), upland annual crops such as corn and 
cassava, industrial trees (for paper), mixed 
gardens and livestock. Can Tho province is 
located in the heart of the Mekong Delta and 
is a major rice growing region. Fruit produc-
tion in this province is also important and 
increasing. Binh Duong province is located 
adjacent to Ho Chi Minh City and has a very 
diverse agriculture, including rice, industrial 
trees (rubber), fruit trees and pepper. Its 
location close to Ho Chi Minh City means 
that some districts have substantial industrial 
and service provision sectors.
A wide range of mostly quantitative data 
were collected relating to household structure 
and resources and farm production. Detailed 
information concerned land holdings and 
land use, assets, production overall and on an 
individual plot basis, income sources, prices 
paid and received, use of credit, and percep-
tions of yield and price risk. Additionally, a 
number of qualitative questions were asked 
about changes in land holdings and land use, 
and perceptions of household wellbeing and 
opportunities. More detail on the survey is 
given in Appendix I.1
Results and discussion
Farm size distribution
Farm size data were collected for all house-
holds, and the results indicate considerable 
variation in farm size. Selected descriptive 
statistics are given in Table 1 for communes 
with comparatively large farm size, located 
within districts with comparatively large farm 
size, for each province. The data give some 
idea of the variation in farm size between 
the northern and southern delta provinces, 
namely Ha Tay and Can Tho; and between 
delta provinces and provinces with upland 
areas, namely Yen Bai and Binh Duong. In 
the delta provinces farm size is smaller in 
the north and plot number is higher. For the 
upland provinces farm size and plot size are 
both much larger, although Yen Bai has a 
much higher plot number than Binh Duong 
and this affects average plot size.
These average data obscure a great deal of 
farm size variation between households 
within communes. Some idea of this variation 
is given by the standard deviations shown in 
Table 1. The inequality in land holding per 
household can be seen clearly if land distribu-
tion is graphed. The farm size distribution 
for surveyed households in the northern 
delta province of Ha Tay is shown in Figure 
1, where farm size distribution amongst 
households is very variable and farm size 
is generally very small. In Ha Tay province 
more than 60% of surveyed households in all 
communes except Thach Hoa were farming 
less than 5000 m2 (0.5 ha) of land in 2000. 
Note that these households may not have 
land use rights for all this land – this area 
includes land leased-in and borrowed and 
excludes land leased-out. The land limit in 
the Red River Delta is 2 ha and only two of 
the surveyed households in Ha Tay were 
farming more than this area in 2000.
Farm size distribution for households in the 
southern delta province of Can Tho was also 
variable, with the majority of households 
farming an area of between 0.5 and 1.5 ha. 
The land limit in the Mekong Delta is 3 ha 
and five of the surveyed households in Can 
Tho were farming more than this area in 
2000. In Yen Bai province more than 40% 
Table 1  Average farm size and household size data for selected surveyed communes in four 
provinces
Province Ha Tay Yen Bai Binh Duong Can Tho








Avg farm size (m2) 9,412 (9,772) 18,760 (31,459) 35,266 (35,492) 15,943 (8,718)
Avg plot numbers 7.5 (2.7) 6.5 (3.6) 2.5 (1.2) 2.2 (1.1)
Avg plot size (m2) 1,263 (3,683) 2,877 (11,064) 13,973 (19,229) 7,358 (5,925)
Standard deviations are in parentheses1
of surveyed households in all communes 
except one were farming less than 0.5 ha of 
land in 2000, and only four were farming 
more than 10 ha of land (including forestry 
land). In Binh Duong province the majority 
of farmers in all communes also had farms 
of between 0.5 and 1.5 ha, and some house-
holds had less than 0.1 ha. Only two of the 
surveyed households in Binh Duong were 
farming more than 10 ha of land in 2000.
Land distribution is more variable in some 
communes than others. In Ha Tay the 
variability in land holdings is greatest in the 
commune with the largest average farm size 
(Thach Hoa), and least in the commune 
with the smallest average farm size (Dai 
Dong) (Figure 1). In Yen Bai province the 
land distribution in all communes appears 
truncated, with a considerable percentage of 
households having less than 0.5 ha and the 
majority of the remainder having more than 
1 ha. All communes have households with 
both small and large farm sizes but the range 
is less in Bao Ai, the commune with the 
smallest average farm size. In Can Tho the 
variability in land holdings is again greatest 
in the commune with the largest average 
farm size (Truong Thanh) and least in the 
commune with the smallest average farm size 
(Dong Thanh). In Binh Duong there is farm 
size variability in all communes except Vinh 
Phu, which again is the commune with the 
smallest average farm size where over 80% of 
households farm less than 1 ha. In Lai Uyen, 
the commune with the largest average farm 
size, more than 50% of households farm 
more than 2 ha.
Figure 1  Land area distribution for surveyed households in four communes in Ha Tay 














































Farm size can be expected to be related, 
respectively, to areas of perennial and 
cultivated land, as land zoned for perennial 
trees or forestry is generally in larger plot 
areas than cultivated land. This is illustrated 
in Table 1 in the comparative farm sizes of 
households in delta and upland provinces. 
These differences can also be seen at the 
commune level. For example, in Ha Tay 
province communes that have households 
with smaller average farm size have higher 
percentages of cultivated land (Table 2). 
Percentages of land type are not averages 
per household but were calculated from the 
total land area farmed by all the surveyed 
households. Surveyed households in Dai 
Dong and Tho Xuan communes, which 
record the two lowest average farm sizes and 
average plot sizes, record no perennial or 
forestry land.
In Yen Bai province the areas of cultivated 
land are much smaller (Table 3). The 
commune with the largest average farm 
and plot size (Dai Dong) has the lowest 
percentage of cultivated land and the highest 
percentage of forestry land. The commune 
with the smallest average farm and plot 
sizes (Bao Ai) has the largest percentage 
of cultivated land and a comparatively low 
percentage of forestry land. However, the 
percentages of different land types in Bao Ai 
are quite similar to those in Dong Cuong, 
which has larger average farm and plot sizes. 
Land type is one factor influencing farm size 
but other factors also play a role.
Total net value of production (NVP) from 
cropping, livestock and aquaculture activities 
is also not clearly related to farm size. The 
commune with the smallest farm size in Ha 
Table 2  Farm size, net value of farm productiona and land type for surveyed households in 
four communes in Ha Tay province
District Thach That (L)b Dan Phuong (S)
Commune Thach Hoa (l) 
(n = 25)
Dai Dong (s) 
(n = 20)
Tho Xuan (l) 
(n = 26)
Song Phuong 
(s) (n = 26)
Avg NVP (mill VND) 12.6 (14.1) 7.3 (5.6) 20.4 (25.9) 68.3 (223.9)
Avg farm size (m2) 9,412 (9,772) 3,268 (1,292) 3,910 (2,779) 5,310 (4,191)
Avg plot size (m2) 1,263 (3,683) 395 (392) 861 (1190) 1,096 (2,144)
% cultivated land 48 90 60 41
% perennial land 26 0 0 42
% forestry land 7 0 0 0
% ponds 4 1 31 9
a  Includes production from crops and perennial trees, livestock, aquaculture and forestry
b  Letters L and S indicate relative large or small farm size at district level, l and s at commune level
Standard deviations are in parentheses1
Tay (Dai Dong) clearly has the lowest total 
NVP. However, communes in Dan Phuong 
district have higher NVPs than Thach Hoa 
commune, which has the largest farm size. 
In Yen Bai average NVPs are remarkably 
similar between communes despite large 
differences in farm size.
The unequal distribution of farmland 
between population and households can be 
shown as Lorenz curves. For the surveyed 
households in Ha Tay and Yen Bai the 
data generate curves that are very similar 
whether constructed on a per capita or per 
household basis; Figure 2 shows the data on 
a population basis. These curves would seem 
to indicate substantial inequalities in distribu-
tion, but land type and land quality confound 
the data because land is not a homogeneous 
entity. There is more inequity in land area 
distribution in Yen Bai than in Ha Tay, partly 
because there is a higher percentage of peren-
nial and forestry land in Yen Bai. Regression 
analyses discussed in a later section of this 
chapter suggest that in Yen Bai the area 
of cultivated land is positively correlated 
with net income and, conversely, the area of 
forestry land is negatively correlated with net 
farm income. Smaller farm sizes as a result 
of having less forestry land may therefore not 
lead to inequity in income.
However, the data suggest a substantial 
inequity of land distribution both on a 
household and per capita basis. Further land 
fragmentation because of inheritance may 
only just be beginning to appear, resulting in a 
more inequitable land distribution following 
the reallocation of land in 1988–93. There is 
no way of knowing from these data whether 
Table 3  Farm size, net value of farm productiona and land type for surveyed households in 
four communes in Yen Bai province
District Van Yen (L)b Yen Binh (S)
Commune  Dong Cuong (l) 
(n = 25)
 Mau Dong (s) 
(n = 24)
 Dai Dong (l) 
(n = 20)
 Bao Ai (s) 
(n = 22)
Avg NVP (mill VND) 7.1 (3.9) 9.8 (7.8) 8.1 (7.9) 7.3 (8.2)
Avg farm size (m2) 18,760 (31,459) 22,291 (38,081) 46,931 (58,080) 11,661 (9,532)
Avg plot size (m2) 2,877 (11,064) 2,836 (11,560) 5,364 (19,333) 1,644 (3,649)
% cultivated land 14 8 4 17
% perennial land 11 8 1 10
% forestry land 68 81 94 69
% ponds 1 1 0.3 0.4
a  Includes production from crops and perennial trees, livestock, aquaculture and forestry
b  Letters L and S indicate relative large or small farm size at district level, l and s at commune level
Standard deviations are in parentheses1
this is the cause of some of the observed 
inequity, but among the surveyed households 
80% of the population/households farmed 
only 50% of the land in Ha Tay and 34% 
of the land in Yen Bai. Regression analyses 
reported in a later section of this chapter 
suggest that farm size is a consistently 
significant variable affecting income from 
farming activities. The significance of the 
small farm problem is discussed further in 
following sections.
Net value of production from 
farm activities
The net value of farm production (NVP) 
for the surveyed households in the four 
provinces is shown in Figure 3. This value 
includes net production from annual 
cropping and perennial trees, livestock, 
aquaculture and forestry. The NVP, rather 
than sales from farming activities, has been 
used as the measure of production from the 
farmland so as to take account of production 
that is consumed by the household. Because 
this analysis is concerned with measuring 
the performance of the household farm, 
the consumed production, which includes 
both household and animal consumption, 
is costed at market prices (Dillon & 
Hardaker 1980).
Average NVPs vary immensely between 
provinces and are noticeably larger in the 
two provinces closest to the major urban 
centres of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. 
Average NVPs range from VND8.1 million 
in Yen Bai, VND13.0 million in Can Tho, 
Figure 2  Lorenz curve showing percentage of land area versus percentage of population for 

































and VND28.3 million in Ha Tay to 
VND33.8 million in Binh Duong. The 
standard deviation of NVP is very large 
for both Ha Tay (VND117.9 million) and 
Binh Duong (VND92.6 million). Median 
NVPs are surprisingly consistent between 
provinces, ranging from VND6.1 million in 
Yen Bai to VND9.7 million in Binh Duong. 
An NVP from farm activities of less than 
VND10 million was reported by 50% of the 
surveyed households in all provinces.
Income diversity
Household income also includes income 
from off-farm activities, which can include 
handicrafts, the provision of services, and 
waged and casual labour. The average 
percentages of total NPV from different 
income sources are shown in Figure 4 for 
the four provinces. These averaged data 
hide a great deal of income diversity among 
communes and individual households in 
each province. More detailed commune-
based data are shown in Marsh et al (2004a). 
Ha Tay province has the highest percentage 
of NPV from farm-based activities, with 
88% of NPV from cropping, livestock and 
aquaculture activities, and only 10% from 
off-farm activities. More than 70% of the 
NPV comes from farm-based activities in all 
four communes. This is surprising given the 
proximity of this province to Hanoi.
Yen Bai province also has a high percentage 
of average NPV from farm-based activities 
(72%) and a surprisingly high 28% from 
off-farm activities. One commune in 
Figure 3  Average and median net value of farm production for surveyed households in Ha 














































particular, Dong Cuong, has a very high 
percentage of NPV from off-farm activities 
(42%). As in Ha Tay, the average figures 
disguise a lot of diversity among individual 
households. For example, in all communes 
there are households who obtain more than 
90% of their NPV from cropping activities. 
In Bing Duong province overall, 74% of 
NPV comes from farm-based activities 
despite its location close to Ho Chi Minh 
City. However, in communes located close 
to industrial areas on the outskirts of the 
city (eg An Son) more than 50% of NPV 
comes from off-farm activities. Can Tho 
province has the lowest percentage of NPV 
from farm-based activities (64%), with 35% 
from off-farm activities. In this province 
there is noticeably less diversification of 
production, with most NPV coming from 
either cropping activities or off-farm work, 
whereas in all other provinces livestock is 
much more important.
It is clear from these data that production 
from farming activities is a key component 
of NPV for these small farm households. 
Aquaculture and forestry generally provide 
only a small proportion of production value 
(although it is high for some individual 
households), and handicraft production 
value is generally very small.
An illustration of how the net income 
from off-farm activity affects the total 
value of household production is shown in 
Figure 5. In all provinces both average and 
median values of household production are 
increased, often by a considerable amount. 
The smallest increase is in Ha Tay (which is 
Figure 4  Percentage of total net production value from different sources for surveyed 


















































somewhat surprising given its location close 
to Hanoi), where the average NVP increase 
is 12% and the median NVP is 32%. In Yen 
Bai province, where overall average NVPs are 
low and off-farm work could be expected to 
be generally poorly paid (eg workers in a tea 
factory), the addition of off-farm earnings to 
the value of household production increases 
average NVP by 40% and median NVP by 
62%. In Binh Duong province the average 
NVP increase is only 36% but the median 
NVP increase is 106%. In Can Tho the 
average and median NVP increases are 
similar, 56% and 58% respectively.
The relatively small increases in Ha Tay 
are most likely a result of the high depend-
ence in the surveyed households on farm 
production (see Figure 4). Land in Ha Tay 
is fertile and many households are producing 
high-value crops such as flowers, meat, fish 
and vegetables for the increasingly affluent 
Hanoi market.
Perceptions of opportunities for 
off-farm work
Households were asked about their 
perception of opportunities for off-farm 
employment with the question ‘Compared 
to 5 years ago, what opportunities do you 
think there are now for off-farm work for 
members of your household?’ Replies are 
shown in Table 4. Generally, there is a 
perception that there are more opportuni-
ties for off-farm work. Ha Tay and Binh 
Duong provinces (those closest to Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City respectively) have 
Figure 5  Average and median net value of farm and total production for surveyed house-
















































the highest percentages of households 
nominating that there is ‘a lot more 
opportunity’. Percentages of households 
in Yen Bai nominating that there is ‘more 
opportunity’ are surprisingly high but are 
consistent with the percentage of NPV 
from off-farm activities shown in Figure 
4. With the exception of Binh Duong, the 
percentage of households who nominated 
that opportunities are ‘about the same’ is 
similar at around 30%. The percentage of 
households who perceive that there is ‘less 
opportunity’ is low.
The relationship 
between farm income 
and farm size
The major portion of household NPV in all 
the surveyed provinces comes from farming 
activities. Total income from farming 
activities can be expected to be influenced by 
many factors, including variables related to:
land holdings, eg farm size, land quality 
and type, land fragmentation, region and 
crops grown
financial resources of the household, 
eg level of investment, access to credit, 
wealth and production assets
the household itself, eg labour units, 
education and other socioeconomic 
characteristics.
While it is confidently considered that farm 
size will be an important factor, it is of interest 
to investigate what other factors are significant, 
as this may indicate useful policy directions.
Analysis of descriptive statistics
Prior to surveying, households had been clas-
sified by commune authorities into socioeco-
nomic groupings classified as ‘above average’ 
(ho giau), ‘average’ (ho trung binh) and ‘below 
average’ (ho ngheo). Various data from the Ha 
Tay and Yen Bai households on NVP, farm 
size and household characteristics are shown 
in Table 5, classified according to the ranking 




Table 4  Percentage of households nominating their perception of off-farm work opportuni-
ties as either ‘more’, ‘the same’ or ‘less’
Province Percentage of householdsa
A lot more 
opportunity




A little less 
opportunity
A lot less 
opportunity
Ha Tay (n = 99) 26 33 31 7 1
Yen Bai (n = 92) 5 38 29 5 0
Binh Duong (n = 88) 31 41 17 2 0
Can Tho (n = 89) 8 38 36 12 0
a  Percentages may not add to 100% because some households did not answer the question1
Table 5  Selected data for farm households in Ha Tay and Yen Bai based on the commune 
classification of socioeconomic group as ‘above average’, ‘average’ or ‘poor’
Province Ha Tay Yen Bai
Living standard Avg + Avg Poor Avg + Avg Poor
Number in sample 28 52 17 29 44 15
Farm size measures:












 Median farm size (m2) 5,160 3,678 2,916 17,640 14,345 2,490
 Number of plots 6 6 6 8 8 6
 Average plot size (m2) 2,152 748 609 4,555 2,923 948
 Median plot size (m2) 1,427 546 410 1,365 438 401
Farm income measures:












 Median NVP (mill VND) 9.9 8.2 3.3 8.4 6.6 2.6












 Median NVP/ha (mill VND) 32.0 23.8 13.6 4.6 4.5 10.3
Household characteristics:
Labour units (16–55 yrs) 3.3 3.3 2.8 3.9 3.3 2.6
 Education level – h/h head 8 7 7 7 7 6
 Age – h/h head (yrs) 46 49 41 49 48 41
 % male h/h heads 89 77 53 90 100 87
 % h/hs with loans in 2000 46 65 59 34 41 67
 Avg loan in 2000 (‘000 VND)a 25.5 6.8 3.6 7.6 4.7 2.0
 Avg value of production assets 
(‘000 VND)
28,397 13,795 3,322 9,343 11,696 1,872
a  Average of households with loans
Standard deviations are in parentheses1
Larger farm size is associated with higher soci-
oeconomic group (average and above average) 
in both Ha Tay and Yen Bai. Poor households 
have on average in Ha Tay approximately half, 
and in Yen Bai approximately one-fifth, the 
land area of households classified as above 
average. These data are of concern and give 
some insight into the challenge of Vietnam’s 
small farm problem. This trend in relationship 
of farm size to socioeconomic group is also 
seen in figures for median farm size, and 
average and median plot sizes. There does 
not appear to be a distinct difference in plot 
numbers between classifications, but as the 
farm size area is larger for above average and 
average households, the measurement of land 
fragmentation could be expected to be higher 
for households classified as poor.
Average NVP for farm households, as calcu-
lated from the survey data, is also shown 
according to the commune classification. 
Higher NVP corresponds with the above 
average socioeconomic group, particularly 
so in Ha Tay. Some wealthy households in 
Ha Tay reported very large NVPs, one over 
VND1 billion. However, one household 
  Fragmentation indices often combine 
measures of farm size, plot number and 
plot size. For example, Simpson’s index is 
defined below, where ai is the area of the ith 
plot, A is the farm size and A = ∑ ai. This 
index has a value between zero and one. A 
value of zero means that the farm household 
has only one parcel or plot of land, which 
indicates complete land consolidation, while 
a value close to one means that the household 
has numerous plots and the farm is ‘very 
fragmented’.
  Simpson’s index:  (1–  )
∑iai2
A2
classified as poor reported a very large net 
income from livestock production, which 
affected the average for this group. Median 
values for NVP in Ha Tay and Yen Bai show 
the large difference between households 
classified as average and above average and 
those classified as poor. In contrast to the 
average values, median values for NVP are 
not dissimilar between the provinces.
Net values of production per hectare also 
decrease with smaller farm size (or wealth 
ranking) in Ha Tay. This could be expected 
to be a function of level of investment and 
management skill, but could also be affected 
by land type and land quality and perhaps 
fragmentation. This effect is not seen in Yen 
Bai, where NVPs/ha are similar between 
the household classifications, and in fact the 
poorer ranked households have the highest 
median NVP/ha.
Households classified as poor appear to have 
a smaller number of labour units, particularly 
so in Yen Bai, a slightly lower average educa-
tion level for the household head, household 
heads who have a lower average age, and more 
female household heads. Dai Dong commune 
(Ha Tay), a commune with small average 
farm size, has an unusually high proportion 
of female household heads. Most of these 
households are not single-parent households.
The percentage of households with loans 
in 2000 was less, rather than more, for the 
households classified as above average (for 
a discussion of this see Marsh et al 2006, 
chapter 6 this volume). In Yen Bai the 
percentage of households with loans was 
considerably higher for the poor group. 
However, in both provinces loan amounts 
were higher for the above average group.1
In Ha Tay province the value of production 
assets is highest for households classified as 
above average, lower for those classified as 
average and lower again for those classified 
as below average. In Yen Bai province house-
holds classified as below average have the 
lowest value of production assets, but those 
classified as above average and average have 
similar average values for production assets.
The relationship between farm income 
and a range of variables, including those 
discussed above, was further investigated 
using regression analysis.
Results from regression analysis
Regression analysis (using Stata) was used to 
further investigate factors affecting the total 
net value of farm production. Dependent 
and independent variables used are defined 
in Table 6. Note that the dependent variables 
used in the analysis are not measures of 
household income, as they include the value 
of production consumed by the household 
and do not include income from off-farm 
sources (eg provision of services, waged and 
casual labour, pensions and income from 
handicrafts).
Independent variables attempted to account 
for the effect on the value of production of:
farm size and land fragmentation, with 
variables that quantified farm size and 
various indications of plot numbers 
and sizes
land type and quality, with variables that 
quantified the percentage of different 
land types and land qualities


socioeconomic characteristics of 
the household, such as age, sex and 
education level of the household head, 
and labour availability
financial resources of the household, 
with variables to capture value of 
production assets, credit use and activity 
in the rental market.
Factors affecting the net value of farm 
production in Ha Tay
Regressions were done using the household 
survey data for the year 2000. In Ha Tay 
significant and stable variables that affected 
total NVP for households in 2000 were 
farm size (positive), farm size squared 
(negative), SFI (negative), class 1 (positive), 
perennial land (negative), perennial land 
squared (positive) and education (positive). 
A number of variables are consistently not 
significant, including assets, credit, rent, sex, 
age, class 3, cultivated land and diversity. 
A number of variables can substitute for 
other variables to some extent: eg, a dummy 
variable for Thach Hoa commune can 
replace the perennial land variable; and plot 
number can replace SFI. Generally, signs 
were as expected and stable for different 
regressions. Exceptions to this were the 
variables plot average and plot median, which 
tended to be negative. A regression result 
with higher R2 and lower F values for 
diagnostic tests is shown in Table 7.
Adjusted R2 for this regression is 0.48. 
Diagnostic tests for both functional 
form (using Ramsey’s RESET test) and 
heteroskedasticity are not satisfied, but the 
estimated regression gives an F value for 
Ramsey’s RESET test of 4.5, one of the 
lowest obtained. Robust standard error 

1
Table 6  Definitions of dependent and independent variables used in the regression analyses
Variable name Description Expected sign
Dependent variable:
Net value of 
production (NVP)
Total value of household production from agriculture, 
aquaculture and forestry, including produce consumed by 
the household and minus the cash costs of production (ie 
the cost of family labour is not deducted)
Independent variables:
Farm size Area farmed by the household in m2  Positive
Plot number Number of plots farmed by the household Negative or ?
SFI Land fragmentation as measured by Simpson’s 
Fragmentation Index
Negative or ?
Plot average Average size of the plots farmed in m2  Positive or ?
Plot median Median size of the plots farmed in m2 Positive or ?
Cultivated land Percentage of area classified as cultivated land ?
Perennial land Percentage of area classified as perennial land ?
Pond Percentage of area farmed classified as pond ?
Forest Percentage of area classified as forest (for Yen Bai only) ?
Diversity Number of different crops grown by the household ?
Class 1 Percentage of cultivated land classified as Class 1 
(for Ha Tay only)
Positive
Class 2 Percentage of cultivated land classified as either Class 1 or 
Class 2 (for Yen Bai only)
Positive
Class 3 Percentage of cultivated land classified as Class 3 or higher 
(for Ha Tay only)
Negative
Class 5 Percentage of cultivated land classified as Class 5 or higher 
(for Yen Bai only)
Negative
Age Age of the person nominated as the h/h head ?
Sex A dummy variable to account for female-headed 
households
Negative 
Education Education level attained by the h/h head Positive
Labour Number of people in the household aged between 16 and 
55 years
Positive1
estimation (using White’s robust standard 
errors) did not alter the significance of any of 
the variables; in fact, perennial land became 
significant at 10%. Standard errors for coef-
ficients fell for all variables except SFI, class 
1 and perennial land squared. The correlation 
matrix indicated there was likely to be no 
serious problems with collinearity.
In Ha Tay household NVP is positively 
influenced by farm size but the relationship 
is non-linear. As discussed earlier, house-
holds with more perennial land generally 
have a larger farm size, but the percentage 
of perennial land held by the household 
is, somewhat surprisingly, a negative factor 
on NVP. The fact that this variable can be 
substituted to some extent by a dummy 
variable for Thach Hoa commune indicates 
that the perennial land variable is reflecting 
the effect of upland areas in Thach Hoa 
commune that mainly grow low-value crops 
such as tea and cassava. It is also possible 
that high-value orchards on perennial land 
in Ha Tay were not yet in full production, as 
many fruit tree orchards are comparatively 
recently planted. Another factor affecting 
the negative influence of perennial land in 
Ha Tay could be that much of the cultivated 
land in this province is being used very 
profitably to grow high-value crops such as 
vegetables, soybean and flowers. Cultivated 
land class is a positive variable affecting 
NVP, reflecting the profitable crop choices 
that can be made on good quality land. 
Land fragmentation is a negative influence 
on NVP, suggesting that land consolidation 
in this region would be beneficial for 
households. This result supports the results 
of analyses on the same data made by 
Hung and MacAulay (2005) using frontier 
regression methods with panel data. Finally, 
education level of the household head is a 
positive factor affecting NVP.
Factors affecting the net value of farm 
production in Yen Bai
In Yen Bai significant and stable variables 
that affected total NVP for households in 
2000 were farm size (positive), farm size 
squared (negative), plot number (positive), 
plot median (positive), forest (negative), labour 
(positive) and assets (positive). A number 
Variable name Description Expected sign
Commune Various dummy variables to capture variation attributable 
to specific communes
?
Assets Value of production assets owned by the household, 
excluding the value of orchards and other perennial treesa
Positive
Credit Amount of credit extended to the household from all 
sources in the year 2000
Positive
Rent A dummy variable to capture households that had rented-
in land in the year 2000
Positive
a  Most households were unable to put a value on orchards and other perennial trees.
Table 6  (continued)1
of variables are consistently not significant, 
including SFI, plot average, credit, sex, age, 
education, class 2, class 3, class 5, pond and 
diversity. Dummy variables for Mau Dong 
and Dong Cuong communes were significant 
and interchangeable. Cultivated land and 
perennial land variables could be used instead 
of the forest variable but better results were 
obtained using the latter. Signs were as 
expected and stable for different regressions. 
A regression result with higher R2 and lower 
F values for diagnostic tests is shown in 
Table 8.
Adjusted R2 for this regression is 0.47. 
Diagnostic tests for both functional form 
and heteroskedasticity are again not satisfied, 
but the estimated regression gives a relatively 
low F value of 3.32 for Ramsey’s RESET 
test. Using robust standard error estimation, 
standard errors for coefficients rose for all 
variables except farm squared and plot median. 
Variable significance was not changed, with 
the exception of plot median which became 
significant. The correlation matrix indicated 
correlation greater than 0.5 between farm 
size and forest, and also between plot number 
and plot median.
Again, farm size is a significant factor 
affecting NVP but its influence is not 
as great as in Ha Tay (the coefficient is 
considerably lower). Although households 
with more forest land have a larger farm 
size, higher percentages of forest land have a 
negative effect on NVP. Natural forest land 
has low production value and, again, it is 
possible that much of the planted forest in 
this region has not yet reached its productive 
capacity. Ideally, a harvest value should be 
estimated for forest yet to be harvested. In 
Yen Bai plot number has a positive effect 
on NVP; the fragmentation variable was 
negative but not significant. This is possibly 
a result of the nature of agriculture in 
mountainous regions, where a larger number 
Table 7  Regression results showing factors affecting the net value of farm production in Ha 
Tay province (n = 95). Regression with robust standard errors; R2 = 0.5202
Regressors Coefficient Std error t P > :t:
Farm size 3.467778 0.7035778 4.93*** 0.000
(Farm size)2 -0.0001085 0.000018 -6.04*** 0.000
SFI -55213.9 18153.27 -3.04*** 0.003
Education 1733.11 673.9896 2.57** 0.012
Class 1 16643 7213.788 2.31** 0.023
Perennial land -52683.77 29127.34 -1.81* 0.074
(Perennial land)2 96992.16 52353.33 1.85** 0.067
Constant 25922.76 12603.86 2.06** 0.043
*** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%1
of plots will reflect many different land types 
and crop choices. Labour becomes a variable 
that is positive and significant at 13%, 
possibly reflecting the agricultural realities 
of farming mountainous country and many 
plots. Plot median is positive and significant. 
In Yen Bai it is generally very low compared 
to plot average, because households have 
many small plots of cultivated land that 
they use to grow rice, along with a generally 
smaller number of larger plots of perennial 
and forest land. Although this result would 
support consolidation of rice growing land, 
in this region it may not be possible as plot 
sizes are often related to contours in small 
river valleys. Assets were also a positive 
factor affecting NVP. Production assets in 
Yen Bai are mostly in the form of draught 
and reproducing animals, which would 
contribute directly to production. Finally, a 
dummy variable for Mau Dong commune 
was significant and positive.
Conclusions
Based on this analysis of the survey data, 
the following conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to the relationship between farm size 
and the value of farm production, and the 
importance of off-farm income for Vietnam’s 
small household farms.
Farm size is extremely variable within 
communes and between regions. Variability 
tends to be greater in areas with compara-
tively larger farm size and is also associated 
with land type. Few farmers reported that 
they were farming land holdings over the 
land limits.
The value of production from farms is also 
extremely variable. Some farmers in all 
provinces, but particularly in Binh Duong 
and Ha Tay, reported large values for farm 
Table 8  Regression results showing factors affecting the net value of farm production in Yen 
Bai province (n = 87). Regression with robust standard errors; R2 = 0.5170
Regressors Coefficient Std error t P > :t:
Farm size 0.1380112 0.0624088 2.21** 0.030
(Farm size)2  -3.62e-07 2.35e-07 -1.54 0.128
Plot number 459.6831 219.9403 2.09** 0.040
Plot median 0.478544 0.1555758 3.08*** 0.003
Forest -4614.58 2354.887 -1.96* 0.054
Labour 764.9346 492.9871 1.55 0.125
Assets 0.3818101 0.1050362 3.64*** 0.000
Commune 3 2880.909 1355.812 2.12** 0.037
Constant -2485.57 2028.709 -1.23 0.224
*** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%200
production that affect the average NVP 
value. However, half of the surveyed farmers 
had a value of farm production of less than 
VND10 million, giving a median NVP 
which is low and remarkably similar across 
the provinces. That some households have a 
very large value for farm production indicates 
a substantial inequality existing between 
rural households in these provinces on the 
basis of farm production alone.
Production activities are diverse. Households 
in all regions are engaged in a wide range 
of production activities, but more so in the 
northern provinces where the percentage of 
production from livestock and aquaculture 
activities is generally higher. Production from 
off-farm activities made a substantial increase 
to both average and median total household 
NVP in all provinces, indicating that off-
farm employment is important in raising the 
incomes of the poorer 50% of households. A 
substantial number of households perceived 
that the opportunities for off-farm employ-
ment were now greater than 5 years ago, 
especially in Binh Duong and Ha Tay.
Small farm size and low asset value are 
clearly linked to those households classified 
as being in the poor socioeconomic group. 
Poor households have on average in Ha Tay 
approximately half, and in Yen Bai approxi-
mately one-fifth, the land area of households 
classified as above average. These data are 
of concern and give some insight into the 
challenge of Vietnam’s small farm problem.
For the Ha Tay data, regression analysis indi-
cated that NVP is positively but non-linearly 
related to farm size, and positively influenced 
by a higher percentage of better quality 
cultivated land and a higher education 
level of the household head. NVP in this 
province is negatively related to the degree of 
fragmentation and non-linearly influenced 
by the percentage of perennial land. This 
regression analysis, based on whole farm 
production figures, suggests that in the Red 
River Delta area fragmentation may affect 
household NVP adversely.
For the Yen Bai data also, regression analysis 
indicated that NVP is positively but non-
linearly related to farm size. In this province 
other positive and significant variables 
include the value of household assets, the 
number of plots, the median size of plots 
and the number of labour units. The area of 
forest land was negatively but non-linearly 
related to NVP. In this province land 
fragmentation is not a disadvantage, possibly 
reflecting the nature of agriculture in 
mountainous regions, where a larger number 
of plots will reflect many different land 
types and crop choices. The results of these 
analyses suggest that care should be taken 
with policy to encourage the consolidation of 
land holdings.201
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modelling vietnAmeSe HouSeHoldS: 
An economic model oF lAnd 
trAnSActionS in A villAge context
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Following the reforms of doi moi, household farms in Vietnam are being affected by 
policies which involve land, financial and trade reforms. The nature of agriculture in 
Vietnam is such that household farms operate and are constrained by their location 
within a village. Modelling household farms so as to analyse the effects of changing 
policies needs to account for the spatial links between farms in relation to land, 
labour, inputs and produce when considered in a village context. In this chapter a 
‘mixed’ model of Vietnamese farms at the village level, incorporating aspects of the 
knapsack problem approach, and of spatial equilibrium and household models, is 
proposed and developed to examine land transactions. Diary data from three house-
holds over a 12-month period were used in the model. Simulations were carried 
out to illustrate the effect of changes on land transactions and household incomes. 
Changes were explored in wage rates, output prices and land market transaction 
costs. It was found that higher wage rates and output prices, and lower transaction 
costs, increased activity in the land market. Households with a higher relative 
efficiency in farm production tend to rent-in land from households with a lower 
relative production efficiency, who in turn tend to move to off-farm work. However, 
total profits for both types of farms can increase.202
Introduction
According to current land law in Vietnam, 
all land belongs to the Vietnamese people as 
a whole and is administered on their behalf 
by the State. Thus, there is no ownership of 
agricultural land but the rights to use the 
land are allocated to households. Associated 
with the land use right is the possibility of 
lending the right to others, and mortgaging, 
exchanging and bequeathing the land use. 
The life of the land use right is limited 
in time – 20 years for cropping land and 
50 years for perennial crops – and there 
are area limits per household. Thus, the 
structure of land distribution and land use in 
Vietnam has resulted from a highly regulated 
and controlled allocation of land. This raises 
the question as to what would happen to the 
structure of agriculture if controls on land 
use and land transfer were to be relaxed.
The nature of agriculture in Vietnam is 
such that household farms operate and are 
constrained by their location within a village. 
Modelling household farms to analyse the 
effects of changing policies needs to account 
for the spatial links between farms in relation 
to land, labour, inputs and produce in this 
village context. In this chapter a ‘mixed’ 
model of Vietnamese farms at the village 
level, incorporating aspects of the knapsack 
problem approach, and of spatial equilibrium 
and household models, is proposed and 
developed to examine land transactions.
In the first section of this chapter a brief 
outline is given of the structure and organisa-
tion of agricultural households in Vietnam. 
A section on the economic conceptualisation 
of the village is followed by proposal of a 
modelling approach to examine land transac-
tions within a village context. The model is 
developed and used to examine the effects of 
changes in wage rates, output prices and land 





within the village context
In order to explore the issues involved in 
modelling a village, some of the characteris-
tics of Vietnamese villages are considered in 
this section.
Land allocation to households 
within a village
Villages are a common organisational struc-
ture within Vietnam. The basic structure of a 
village is a set of households located together 
within or adjacent to an area of land that is 
farmed by members of the village who have 
the land use rights (LUR) to the land. A 
village may be made up of several hamlets. 
Following doi moi and the recognition of the 
household as the basic unit of production, 
LUR have been allocated to individual 
households. This has been done differently 
in different villages, but generally land has 
been allocated based on family size and an 
equitable allocation of parcels of land of 
different quality, especially in the north.20
This allocation policy has resulted in fragmen-
tation of land. Typically, each household in the 
Red River Delta will have LUR for three to 
ten small plots scattered in different locations 
(Chung 1994). In mountainous areas, where 
land quality is more variable, plot numbers per 
household tend to be higher and the distance 
between plots greater. Throughout Vietnam 
there are now around 75 million parcels or 
plots of land, on average eight to ten per 
household (Vy, pers comm). The government 
is encouraging the consolidation of plots at the 
village level and there is some indication that 
this is occurring (Hung et al 2004).
There are limits on the size of holdings of 
between 2 and 3 ha per household for annually 
cropped land depending on the region, and 
land-use-right titles specify that the land is to 
be used for either annual or perennial crops 
(or housing). Land use rights include the 
ability to transfer, lease, exchange, mortgage or 
inherit land use. There is anecdotal evidence 
that this is occurring informally (Kerkvliet 
2000), and limited data to support the idea 
that low-income farmers are transferring LUR 
to high- and medium-income farmers (Marsh 
et al 2006, chapter 4 this volume). Kirsch 
(1997) suggests that in any village there will 
be a proportion of people with land (ie they 
have title to the land with use rights) and a 
proportion of landless labourers.
Modelling at the village level is one way to 
conceptually capture land transfers within 
a village that may result in either land 
consolidation (of plots into larger plots) 
or land accumulation (ie increasing overall 
farm size), and a resultant increase in labour 
available for off-farm work. The impact on 
land use efficiency can be assessed by using 
such models.
Management of the village
Communes are the smallest official 
administrative unit of government, and 
may consist of a hamlet, a village or several 
villages, depending on the size. Each level of 
administration (province, district, commune) 
has a party committee headed by a secretary, 
and (on the ‘state’ side) a popularly elected 
people’s council which selects a people’s 
committee to take charge of day-to-day 
administration. These party and state 
administrative bodies operate in parallel but 
with considerable overlap of personnel and 
responsibilities (East Asia Analytical Unit 
1997). In practice the people’s committee 
in a village serves as an administrative as 
well as a political body (Kirsch 1997). Each 
person is a commune member, and the 
people’s committee is the elected body of 
household representatives over 16 years of 
age (Kirsch 1997).
The official levels of administration are the 
province, district and commune. However, 
because communes are large (4–11 villages 
with total populations of 4000–15,000), 
much of the practical management of farm 
households takes place at the village level. 
Each village has a leader who takes respon-
sibility for all activities, including social and 
economic ones, in the village. For example, 
if a farm household wants to borrow money 
from a bank, they need a letter from a village 
leader saying that their household is located 
in the village and that the project is feasible. 
Commune officials just certify the signature 
of the village leader by stamping a seal on the 
documents. Village leaders receive a salary 
from the government.20
Other mass organisations (eg the Women’s 
Union, Youth Union and Farmers’ 
Association) have similar hierarchical 
structures at province, district and village 
levels. These organisations can be active in 
extension activities and off-farm enterprises 
such as handicrafts, and can facilitate credit 
for households through micro-finance 
schemes and bank loans. Additionally, some 
districts have agricultural cooperatives, which 
are organisations of producers from one or 
more villages. They are usually concerned 
with the supply of services but in some 
cases they also manage the organisation of 
production and the sale of outputs. Not all 
households in a village need be members of 
the cooperative. The structures and inter-
relationships between villages, communes 
and cooperatives can be quite complex. For 
example, Kirsch (1997) reported that the 
Nam Son cooperative (Vu Ban District, 
Nam Ha Province – Red River Delta) 
comprised 1050 households cultivating 
281 ha and involved farmers from half of 
Tam Hane commune’s four villages.
Prior to 2003 all farmers paid agricultural 
land-use taxes at the commune level and 
a share was delivered sequentially to the 
commune, district, province and national 
levels of government. The land-use tax 
was charged on the basis of cultivated 
area according to location and cultivation 
conditions (six categories for annual crop 
land and five categories for perennial crop 
land). In 2003 land holdings below the land 
limit were exempted from agricultural land 
taxes until 2010 (see Anh 2006 this volume). 
In addition, dues are paid to the people’s 
committee (and to cooperatives if they exist 
in the village) for special services such as 
irrigation, electricity, extension services etc.
In many cases there appears to be organisa-
tion of production within a village, either 
from necessity (eg irrigation of wet rice land) 
or tradition. Production can be organised by 
the cooperative to the extent that it may plan 
the timetables for the cultivation of plots 
so as to optimise irrigation and cultivation. 
In some districts control over production is 
still exerted by the State, particularly with 
regard to rice production (The World Bank 
in Vietnam 1998; Vasavakul 2006 this 
volume). Production targets are set at a local 
level in response to government directives, 
and individual households may have to grow 
crops as directed. About 4 million ha of land 




In the village context, transaction costs 
would appear to be a significant element in 
determining the transactions and exchanges 
that take place between the households in a 
village. For a collectivised agricultural system 
the basic structure is a sharing of both the 
resources and the product of the use of those 
resources. When households become the 
basic functional units and have command 
over resources, trade and exchange of the 
resources and products will be significant 
components of the economic structure of a 
village. Of course, there will be exchange of 
outputs and inputs beyond the boundaries of 
the village, but in terms of simplification it is 
useful to think of a village as a self-sufficient 
entity. In many respects a collection of 
villages becomes a regional economy.20
Although there are clearly many factors 
which make up the relationship between 
households in a village, it is proposed in 
this chapter that the central economic 
relationships are those of exchange and 
the associated transaction costs involved in 
the various aspects of the production and 
exchange processes.
Consider the issue of labour within the 
context of a village. Sadoulet et al (1998, p. 
85) point out that farm households with 
different asset positions often relate differ-
ently to labour markets, which are typically 
characterised by large transaction costs that 
‘… make effective wages received when selling 
labor and effective wages paid when hiring 
labor diverge …’. Thus, some households 
sell labour, others hire labour and some 
are self-sufficient in labour. This situation 
is analogous to the relationship between 
trading nations which may import, export 
or have no trade between them. Labour 
also has a characteristic of not generally 
being storable.
Another major aspect of a household within 
the context of a village is that it is subject to 
a budget constraint. The budget constraint is 
specific to the household yet it is possible for 
exchanges to take place between households 
in relation to working capital. Such exchange 
will also be subject to transaction costs.
Land is also a major resource for households 
within a village, and LUR or land ownership 
allow for the transfer of land and land use 
between households. These transfers will 
also be subject to transaction costs.
When considering production from the 
agricultural household, the marketable 
surplus may be traded with other village 
households or outside the village. Whether 
or not a household imports or exports 
production will depend on many factors but 
the flows will also be subject to transaction 
costs. The size of the transaction costs and 
the excess demand or supply (as reflected by 
the individual household) will determine the 
nature of the trade.
Modelling land 
transactions in a 
village context
One of the approaches used to assess the 
possible benefits and costs of a system 
of agriculture where a large number of 
small plots are held and managed by each 
household is to model the possibilities 
that may arise through reorganisation and 
exchange of the plots. Exchanging plots has 
become possible with the introduction of a 
more flexible land rights system in Vietnam. 
However, in general there seems to be a 
very limited level of exchange (Hung 2006), 
possibly because there is surplus agricultural 
labour in Vietnam, especially in the north 
and the Red River Delta, and a low level 
of application of existing agricultural tech-
nology. There are also low opportunity costs 
for rural labour and difficulties in the transfer 
of labour from farm to non-farm employ-
ment. Developing a model which includes 
land transactions will allow the significance 
of these factors to be considered.20
A ‘mixed-model’ approach to 
modelling land transactions
Modelling a land market poses a number 
of difficulties in model formulation and 
mathematical representation. One approach 
to the problem of analysing the transfer and 
adjustment of land parcels is to recognise 
the parallels with the transfer of goods in a 
spatial equilibrium model, eg that of filling 
a knapsack (Hung & MacAulay 2002). The 
classical knapsack problem involves filling a 
knapsack of given volume so that the weight 
carried is maximised given the known weights 
of the individual items (Moore et al 1993). In 
terms of plots this is similar to filling a given 
requirement for land area with a number of 
plots of known area. The knapsack problem 
uses integer programming, which allows for 
the variables to have a value of one when the 
item is included in the knapsack and zero 
when it is not. In the case of land plots a value 
of one implies that the plot is included in the 
household’s parcel of plots (overall area) while 
a value of zero implies that it is not. This is 
combined with the possibility of transferring 
plots between households using the ideas of 
spatial equilibrium. The objective in relation 
to the plots is to exchange them (if required) 
at a minimum transaction cost.
For the knapsack problem let wi be the 
weight of each item i (transaction costs 
in the case of plots), xi be the choice of 
including the item in the knapsack (a 
decision to include the plot or not), ai the 
volume of the item (area of the plot), V the 
volume available in the knapsack (total land 
area), and m the number of possible items 
(plots). The problem is then to maximise (ie 
minimise the transaction costs) the objective 
function value Z:
(10.1)  Max (or Min) Z = w1 x1 + w2 x2 
+ … + wm xm
subject to
a1 x1 + a2 x2 + … + am xm ≤ V
x1, x2, …, xn is {0, 1}
This problem can be modified so that it is 
structured to have the available plot area or 
the plot supply meet the demand for plots. 
It is also possible to formulate this as a more 
standard household model (for a summary 
of the standard household model see Ellis 
(1993)), and this is outlined below as the 
discussion progresses.
Spatial equilibrium models are based on the 
concept of the transfer of goods between 
regions, with each region having both a 
supply of and demand for goods. There are 
transfer or transportation costs between 
the regions. The parallel in the case of the 
transfer of plots between households is that 
each household will have a supply of land 
in the form of a number of plots (or area 
of land) and a demand for that land based 
on using plots of land for production. If 
the transfer of plots between households is 
possible, it can be modelled in a similar way 
to the transfer of goods between regions. 
However, in the case of plots given areas will 
be either transferred or not transferred (zero 
or one), rather than having a variable number 
of goods. This can be represented as the 
following programming problem:
(10.2)  Max Z = – T’X + pq q – pd d
subject to
Ax X ≤ ax
– Ay X ≤ -ay
q = f(ay, d)
X is {0, 1} and q, d ≥ 020
where:  T is a vector of transaction costs for 
the transfer of land
X is a vector of zero–one variables 
indicating the transfer of plots
pq is the price of output
q is the level of output
pd is a vector of the prices of inputs
d is a vector of the level of inputs used
ax is the total supply of land of each 
of m households (area)
ay is the total demand for land of 
each household (area)
Ax and Ay are matrices of m x m 
order representing the area of plots.
The level of output can be a function of the 
resulting land area ay (after any transfers 
have taken place) and other inputs. It is 
assumed that each farm household has a plot 
with a given area (ai) and there are m house-
holds. A plot with size ai can be supplied 
to household i or another household. The 






















where matrices Ax and Ay represent a supply 
of and demand for land. If a household has 
n plots the matrices Ax and Ay are of m x 
(m x n) order.
Once the combined knapsack and spatial 
equilibrium model has been established 
(problem 10.2), other elements of the 
farming systems for households may be 
added. For example, crops may be produced 
using inputs of labour and land. Households 
that have less land may rent-in land while 
households who have large amounts of 
land may rent-out. Moreover, households 
can hire-in labour or employ their labour 
off-farm. Another element in the model 
can be the incorporation of some of the 
costs of land fragmentation. If the distances 
between the plots are known, the labour 
time for working each plot and the travel 
time between plots can be included. As a 
result, households can choose a combination 
of plots which can reduce labour and 
transportation costs. Therefore, in a ‘mixed’ 
model land and other resources can be 
transferred to or from households, and will 
tend to move to those that use them more 
efficiently. This can be represented as another 
programming problem:
(10.3)  Max Z = – T’X + P’Q – Pd D - Ct X
subject to
Ax X ≤ ax
– Ay X ≤ –ay
Q =f(ay, D)
pd d – pq q ≤ 0
Ct X ≤ ct
X is {0, 1} and Q, D ≥ 0
where:  Z is the total profit obtained from 
all households in a village
P is a vector of the output prices
Q is a vector of outputs of 
households
Pd is a vector of the input prices20
D is a vector of the level of inputs 
used by all households
Ct is a vector of transfer costs from 
farmers’ houses to plots
ct is the total transfer costs of each 
household before land transactions 
take place
other variables are as noted 
previously.
The problem in (10.3) is to maximise the 
total profit of all households in a village or 
region subject to: the supply of and demand 
for land, production functions associated 
with agricultural production, transportation 
costs and non-negative profits of each 
household; and to meeting the income 
requirements of the households.
Formulation of the 
empirical model
Assumptions of the model
Since the empirical model is solved within 
a programming framework, a large volume 
of information is required on the physical 
relationships between different activities and 
resources. In other words it requires much 
technical knowledge about the nature of 
different crops and the input requirements 
for their production. This is because the 
coefficients in the programming model are 
specific, and the level of relative accuracy of 
these coefficients will determine the robust-
ness of the results.
When modelling the possible exchange of 
land parcels there are a number of issues 
involved. Essentially, land transfer between 
households requires an effective market in 
land or, in the case of Vietnam, the ability 
to transfer LUR. To establish a modelling 
framework designed to allow the assessment 
of the broad parameters under which parcels 
of land might be transferred, it needs to be 
assumed that such a market exists and that 
there are known transaction costs. As well, 
the effects of changes in the use of tech-
nology as land parcels are combined need to 
be considered. Such changes may be from 
the use of animal power to tractors, or from 
the use of manual labour for many common 
tasks to a variety of forms of mechanisation. 
In setting up a land transaction model at the 
household and village levels, the existence of 
a labour market is also assumed, indicating 
that farmers can hire-in labour for farm 
activities and/or be employed off-farm. 
Moreover, funds for crop production may be 
borrowed and/or obtained as a result of the 
sale of outputs and renting-out of land.
Structure of the model
The model is constructed at a plot level 
to explain micro-level land use decisions, 
an approach that is also used by Antle 
and Capalbo (2001). The objective of the 
model is to maximise the total profit of all 
households in a village, where total profit is 
defined as the value obtained from the sale 
of crop outputs less the total variable costs. 
These costs include expenditure for inputs 
used and renting of land, transaction costs in 
the rental market and as a result of fragmen-
tation, tax and other fees, and expenditure 
spent by households. The activities of the 
model are the land area of each household, 20
the planted area of each crop, the sale and 
consumption of crop outputs, family and 
off-farm labour used, variable costs, rents in 
and out, transaction costs in the land rental 
market and those caused by land fragmenta-
tion, and transportation costs.
Land transaction activities form a major set 
of variables in the model. To demonstrate 
the nature of the model, the case of two 
farms operated by two households A and 
B is considered (Figure 1). The households 
both have a supply of land broken into plots 
and a demand for land to use for cropping. 
Household A may keep its land (as in the 
existing situation) or exchange plots with 
household B to have plots in a certain 
location, eg in region 1 or 2, thereby reducing 
costs. By exchanging plots each household 
may consolidate all their plots in the same 
region, resulting in considerable savings 
in labour and transfer costs. It is assumed 
that the problem of considering land as an 
appreciating (or depreciating) asset can be 
avoided, at least initially, and that there is no 
change in the value of the land or even an 
expectation that the value will change in the 
future. However, the fertility of land can be 
considered and reflected in the rental rate.
A household may have a number of plots 
that are scattered in different regions or 
land areas (eg irrigated fields, upland areas). 
To illustrate plot exchange in the model 
the case of a household with ten plots 
located in three locations (I, II, and III) is 
considered (Figure 2). Distances from the 
house to these plots are different and plot 
sizes also vary. For example, plot 1 is 500 m 
from the house and has an area of 800 m2 
while plot 2 is 1000 m from the house and 
has an area of 650 m2 (Figure 2). In order 
to reduce the level of fragmentation the 
household can exchange plots with others 
to have all plots in one of the three locations 
or in a combination of two locations. If 
the household has plots in only one or two 
locations, travel time between plots may 















be less. The model has been formulated so 
the household can not exchange or rent-in 
land from areas outside locations I, II and 
III where they do not already have plots 
(defined in the model as ‘other’ locations) 
because transportation costs and travel time 
will be high. In the model it is assumed that 
each household has one ‘basic’ and a set of 
‘non-basic’ locations. The definition of the 
locations is based on transaction costs and 
the number of plots the household has in 
a location. A ‘basic’ location is where the 
household has their largest number of plots 
while the ‘non-basic’ locations are where 
they have fewer plots. In Figure 2 location 
I is classified as ‘basic’ for the household 
while locations II and III are ‘non-basic’. In 
this context the household should exchange 
or rent-in more plots in the ‘basic’ location, 
and will have a lower preference for plots in 
‘non-basic’ locations.
The major constraints on land use in the 
model include the supply of land and 
demand for land in each of the m house-
holds, and the planted area of crops for each 
household that are possible in each season. 
To account for self-sufficient production and 
quotas on rice fields, rice production of a 
household must at least meet the household’s 
consumption requirements. The remaining 
amount of rice can be sold. Thus, rice output 
is used for two purposes: home-consump-
tion and sale. It is assumed that there is no 
storage of rice and other crop outputs, and 
that the output of other crops is produced 
for the market. In addition, the total costs 
of a household in each season are the total 
variable costs of all crops cultivated in the 
season, the costs of renting-in land, transac-
tion costs in the rental market, and transpor-
tation costs including the transaction costs 
associated with land fragmentation.
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Data and inputs for the model
It is assumed that land transactions in 
general and plot exchanges in particular 
occur within a village. This means that a 
farm household can exchange land plots with 
and rent land to or from other farmers living 
in the same village. As discussed earlier, in 
practice this is generally the case because the 
structure of communes in Vietnam makes it 
difficult for households from one commune 
to cultivate land in another commune. Data 
from three farm households in Luon Ngoai 
village, Dai Dong commune, in Ha Tay 
province were used for the construction 
of the empirical model. These households 
had completed a diary survey of time use, 
consumption and production activities over 
a period of 12 months. The first household 
(H/H A) had ten plots in three locations: 
five in Dong Khanh, three in Dong Hoi 
and two in Dong Bau. The second (H/H 
B) had eight plots: two in Dong Khanh, 
four in Dong Hoi and two in Dong Gia. 
The third (H/H C) had nine plots: two in 
Dong Khanh, three in Dong Hoi and four in 
Dong Bau. Thus, there were four locations in 
the village and each household had plots in 
three of these locations. Each household also 
had one area where their largest number of 
plots were located (Dong Khanh for H/H 
A, Dong Hoi for H/H B and Dong Bau for 
H/H C). Thus, they had a ‘basic’ and two 
‘non-basic’ locations, and the fourth location 
for each household was known as ‘other’. It 
was also assumed that land fertility was the 
same within each location so that the rental 
rate varied only among the different locations 
but not within a location.
There were four crops cultivated by these 
households: first and second rice crops, 
corn and soybean. Corn and soybean can be 
cultivated in three seasons, namely the first, 
second and winter seasons, while the first rice 
crop was assumed to be grown in the first 
season and the second rice crop in the second 
season. The output of rice was used for sale 
and consumption by the household and was 
represented by a production function. In the 
model, variables in the production function 
included farm size, family labour and the 
number of plots, while seeds, fertilisers and 
other cash costs were assumed at an average 
level of input used by each household. Corn 
and soybean were produced for sale. The total 
profit was calculated as the sum of the sale of 
crop outputs from all plots of the households 
plus any income from off-farm work and 
renting-out of land, less the total costs which 
included variable costs, costs of land rented-
in, and transportation and transaction costs.
Food consumption requirements were esti-
mated from the diary data for each household. 
The output of the first rice crop was consumed 
from June to October while the second rice 
crop output was consumed from November 
to May. The maximum farm working time for 
a household was calculated as the time that 
the household head and his/her spouse were 
able to work, plus any time supplied by their 
children who were under working age but 
above 12 years old. The total time assumed 
to be available annually for a household was 
540 man-days working 8 hours/day.
A detailed mathematical formulation of the 
model is given in Hung (2006). The method 
used in solving the problem was branch and 
bound, an algorithmic technique used to find 
an optimal solution to integer programming 212
problems by keeping the best solution so 
far. In this method the basic variables are 
bounded with integer values and solved as 
subsets of the problem (Moore et al 1993; 
Winston 1994). The software used was 
What’s Best version 7.0 (LINDO Systems 
Inc. 2003).
Results and discussion
Results for the base case
To be able to analyse alternative scenarios it 
is important to set a base case against which 
the alternatives can be evaluated. Results 
for the base case are given in Table 1. In the 
specified base case a household can produce 
rice or corn and soybean in two seasons (the 
first and second seasons), while in the winter 
period only corn or soybean can be grown. 
The total profit made by these farms under 
this base case scenario was VND26,698,000: 
of this, household B contributed the highest 
amount of VND10,198,000; household 
A VND8,904,000; and household C 
VND7,596,000. Household A kept its 
existing farm area, while household C rented 
out a large amount of land (5.3 sao – a sao 
is a unit of land area equal to 360 m2 in the 
north of Vietnam – or 51% of the initial farm 
size) to household B. Household B cultivated 
only two rice crops in the first and second 
seasons. Besides rice, soybean was grown in 
the winter season by household A and in all 
three seasons by household C. In this model 
no households chose to cultivate corn. The 
outputs of two crops were sold by two of the 
three households: rice for households A and 
B and soybean for households A and C.
In order to measure the impact of land trans-
actions, each household can be restricted to 
cultivate only their own land. This can be 
modelled by including a constraint on land 
transactions for the base case. Alternatively, 
if the restriction on land transactions is 
removed there could be significant change 
within a village. Results are given in Table 
2 for the comparison of base case scenarios 
with and without land transaction restric-
tions. Without restrictions the total land 
areas demanded by households A, B and C 
decreased by about 3.7%, but the total profits 
increased by 3.1% because households B and 
C changed their activities to increase their 
profits. Household B concentrated on crop 
production while household C increased 
off-farm work and decreased farming activi-
ties. Household B was more efficient in crop 
production and so rented-in a large amount 
of land (84.7% of the farm area). Farming 
activities for household C were relatively 
less efficient and therefore they rented-out 
half of their land and produced outputs to 
meet self-consumption requirements only. 
However, their profit increased by 11.3%. In 
contrast, household A did not participate in 
the rental market but decreased its planted 
area by about 4%. These results show that 
if land transactions were not restricted and 
farmers were free to exchange or rent-in or 
rent-out land, they may be better off.
Results for different scenarios
The model can be used to examine many 
factors which could be expected to influence 
land transactions between households. In 
this section experiments with changes in 
wage rates, transaction costs in the rental 
market, and paddy prices are examined.21
Table 1  Results for the base case (with unrestricted land transactions)
Model inputs Value Major variables Solution
Prices (VND ‘000) Total profits (VND ‘000) 26,698
first rice crop 1.9 of which: H/H A 8,904
second rice crop 2.0 H/H B 10,198
corn 2.5 H/H C 7,596
soybean 4.5 Farm size (sao) H/H A 9.1
Rental rate (VND ‘000) 200 H/H B 10.6
Wage rate (VND ‘000) 20 H/H C 5.5
Transaction costs in the 
rental market (%)
10 Number of plots H/H A 10
H/H B 10
Increase in transportation (%) 10 H/H C 6
Land rented-out (sao) H/H A 0
Time available for a 
household (man-days)
540 H/H B 0.5
H/H C 5.3
Initial farm size (sao) 26.1 Land rented-in (sao) H/H A 0
of which:  H/H A 9.5 H/H B 5.3
  H/H B 6.3 H/H C 0.5
  H/H C 10.3 Family labour used 
(man-days)
H/H A 272.0
Total number of plots 27 H/H B 228.1
of which:  H/H A 10 H/H C 160.2
  H/H B 8 Off-farm work (man-days) H/H A 268.0
  H/H C 9 H/H B 311.9
H/H C 379.8
Crop sale (kg)
rice H/H A 2,787.7
soybean H/H A 409.5
rice H/H B 4,569.5
soybean H/H C 274.0
Total costs (VND ‘000) H/H A 3,712.4
H/H B 4,940.9
H/H C 1,233.121
Results for simulation of changes in 
wage rates
In the base case the wage rate for off-farm 
work was estimated to be an average of 
VND20,000 per working day. It was assumed 
that the wage rate increased from this level 
to a maximum of VND80,000, which was 
equivalent to the daily wage rate of higher 
educated people (university level). A daily 
wage rate of VND35,000 to VND40,000 is 
equivalent to that which currently exists in the 
south of Vietnam. Results for the simulation 
are presented in Figure 3.
In order to compare these results with 
the base case, the total land rented-out by 
households was represented by a line in 
Figure 3 and referenced to the secondary 
Y-axis, while on-farm and off-farm labour 
were represented as percentages by bars 
and referenced to the primary Y-axis. The 
area of land rented-out seems to be directly 
proportional to the wage rate, initially 
increasing rapidly when wage rates are in 
the range of VND20,000 to VND40,000 
and then increasing at slower rates up to the 
level of VND80,000. The simulation results 
Table 2  Effects of land transactions versus no transactionsa
Total (%) Of which
Household A Household B Household C
Profits 3.1 –0.8 1.0 11.3
Farm size –3.7 –3.9 67.7 –47.1
Land transactionsb:
renting-out 25.9 3.9 16.9 51.6
renting-in 22.2 0 84.7 4.5
Number of plotsc –1 0 +2 –3
Planted areas 1.1 –3.9 67.7 –42.6
Sale of rice 41.7 –6.1 105.7 0
Sale of soybean –28.4 –3.9 –48.1 0
Farm labour 6.9 –3.9 67.7 –19.4
Off-farm labour –4.3 4.3 –22.8 11.3
Total costs  15.8 –3.5 113.6 –48.1
transportation costs –0.4 0 48.7 –23.8
Notes:
a  Percentage changes compared to the case of no land transactions (positive signs are 
percentage increases and negative signs are decreases)
b  Land rented-out and rented-in as compared to the farm area.
c  Expressed in relevant units, not percentages.21
imply that an increase in wage rates leads 
farmers to rent-out more land because crop 
production becomes relatively less profitable 
in comparison with working off-farm. If 
wage rates and opportunities for off-farm 
work increase, some farmers in a village may 
rent-out land and/or leave farming.
With regard to the total labour used, 
the amount of on-farm/off-farm labour 
decreases /increases as the wage rate 
increases from VND20,000 to VND35,000. 
Above this rate the levels of labour used 
for on-farm and off-farm activities seem 
to be relatively stable (Figure 3). One 
explanation for this result is that the total 
labour available for a household is assumed 
to be constant, but it may also be that in the 
model the output from rice production must 
meet the requirements for food consumption 
of each household and labour is required 
to achieve this. This scenario may be an 
accurate representation for the north and 
the Red River Delta of Vietnam, where 
farmers are still aware of food crises that 
occurred in the 1980s and tend to produce 
(rather than buy) rice needed for home 
consumption. This leads to the conclusion 
that at some wage rate levels on-farm labour 
use is likely to become a constraining factor 
to off-farm work.
Figure 3  Impacts of wage rates on labour and land rented-out (starting point is the base 
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From the simulation results it was also 
observed that profits from crop production 
decrease and may reach zero as wage rates 
increase. Some farmers may then decide to 
rent-out more land and reduce their farm 
size. In this scenario the total farm area of 
the three households decreased by 8.6% from 
25.1 to 22.3 sao. The farm size of households 
A and B decreased but that of household 
C increased. The total planted area also 
decreased substantially from 58.9 to 32.2 sao 
(45%). The planted areas of some crops 
decreased even more sharply, eg the first rice 
crop by 69.2% and soybean by 56.7%. The 
sale of rice output was equivalent to about 
30%, and of soybean 44.6%, of that in the 
base case. Moreover, the total number of plots 
of all households and of each household also 
decreased as the wage rate increased.
Results for simulation of changes in 
transaction costs in the rental market
Transaction costs in the rental market were 
assumed to be 10% of the ‘basic’ rental rate 
for the base case. In order to examine the 
impacts of changes in transaction costs in 
the land market, changes in 5% steps in these 
costs were simulated. Results are presented 
in Figure 4. It is apparent that as transaction 
costs increase the area of land rented-out by 
households decreases. If transaction costs 
increase from 5% to 30%, land rented-out 
decreases from 6.3 to 4.7 sao. Within a village 
the total amount of land rented-in by house-
holds should be equal to the total amount 
of land rented-out. Therefore, an increase in 
transaction costs leads to a decrease in the 
total area of land transacted in the market. It 
is also observed that the area of land rented-
in by households A and C decreased, while 
for household B the level varied with no clear 
trend (Figure 4). This leads to the conclusion 
that when transaction costs in the rental 
market are high households who rent-in land 
will rent-in less land and those who rent-out 
will also rent-out less land.
In addition, in the two scenarios with rental 
market transaction costs of 10% and 30%, 
household profits decreased by a total of 
3.4%, while farm profits decreased by 22%. 
This implies that a decrease in transaction 
costs in the rental market will lead to farmers 
being better off. An increase in transaction 
costs of 20% (from 10% to 30%) leads to a 
decrease in the average farm size by 4.4% 
and in total planted area by about 10%. In 
the case of this simplified model for three 
households, this land becomes unused (in 
a more detailed system this land would be 
used in an alternative way).
Results for simulation of decreases in 
paddy prices
In Vietnam rice, maize/corn, cassava and 
sweet potato are classified as paddy crops and 
they are the dominant production activities. 
A change in the output prices of these crops 
has a significant effect on both farmer well-
being and the whole economy. Changes in the 
output prices of rice and corn are examined 
to analyse the effect on land transactions and 
crop production. Decreases in 5% steps in the 
price of these crops were simulated and the 
results are presented in Figure 5.
Percentage changes in the total land transac-
tions as a proportion of the total amount of 
land rented-in (including land exchanged) 
and the total farm areas are represented by a 
solid line in the figure and referenced to the 
secondary Y-axis. Land rented-out is calculated 
as a percentage change in farm size and also 21
referenced to the secondary Y-axis. Total land 
transactions include those between the three 
households but land rented-out does not. The 
total profits and farm profits are bars in the 
figure and are referenced to the primary Y-axis.
From Figure 5 it is apparent that a progres-
sion of 5% decreases in the output prices 
of paddy crops leads to a decrease in total 
land transactions. In contrast, it leads to an 
increase in the percentage change of the total 
areas of land rented-out. If the output prices 
of crops decrease, crop production becomes 
less profitable and farmers have less incentive 
to produce. As a result, they want to rent-out 
more land and leave farming. On the other 
hand, many farmers do not want to partici-
pate in the rental market because they want 
to reduce farm production due to decreases 
in profit. The effects are that the total farm 
areas of households decrease by 18% while 
planted areas decrease by more than 30%.
In Figure 5 it is apparent that farm profits 
decrease sharply as the output prices of 
paddy crops decrease, but total profits 
including income obtained from off-farm 
activities do not decrease by much. This is 
the case because farmers transfer their labour 
from farm to off-farm employment: eg, the 
total on-farm labour used decreased by 28% 
but off-farm labour increased by about 20%. 
They may also cultivate other crops such 
as soybean to replace paddy crops: eg, the 
planted areas of soybean increased by 113% 
and the sale of outputs by 115%.
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Concluding comments
In this chapter a land transaction model 
for households within a village context is 
proposed. The idea of a ‘mixed’ model using 
aspects of the knapsack problem approach, 
and of spatial equilibrium and household 
models, is developed. The transfer of land 
plots is compared to the transfer of goods in a 
spatial equilibrium model. It is also assumed 
that each household has a supply of land in 
a number of parcels and a demand for that 
land derived from crop production. The 
objective of the model is to maximise the 
total profits (incomes) from three sources: 
crop production outputs from all plots, 
off-farm work, and land rented-out by all 
households in a village. It is assumed that 
markets exist for labour and land rental, 
and that the land rental market is imperfect 
and has associated transaction costs. Land 
fragmentation, as measured by the number of 
plots, is also included and is assumed to affect 
production costs. The total labour available 
for a household can be used both for farm 
production and off-farm employment.
Data from three households in Ha Tay 
province are used in analysis of the model. 
Simulations based on changes in off-farm 
wage rates, transaction costs in the rental 
market and output prices of paddy crops 
were examined. From the results of the 
analyses, total profits increased if restrictions 
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on land transactions were removed. Land 
tends to be concentrated in households who 
use this factor of production more efficiently. 
Households who used land relatively less 
efficiently rented-out more land and trans-
ferred labour from farm to off-farm activities.
In simulation of changes in wage rates, it 
is apparent that as the wage rate increases 
farmers will rent-out more land. However, 
some households who produce relatively 
more efficiently increase their farm size. 
This leads to the conclusion that as Vietnam 
appears to have surplus agricultural labour, 
at least for much of the production year, the 
real benefits to farm households from land 
consolidation may not be apparent until the 
real opportunity cost of farm labour begins 
to rise. This opportunity cost will clearly be 
affected by a number of factors such as the 
availability of employment opportunities 
for farm family members and the wage rate 
associated with these opportunities. Thus, an 
increase in opportunities for off-farm work is 
a key policy now and in the future to increase 
the incomes of the rural population.
The simulation of changes in transaction 
costs in the rental market also produced 
significant changes. Households who rent-in 
land will rent-in less land and those who 
rent-out land will also rent-out less land as 
these costs increase. This implies that the 
total area of land transacted in the market 
decreases and farmers have less incentive to 
participate in the rental market. Although 
the impacts of changes in transaction costs 
on individual households are different, in 
general an increase in these costs leads to 
decreases in farm size, the total planted 
area and the total profits, especially farm 
profits. Therefore, policy reforms leading to a 
reduction in transaction costs may encourage 
not only the process of land accumulation 
and a more active rental market, but also a 
more active involvement in farming and an 
increase in household income.
Decreases in the output prices of paddy 
crops have also been simulated. As a result, 
farm profits decrease significantly and 
farmers want to leave farming. As the prices 
of rice and corn decrease, farmers tend to 
rent-out more land but the total area of land 
transacted decreases because land exchanges 
decrease. This result illustrates the problem 
facing agricultural development in the north 
of Vietnam where farmers depend heavily on 
the cultivation of paddy crops. Agricultural 
policy allowing farmers the freedom to 
cultivate other crops, especially cash crops, 
rather than rice is desirable.221
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AgriculturAl lAnd mAnAgement 
under doi moi: policy mAkerS’ viewS 
ThaVeePorn VaSaVaKul
In this chapter the views of Vietnamese policy makers on land policy change in 
Vietnam are explored and discussed, based on information gathered during inter-
views conducted in November 2003 with party and government officials, researchers 
and university professors. Three areas connected with land policy change are 
explored: the first examines specific problems in agricultural land management and 
potential solutions, the second focuses on land policy change with respect to rural 
development and poverty alleviation, and the third presents policy makers’ views on 
the overall impact of land policy change in the era of doi moi and considers future 
policy directions.222
Introduction
In this chapter the views of Vietnamese policy 
makers on agricultural land management 
problems under doi moi and their potential 
solutions are presented. The views are based 
on information gathered during interviews 
conducted in November 2003 with party 
and government officials, researchers and 
university professors. Fourteen informants 
were contacted and ten were available to be 
interviewed. The informants are from the 
following party and government agencies: 
the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Central 
Party Commission for Economic Affairs 
(Ban Kinh Te Trung Uong); the Office of 
the Government (OOG); the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD); the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment (MNRE); the Ministry 
of Labour, War Invalids, and Social Affairs 
(MOLISA); the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF); the Institute of Agricultural 
Economics (IAE); the Central Institute for 
Economic Management (CIEM); the Hanoi 
Agricultural University I (HAU); and the 
District People’s Committee of Soc Son 
under the Hanoi Municipality. The interviews 
were conducted as face-to-face discussions 
in Vietnamese, and each interview lasted 
between two and three and a-half hours.
In the interviews opinions were sought in 
five main sections. The first section was 
concerned with land policy-making networks 
and the policy-making process, while the 
second focused on the views of policy makers 
on the pace of reform, factors precipitating 
reform and implementation problems. The 
third section examined specific problems in 
agricultural land management and potential 
solutions, and the fourth dealt with the links 
between land management and other rural 
development policies. The last section of the 
interview focused on the overall impact of 
land policy change in the era of doi moi, and 
addressed future policy directions.
In this chapter information and opinions 
expressed in sections three, four and five of 
the interviews are presented, with the aim 
of exploring the views of policy makers on 
current land policy issues and needed future 




Land fragmentation and plot 
consolidation (don dien doi thua)
Land fragmentation is a problem of 
northern and central Vietnam. Following 
decollectivisation in 1988, land was allocated 
to farmers on the basis of both land quality 
and the number of people in each household. 
This process led to the problem of land 
fragmentation, where each farm household 
received several small and non-contiguous 
plots of land of various sizes and quality. 
Land fragmentation has hampered the 
development of commodity production and 
made it difficult for households to mechanise 
agricultural work because the average plot 
size is small and the plots themselves are 
often scattered.22
The government has since supported plot 
consolidation in the hope that it would help 
reduce production costs in the long run 
and intensify cultivation. Under MARD as 
the key implementing agency, certain areas 
were targeted: the Red River Delta, the Old 
Inter Zone IV (Thanh Hoa, Nghe An and 
Ha Tinh) and the central coastal provinces. 
Towards the second half of the 1990s the 
IAE, in collaboration with other research 
agencies, carried out research work on the 
subject. Party resolutions focusing on plot 
consolidation include ‘the Resolution on the 
promotion of rural industrialization and 
modernization’ and ‘the Resolution on the 
reorganization of the collective economy’. 
The target is to solve the situation of land 
fragmentation by the year 2005.
Land consolidation may take place through 
the exchange of plots among households. 
This process, however, must not change the 
total original amount of land area allocated 
to each household. The process has to be 
voluntary, although the local government 
may intervene to expedite plot exchange by 
designing a local land use plan that neces-
sitates plot consolidation. Local authorities 
are also instructed to propagate the positive 
results of plot consolidation while setting 
up incentives for farmers. For example, the 
local government might invest in irrigation 
work and infrastructure in the area where 
plot consolidation takes place; it could be 
responsible for all the expenses incurred 
by plot exchanges; or it could issue new 
certificates free of charge to households who 
exchange plots.
A number of provinces such as Thai 
Binh, Ha Nam and Bac Ninh have been 
successful in plot consolidation, with the 
average number of plots per farm household 
decreasing to between three and five.
Land accumulation (tich tu dat dai)
The 1993 Land Law stipulated ceilings on 
areas of land for annual crops and forest land. 
The maximum area of land per farm house-
hold for annual crops in the Red River Delta 
is 2 ha, and in the Mekong Delta it is 3 ha.
Most policy makers agree that in theory 
land accumulation is acceptable because 
it helps raise the effective use of land and 
promotes commodity production. However, 
a fully-fledged policy that supports unlimited 
land accumulation cannot be implemented in 
Vietnam at this time because progress needs to 
be step by step. Land accumulation may lead 
to landlessness, which in turn may be a source 
of economic and social instability. At the policy 
level there are not sufficient non-agricultural 
jobs in Vietnam to absorb excess agricultural 
labour if land is allowed to be accumulated in 
the hands of a few. Equally importantly, land 
accumulation requires the ability to manage 
larger-scale enterprises, for which very few 
farmers are equipped. As a result, the level of 
land accumulation has to be ‘reasonable’.
When discussing land accumulation, a 
number of policy makers also caution 
that there may not be a clear and direct 
correlation between the size of a land plot 
and its effective use. Greater size does not 
necessarily lead to an increase in productivity. 
A study conducted in southern Vietnam 
shows that 2.5 ha seems to be the appro-
priate size to generate efficiency. More than 22
3 ha requires quite sophisticated production 
knowledge and management experience, as 
well as more favourable production condi-
tions and market access. In addition, the 
notion of commercial farms (trang trai) tends 
to promote and endorse the idea of land 
accumulation. However, many commercial 
farms cannot or do not carry out intensive 
cultivation; they cultivate a large area of land 
(quang canh) but do not practise multiple 
cropping (tham canh).
Current policy directions include the 
following:
1.  The government hopes to create suitable 
conditions for land accumulation in the 
long run through rural industrialisation 
and the expansion of the service sectors. 
It has set a target of reducing the 
percentage of the agricultural workforce 
from 67% to 50% by the year 2010. This 
will involve a transfer of agricultural 
labour to other economic sectors. The 
government will expedite the process 
by providing the rural workforce with 
vocational training, promoting the 
growth of the industrial and service 
sectors in rural areas, expanding 
handicraft villages and increasing the 
scale of labour exports. An increase 
in job opportunities in rural areas will 
motivate some farmers to transfer their 
land use rights (LUR) and move out of 
agriculture altogether.
2.  Currently, land accumulation may take 
place in mountainous and midland areas 
where the population density is low. 
Land accumulation is difficult in the 
Red River Delta area, although it could 
be expedited by increased growth in 
the industrial and service sectors. The 
transfer of agricultural labour to newly-
built industrial zones and handicraft 
villages (focusing on carving, paper 
and ceramics) has already been quite 
successful in the Hai Duong, Ha Nam 
and Bac Ninh provinces of the delta.
3.  A number of policy makers comment 
that the 2003 Land Law allows land 
accumulation by permitting farmers 
to transfer their LUR, whereas the 
previous laws clearly stated ceilings for 
agricultural land. For example, the 1993 
law stipulated that the maximum level of 
land consisted of a combination of land 
allocated by the state, land purchased 
or acquired through transfers, and land 
inherited or given as a gift. The 2003 law 
does not stipulate overall ceiling levels, 
but states only the maximum amount 
of land allocated by the state. While the 
government will have to determine later 
how much transferred land a household 
may have, the amount of inherited land 
will probably have no limit. The 2003 
law is therefore more favourable to land 
accumulation and the development of 
commodity production.
4.  There is an opinion that land 
accumulation may become a ‘collective’ 
process, in which the new style of 
cooperative may play an important 
promotion role. Inexperienced and poor 
families who join the cooperative may 
‘rent’ their land to the cooperative for 
a fee and at the same time contribute 
labour when the cooperative works on 
management issues.22
Informal land transactions
The government has not yet been able to 
manage all land use and land transactions in 
rural areas. There are cases in which farmers 
do not till the land themselves but rent it out, 
eg in trading villages, villages on the outskirts 
of big cities including Hanoi, and handicraft 
villages. In addition, buyers and sellers agree 
on transactions between themselves without 
proper official paperwork.
One of the key reasons for the problem is 
administrative problems: burdensome admin-
istrative procedures, lack of efficiency among 
different management units, and high fees and 
taxes. Another reason is that most farmers 
do not feel that they need legal documents 
(including LUR certificates). Only farmers 
working on large commercial farms and those 
owning land in urbanising areas feel the need 
of certificates and proper legal documents.
To minimise informal land transactions, 
policy makers list a number of solutions:
1.  The government needs to raise legal 
awareness among the population so 
that they understand their rights and 
responsibilities. To facilitate this, land 
laws have to be translated into minority 
languages.
2.  By making sure that all land users have 
LUR certificates, the government will be 
able to establish administrative order and 
determine what to do when transactions 
occur. The 2003 Land Law compels 
each local government to determine the 
deadline by which all LUR certificates 
will be issued. In the interim, under 
the land law land users without LUR 
certificates are allowed to use other types 
of documents in land transactions.
3.  The government has tried to reform 
the administrative procedure through 
the use of the one-stop shop model 
and the decentralisation of the land 
registration process. There is also a 
need to review land-related financial 
matters. For example, the government 
should be more flexible when collecting 
the fee required before granting LUR 
certificates, allowing those who cannot 
pay up-front to pay later.
4.  There is a need to computerise land 
records.
Development of commercial 
farms (trang trai)
In 2000 there were approximately 113,000 
commercial farms nationwide, with an 
average land area of 5 ha. Government 
support for the development of commercial 
farms is indicated by resolution no. 03 of the 
Prime Minister (dated 2/2/2000), which 
states detailed policy directions in the areas 
of land management, taxation, investment, 
credit, labour policy, technology transfer, 
environment and marketing.
One of the current problems is that a large 
number of commercial farms still do not 
have LUR certificates. One reason cited by 
Vietnamese officials is that some of the farms 
without certificates do not have concrete 
production proposals, a requirement by law 
before certificates can be issued. No survey 
has as yet been carried out to verify whether 
land allocated to some commercial farms 
is from reserved areas, a process required 
before certificates can be issued. In addition, 
MARD has only recently clarified the criteria 
for commercial farms.22
Areas yet to develop commercial farms are 
the midland and uplands. Provinces where 
commercial farms have been doing well are 
Yen Bai, Bac Giang and Ha Giang. Most of 
the owners of these farms come from Hanoi 
and hire local labour to grow tea and fruit 
trees, and raise livestock. There are also farms 
in the Central Highlands, growing coffee and 
rubber; and in the Mekong Delta, growing rice 
and raising shrimp. Land used by these farms 
includes both allocated and transferred land.
The use of land as collateral (tin 
chap and the chap)
Decision 67 issued in 2000 states that 
borrowing of any amount of money under 
VND10 million does not need collateral. 
Farmers merely need mass organisations to 
guarantee that they are engaged in produc-
tion. Farmers wanting to borrow more than 
VND10 million need collateral to arrange 
loans from banks, and LUR certificates can 
be used as collateral.
The amount of agricultural borrowing 
allowed for household farmers is relatively 
small at VND5 million for 1 ha of agricul-
tural land. Commercial family farms with 
5–10 ha and larger commercial private farms 
can borrow more than individual house-
holds. The time period of the loan depends 
on need, but in general it is 12 months for 
annual crops and longer for long-term crops.
Problems in using land as collateral include 
the following:
1.  The interest rate for agricultural loans is 
high. The agricultural sector only grows 
by about 4% annually, while the interest 
rate for agricultural credit is as high 
as 10% annually (0.9–1.1% monthly). 
However, because farmers are in need 
of credit, they will borrow even if the 
interest rate is 2–3% a month, particularly 
the farmers in the Mekong Delta.
2.  Banks do not keep the original copy of 
LUR certificates, so technically the same 
certificates may be used several times.
3.  Borrowers are loaned around 70% of the 
value of the collateral, but the values used 
are not yet based on market prices.
4.  Vietnamese policy makers observe that 
Vietnamese farmers are generally very 
good at settling their debts. While those 
in difficulty may try to transfer their land 
to obtain money to pay the bank, they 
tend to get very low prices. Currently, 
banks cannot do anything with the LUR 
certificates they collect after foreclosure, 
but in the future the law will be revised 
so that banks can transfer the certificates.
In the past only state enterprises were 
allowed to use LUR as investment capital, 
but the 2003 Land Law now allows house-
holds this right too.
Land use planning for rice land
Resolution no. 10 (1988) and the 1993 
Land Law granted farmers decision-making 
rights to grow whatever crops they wanted. 
However, during implementation of the law, 
the question arose as to whether farmers in 
those areas specifically allocated for growing 
rice could change and plant something else. 
The 1998 and 2001 revised laws clarified 
that the change in the land use purpose is 
only allowed within the existing physical 
planning framework adopted by the central 
and local governments. If the physical 
planning framework is liberal, households 
are free to choose which crops they grow.22
Physical planning is a process that in 
theory begins at the commune level. It is 
about making decisions on how to use land 
according to geographical location (upland, 
midland or lowland). Local production and 
investment plans will be formulated based on 
this physical planning framework. From the 
commune, the process then moves up to the 
district and the provincial levels. Although 
the methods and process of physical 
planning (quy hoach) are not yet ‘scientific’ 
(chua khoa hoc may), they help to serve as a 
foundation for local socioeconomic plans.
Within the Vietnamese physical planning 
framework, rules and regulations governing 
rice land seem the most rigid. The central 
government insists on the need to maintain 
a certain amount of rice growing area for 
food security purposes, and each province 
has local plans for rice growing. Currently, 
the adopted plan is to retain a total of about 
4.2 million ha of rice land until the year 2010.
Farmers living in rice growing areas will not 
be allowed to grow other crops. Reasons 
given include the fact that local violations 
may environmentally damage the areas 
developed for rice growing; that in some 
areas farmers are not equipped to grow 
anything other than rice; and that the state 
has already invested heavily in irrigating rice 
land, at a cost of around US$10,000/ha in 
the Red River Delta.
Conflict over the use of land has taken 
place in some provinces. For example, there 
were cases of farmers in some rice growing 
provinces in the south wanting to switch to 
shrimp raising, especially when prices were 
high. Local and central authorities objected 
to the move on the grounds that salt water 
brought in for shrimp raising ruined rice 
land, and that shrimp raising introduced 
diseases that the locality was not equipped 
to deal with. There were some provinces 
(eg Hai Duong) in the Red River Delta 
that wanted to switch from rice growing to 
fruit growing. The outcome was that the 
province, with assistance from agricultural 
technicians and NGOs, experimented with 
a model of growing rice combined with fruit 
trees (longan) instead of abandoning rice 
growing altogether.
Should the state intervene in the land use 
planning process? Some informants think 
that the state should intervene but at the 
same time it should be responsible when 
the plans it sets up do not work well. For 
example, when prices are low for planned 
crops, the state should provide subsidies. For 
the rice growing areas there is an opinion 
that the key should be productivity. Areas 
with high efficiency and productivity should 
continue to grow rice, while areas with low 
productivity should switch to other crops. 
Ascertaining productivity, however, will 
require better research and survey method-
ology. The current information-gathering 
system on productivity is still inadequate.
The government will present a national 
physical plan for land use to the National 
Assembly in the near future. To prepare 
the new plan, provinces have been asked 
to recalculate their land use needs for 
agriculture and industry, and around 40 
provinces have already reportedly completed 
their physical plans.22
Agricultural land use rights 
after 2013
The 1993 Land Law granted users of annual 
crop land the right to use land for 20 years, 
a term which will expire in 2013. There 
are two conflicting opinions as to how to 
proceed after 2013, one favouring the redis-
tribution of land while the other does not. A 
majority of policy makers favour the latter.
Those favouring redistribution cite 
demographic change (deaths and births 
necessitate the restructuring of LUR) and the 
needs of those returning to rural areas from 
cities as key reasons. In 2003 the National 
Assembly reportedly discussed these issues 
and decided against land redistribution. Most 
policy makers comment that there should be 
no redistribution of land, and that Vietnam 
needs the land distribution system to be 
stable for the sake of long-term development. 
Each individual household and society as a 
whole will have to handle problems resulting 
from demographic changes at their own level. 
Those who pass away may give land to their 
children or transfer land to those in need. A 
number of policy makers also argue that the 
policy of maintaining agriculture as the key 
occupation in rural Vietnam does not promote 
development and growth in the long run. The 
government should not tie rural inhabitants to 
land, but should promote industrialisation and 
the development of services.
The policy after 2013, then, is to allow land 
users to continue using land providing that 
they have a need to do so and that, during 
their first tenure, they did not violate the 
stated land use purposes. It is not clear, 
however, how long the post-2013 land use 
period will be.
A small number of government officials 
interviewed feel that land redistribution 
should be allowed to occur at the local level 
if necessary. For example, if a sick person has 
no heir to inherit their land, it can be redis-
tributed within the community at the village 
level. Also, in practice, each local community 
may have its own preference depending on 
local discussion and needs.
The role of the government in 
price control over land
To what extent should the government 
have control over the price of LUR for 
agricultural land in rural areas? Following 
the 1993 Land Law, the Ministry of Finance 
constructed a price framework (khung gia 
dat) (ND 87 of 1994) which provinces used 
as the basis to set prices. The 2003 Land 
Law states that the government will still 
intervene to determine land prices on an 
annual basis but these prices have to be close 
to the market level. According to the law, 
LUR prices will also be determined through 
the process of bidding and auction as well 
as through negotiations between seller and 
buyers (Clause 55). Following Taiwan’s 
model, the law states that there will be an 
agency assisting the government in deter-
mining prices (tu van gia dat). Currently, a 
Government Committee for the Preparation 
of Land Prices, which includes different state 
agencies and is presided over by the Ministry 
of Finance, is working on price issues.
Vietnamese policy makers diverge in their 
opinions over the role of the government. 
Some feel that the government should 
not intervene in price setting because the 
government price system has not been 
followed. There is a need to eliminate the 22
two-price system in land in order to avoid 
establishment of an underground market 
(thi truong ngam). A one-price system will 
also eliminate the practice of ‘asking for and 
giving’ (xin-cho) land. Others believe that the 
government should still provide a guideline 
(dinh huong) but that provinces should try to 
set prices as close to the market as possible. 
A third group feels that there is a need to 
find a balance between state prices which 
are too low and popular prices which are too 
high. Land prices in Vietnam are currently 
experiencing inflation.
Development of an unrestricted 
LUR market
Most of the policy makers think that an 
unrestricted LUR market will develop. In 
reality a land market has already emerged, 
especially for residential land. It appeared 
when people began to sell houses because 
the land price is included in the transaction 
price for a house.
Various factors are identified as either 
stimulating or hampering the growth of the 
land market. First, if agricultural production 
costs are high, farmers will want to leave 
the agricultural sector; conversely, if costs 
are low, farmers will want to acquire more 
land. Second, although many farmers want 
to keep land, the poor have a tendency 
to transfer their LUR more easily. Third, 
the development of the non-agricultural 
sector and urbanisation will serve as an 
incentive to the sale of land. Finally, failure 
in agricultural production (owing to lack 
of capital, high interest rates for formal and 
informal borrowing, and high production 
costs or losses) will encourage farmers to sell 
their LUR.
Vietnamese policy makers comment that 
the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
has endorsed the development of the 
real estate market, as is indicated in the 
Resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the 
Central Committee (CC) (VIII Congress) 
in 1998, the political report of the Ninth 
Congress of the VCP that met in 2001, and 
the Resolution of the Seventh Plenum of 
the CC (IX Congress). In 2000 there was an 
experiment on land markets for housing in 
Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City, and in 2003 
the Land Law institutionalised the develop-
ment of a market for LUR.
The key question is what the government has 
to do to make that market work. How can 
the government ensure that entrepreneurs 
register, pay taxes, follow the laws etc? When 
promoting the LUR market, it is also neces-
sary to take into account how it will affect 
those poor households who will be forced to 
sell their LUR. This is an important factor 
in why the government still tries to limit 
the sale of agricultural land. Vietnam needs 
growth-oriented policies and protective 
social policies for the poor at the same time.
Ownership of agricultural land
Will agricultural land be privately owned in 
the same way that settlement land is owned 
in Vietnam? Opinions on this subject can be 
summarised as follows:
1.  When discussing ownership in Vietnam, 
the land laws from 1993 to 2001 use the 
term ‘people’s ownership through the 
management of the state’ (so huu toan 
dan thong qua nha nuoc quan ly). The 
2003 Land Law somewhat modifies 
the phrase to: the government is the 
‘representative of the people’s ownership’.20
2.  Legal documents do not include the 
term ‘private ownership’ of agricultural 
land in Vietnam. However, the state 
allocates LUR to people, and these rights 
have been expanded over the years. In 
1993 the question of transferring LUR 
was controversial, but many concessions 
have been made during the past 10 years 
with the aim of increasing production 
capability.
3.  The term ‘private’ is not suitable for 
characterising the possession of LUR 
because although farmers have rights, the 
state still limits (restricts) the buying and 
selling of agricultural land.
4.  In other countries also, the term ‘private 
ownership’ does not necessarily imply that 
land owners can do whatever they want.
5.  Private ownership may lead to the 
pauperisation of rural life if land is not 
used to grow food. To guarantee food 
security, farmers must continue to till 
the land.
6.  The concept of private land ownership 
is not necessary. Instead, what is needed 
is the reallocation of rural labour so as 
to use land more effectively. If farmers 
wanted to move out of production, they 
could transfer their land after deciding 
how else to earn a living.
Land policy, rural 
development and 
poverty alleviation
Land policy and rural 
development
Land policy change in Vietnam has promoted 
rural development and growth, as was the 
objective of those who supported policy 
change in 1988. It is clear that land policy 
change has increased production capability; 
Vietnam has become one of the top three 
rice exporters in the world. The current land 
policy includes initiatives such as plot consoli-
dation and the development of commercial 
farms, which are both designed to promote 
growth in commodity production.
Land policy change in itself is not sufficient to 
bring about rural industrialisation and urbani-
sation. A separate yet simultaneous policy is 
needed to promote the growth of the industrial 
and service sectors in rural areas. This will help 
transfer labour from agriculture to other rural 
economic sectors, which in turn creates suitable 
conditions for land accumulation.
Land policy and poverty 
alleviation
Land policy has been designed to contribute 
to poverty alleviation in rural areas. The 
policy benefits both rural inhabitants in 
general and the poor in particular.
First, some rural households are exempt 
from land tax. From 2003 to 2010, the 
government will not impose taxes on those 21
having land under the maximum area limit 
(the National Assembly passed this law 
in May 2003). Those having land over the 
maximum limit will have to pay tax, but in 
Zone III communes (ie communes faced 
with difficulties) even households having 
land over the limit will be exempt from tax. 
The 2001 revised law also exempts families 
classified as poor from paying land taxes.
Second, the government guarantees that 
landless farmers wanting to farm will be 
given land. The 2003 Land Law includes a 
clause guaranteeing that farmers engaged in 
farming work will keep their land. Surveys 
carried out in 1997 and 1998 in the Mekong 
Delta showed that landlessness was an acute 
problem. Since then, the government has 
developed a number of policies: loans are 
available for landless farmers who want to 
start farming their land again; barren land in 
any locality will be allocated to local landless 
farmers; and farmers volunteering to go 
to a new economic zone will be provided 
with basic necessities and moving costs. 
Some of these policies have already been 
implemented. In An Giang the local govern-
ment redeemed land for landless Khmer 
farmers, and those not wanting land received 
money instead. In Ben Tre land belonging to 
the army was allocated to landless farmers. 
In the Central Highlands the government 
purchased land from local people and state 
farms and distributed it to landless farmers 
on condition that they would not transfer 
the land for 10 years. (Decision 132 dated 
8/10/2003).
Third, the new marriage law requires that 
both the husband’s and wife’s names be on 
land titles. This policy change is beneficial to 
women.
Fourth, the current land policy helps farmers 
keep land by limiting the development of the 
land market, but farmers may transfer land 
if they want to. The government will create 
non-agricultural jobs and provide those in 
need with vocational training so that they 
can move out of the agricultural sector.
Fifth, a number of research agencies are 
working to design a long-term security frame-
work for poor farmers who do not have the 
knowledge and skills to use land effectively. 
Many poor farmers who became landless and 
received land from the government ended up 
losing the land again and again. One long-
term solution is for them to join a cooperative 
and to use their land as contributing capital, 
which would allow them to work for the 
cooperatives while also receiving some level 
of land rent. However, although this solution 
might work for farmers in the north, those 
in the south do not favour the cooperative 
sector. Another solution is for agricultural 
extension work to target mainly poor farmers. 
Both solutions will help the poor to use land 
more effectively.
The impact of land 
policy and future policy 
directions
Key impacts of land policy 
change
Most policy makers cite the positive impact 
of land policy change. The change has 
increased production capability, allowed 
more effective use and exploitation of land, 
and better served environmental protection. 22
The 2003 Land Law has been designed to 
address some problems generated by the 
previous laws and will undoubtedly ensure 
further productive growth.
Considerations for future policy 
directions
The Vietnamese policy makers interviewed 
have highlighted a number of considerations 
necessary for land policy planning following 
the promulgation of the 2003 Land Law.
1.  There is a need to consider the 
conceptual relationship between ‘land 
owners’ and ‘land users’ (chu so huu 
and nguoi su dung dat) – the former 
refers to the state and the latter to 
economic organisations, individuals and 
households.
2.  One key focus for the period from 2004 
to 2010 is how to exploit land effectively, 
and how the 2003 Land Law could 
generate enthusiasm among land users. 
The development of real estate and LUR 
markets is one significant policy outcome 
of the law.
3.  There is a need for land management 
by the state to be more effective. State 
management of land will involve: 
organisation of the state apparatus in 
land management; the role of commune 
cadres; development of the LUR 
market in conjunction with sound 
financial policy; land accumulation; and 
management of landlessness. Without 
the involvement of the state in land 
management, ‘big fish will eat small fish’.
4.  In addition to growth, Vietnam also 
needs stability, transparency and 
democracy in land management. Farmers 
are an important constituency as they 
form around 70–80% of the population.
5.  From the perspective of poverty 
alleviation, simplification of the land 
transfer process is needed, so as to 
benefit those wanting to move out of 
agriculture. However, land transfer 
should be carried out as a mechanism to 
move people from one economic sector 
to another in rural areas only; it should 
not encourage farmers to move to urban 
areas.
6.  Vietnamese policy makers need to 
reflect on how to learn from foreign 
models, and on which model is most 
useful for Vietnam. They have looked at 
models from Australia, China, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and 
France. Foreign experts who have assisted 
Vietnam have come from Australia, 
Sweden and New Zealand. Most have 
suggested that privatisation should 
proceed more quickly, the land market 
should develop more rapidly, and the 
market should play a more decisive role. 
However, Vietnam has a different history 
with different domestic conditions, and 
its pace of change should be neither too 
fast nor too slow. Vietnam needs a land 
market but the best way to organise it 




Agricultural land use 
flexibility
Purpose
To outline the importance of flexible agricul-
tural land use in a market-oriented economy, 
and recommend government policies that 
will encourage land use flexibility.
Background
Flexibility in the use of agricultural land 
indicates how readily land use patterns 
can change in order to adapt to varying 
production conditions and opportunities. It 
includes changes in:
cropping patterns and livestock raising




land use resulting from varying levels of 
investment in production inputs.
Since 1986 Vietnam has moved from a 
centrally planned economy where agricul-
tural production was under the control of 
the State to a socialist-orientated market 
economy where farm households have more 
individual control over their production 
activities. In a market economy land use flex-
ibility is important for a number of reasons:
Agricultural land use flexibility allows 
farmers to respond to market signals 
such as the prices of inputs and outputs. 
Prices of inputs directly affect investment 
levels and production costs, while output 
prices have a direct effect on production 
results and returns to investment.
Because prices are always fluctuating, 
flexibility in land use allows producers to 
take advantage of market opportunities 





Agricultural production takes place 
under variable climatic conditions 
that increase production risk. In such 
conditions rigid and inflexible production 
in response to pre-determined 
production targets does not allow 
adaptation to unusual circumstances. 
Farmers benefit from land use flexibility 
that allows them to reduce the risk 
associated with the production process 
by saving costs and reducing possible 
losses, and thereby increase their income.
Since farmers have been able to make 
their own production decisions based on 
available resources, their management skills 
and the price signals, crop patterns in some 
farm households have changed remarkably. 
Research undertaken for the ACIAR project 
has documented that diverse land use 
practices exist (for example, there were 63 
distinct land uses from 200 households in 
the two northern provinces of Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai). Economic returns from different 
land uses also varied considerably and were 
generally higher for perennial crops than 
annual crops. For annual crops rotations 
of rice with vegetable (food-stuff) crops 
generally gave higher returns than rotations 
of rice with other food crops such as maize 
and cassava. Highest returns were obtained 
from niche crops such as flowers and 
ornamental plants.
 Issues
In practice land use flexibility is affected by 
several factors, including:
the rules and regulations governing the 
use of land
farmers’ awareness of land use 
opportunities and possibilities
the ability of farmers to respond to 
market opportunities
access to financial and other resources 
needed to make changes to land use.
Land policies play an important role in 
determining the degree of land use flexibility 
that exists in Vietnam, including policies on:
the term of agricultural land use. Longer 
land use rights increase security of tenure 
and encourage the investment required to 
change land use, for example from annual 
crops to perennial crop options.
land use classifications. Annual and 
perennial crop land classifications are 
determined by the government and 
stated on the land-use-rights certificate, 
thereby acting as a constraint to land 
use flexibility. There is also a need for 
flexibility to be balanced by necessary 
land use zoning or control (eg protection 
of forest areas). Many land use changes 
are required to be officially registered 
and incur a fee. This is a transaction cost 







the amount of land that can be held by the 
farm household. Land ceilings can act 
to discourage flexible land use through 
limiting land accumulation by efficient 
producers, and because of lower security 
of tenure for land over the limit leased 
from the State. Land over the land limit 
is also subject to agricultural land tax.
the rights and responsibilities of the 
agricultural land user. As land is ‘owned 
by the people as a whole’ there are 
responsibilities associated with its use. It 
is required that land should be farmed 
efficiently with appropriate crops and 
rotations, and that attention be paid to 
maintaining the fertility of the land. In 
practice this is determined by restrictions 
on land use that are specified on the 
certificate of land use rights.
agricultural land prices. Rental and land 
transfer values do not reflect true market 
prices, but rather are determined within 
a pricing framework set by the central 
government, with the actual prices 
fixed by the provincial or municipal 
authorities. Failure of the land-use-rights 
market to accurately reflect market values 
restricts the ability of efficient farmers to 
take advantage of market opportunities 
to increase production, and of inefficient 
farmers to leave the sector.
Other government policies which have an 
impact on land use include those related 
to: credit provision to rural households and 
rural industries, investment in rural areas 
and infrastructure, markets and prices, goods 
circulation and trade, education and training, 
and science and technology. Besides these 





the land use design and planning system 
of the central government, which is 
implemented by local government at 
provincial and district levels
land use planning at the communal 
level such as the planning of irrigation 
systems, transportation networks and 
land allocation
the service provision system at the 
communal level such as input supplies, 
land preparation, crop protection and 
the adoption level of new technology 
by farmers.
Policy recommendations
The extent to which land use flexibility exists 
has a direct effect on both farmers’ incomes 
and agricultural development.
Recommendations for Government
Through the use of macro policy 
changes, especially land policy, create 
favourable conditions for land use 
flexibility at the household level.
Through land use planning, with close 
links to macro-level land use plans, 
provide for land use flexibility by farmers.
Provide accurate information 
(including forecasts) related to markets 
and production in a timely fashion 
to farmers to enable them to make 
production choices.
Actively pursue supportive activities 
related to credit provision, introduction 
of technology, and development of input 
and output markets as these are critical 








Recommendations for local 
government
Through land use planning, create a 
favourable environment for land use 
flexibility.
Establish and develop infrastructure and 
service systems in rural areas that will 
enhance flexibility in land use.
Strengthen the extension system for 
diffusing technology to farmers.
Recommendations for farmers
Encourage the enhancement of 
education levels and knowledge about 
technology and markets to help farmers 
take advantage of opportunities to 
change land use and obtain higher 
economic returns.
Seek to enhance farmers’ ability to access 
information and to respond quickly to 
changes in the market that affect returns 
from agricultural production.
More information:
Professor To Dung Tien
Faculty of Economics and Rural 
Development, Hanoi Agricultural 
University No. 1, Gialam, Hanoi. Email: 
pvhung@hau1.edu.vn
Sally Marsh
School of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, The University of Western 







Land fragmentation in 
North Vietnam
Purpose
To inform policy makers about the public 
and private benefits and costs associated with 
land fragmentation. These benefits and costs 
need to be considered when implementing 
policies that promote land consolidation.
Background
Land holdings in North Vietnam are highly 
fragmented as a result of a land allocation 
policy that distributed land so that there 
was equitable quantity, but inequitable 
quality, of land distribution to households. 
In mountainous areas of North Vietnam 
land fragmentation is also exacerbated by 
geographic conditions. Although most 
households have many plots, land use rights 
certificates were issued for the total holdings, 
with the certificates recording multiple rather 
than individual plots.
Issues
1.  From a theoretical point of view land 
fragmentation has both private and social 
benefits and costs. A summary of these is 
provided in Table 1. Many of these costs 
and benefits are difficult to assess and 
quantify (eg equality of land holdings 
amongst households, possible delays in 
the application of new technology).2
2.  Using survey data from 508 plot-based 
observations from 188 farm households 
in the north of Vietnam, it was found 
that an increase in the number of plots 
per farm had a negative impact on crop 
productivity (measured in equivalent 
rice yield) and increased family 
labour use and other money expenses. 
However, data analysis also showed that 
fragmentation was a significant factor for 
increased crop diversity. In the context 
of subsistence-oriented agricultural 
production, diversification may lead 
to security of not only food but also 
farmers’ incomes. These results suggest 
that private benefits from consolidation 
are not certain given existing technology. 
However, savings may be made, especially 
in labour use.
3.  Econometric analysis of whole-farm 
survey data (as distinct from plot data) 
from Yen Bai province suggested that 
increasing plot number was associated 
with higher net values of farm 
production. However, this was not the 
case for Ha Tay province, which indicates 
that land fragmentation may in some 
cases be clearly beneficial, and in other 
cases not, depending on location.
4.  As Vietnam appears to have surplus 
agricultural labour, at least for much of 
the production year, the real benefits to 
farm households from land consolidation 
may not be apparent until the real 
opportunity cost of farm labour begins 
to rise. This opportunity cost will clearly 
be affected by a number of factors, 
such as the availability of employment 
opportunities for farm family members 
and the wage rates associated with these 
opportunities, the level of education 
and age of the rural workforce, the time 
of year and the season. The transaction 
costs involved in job searching will 
be an issue, as will the reliability of 
the employment.
Table 1  Costs and benefits associated with land fragmentation
Benefits of many plots Costs of many plots
Private Public Private Public
Risk spreading:
  flooding
  disease and pests
Inheritance flexibility
Crop rotation flexibility




























costs when used as 
collateral
Management 2
5.  If the number of plots is a significant 
factor in labour use, it would seem 
that appropriate policies to provide 
motivation and incentives for land 
restructuring will be those that are 
designed to allow the full effect of the 
rising opportunity cost for labour to be 
reflected in the rural sector. While i) 
the opportunity cost of labour is low, ii) 
surplus labour is retained in agriculture, 
and iii) labour use is subject to peak load 
periods, the provision of other incentives 
for restructuring of land ownership and 
use may have little effect.
6.  If the role of technology is seen as one 
means of shifting the balance of benefits 
versus costs toward the farmer, then 
clearly research and development and 
the extension system and its effectiveness 
in having new technologies adopted 
will be important. The nature of the 
technologies in terms of capital or labour 
intensity will also be important.
Policy implications
Land consolidation may benefit farmers 
in the short term through higher crop 
productivity, but may result in cost 
increases through the loss of risk-
spreading strategies and other private 
benefits of having many plots, especially 
in subsistence-oriented agriculture.
Government-directed land consolidation 
policies need to be implemented with 
care. In some areas a degree of land 
fragmentation may be beneficial, 
especially in the mountainous areas 




Government policies to increase off-farm 
opportunities for farm-based labour, so 
increasing the opportunity cost of rural 
labour, should provide incentives to 
consolidate land holdings.
More information
Dr Pham Van Hung
Faculty of Economics and Rural 
Development, Hanoi Agricultural 
University No. 1, Gialam, Hanoi. Email: 
pvhung@hau1.edu.vn
The value of agricultural 
land and land use rights 
in Vietnam
Purpose
To provide a simple explanation of the 
factors affecting the value of long-term assets, 
particularly agricultural land.
Background
At present agricultural land in Vietnam is 
considered to be owned by the people as a 
whole and ‘the State is the representative of 
the people’s ownership of land’. Land use 
rights are generally defined for a particular 
parcel of land and period of time, and define 
a person’s use of land. These are recorded 
in the ‘Red Book’. Transactions in land use 
rights form a ‘parallel market’ system for 
land, incorporating the rights of inheritance, 
exchanging, mortgaging, collateral, renting in 
and out, and selling and buying, plus the more 
recent addition of use for joint ventures. There 
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are ceilings on land holdings (eg 2 ha for 
annual crops in the Red River Delta and 3 ha 
in the Mekong Delta), and agricultural land 
tax must generally be paid on land held over 
the land limit.
Issues
1.  The value of land to the landholder, Vh, 
in principle, is the net present value of 
the future stream of earnings from the 
land including any changes in the value 
of the asset. This calculation will include 
deductions for taxes and any other costs 
of holding the land.
The value of land to a potential 
purchaser, Vp, will be the net present 
value of the stream of earnings that are 
expected if the asset were purchased. For 
the exchange to take place the purchaser’s 
valuation must be greater than the 
landholder’s valuation by at least any 
transaction costs (fixed, t, or ad valorem, 
a). Thus, Vp ≥ Vh + a Vh + t
Transaction costs can be an important 
limitation on an active market in land or 
land use rights being developed.
2.  The term of a land use right or lease 
affects the value of the asset, and 
expectations about the renewal of the 
right or lease will also affect the value. 
The value of a VND100,000 stream of 
earnings from an asset, assuming a 5% 
discount rate for an infinite period, is 
100/0.05 or VND2 million; truncated to 
20 years the value is VND1.246 million. 
Any transaction costs involved with 
renewal will also reduce the value of 
the asset.
3.  To purchase long-term assets requires 
credit when liquid assets such as cash are 
not available, and access to credit requires 
collateral and an adequate future income 
stream to make repayments. Truncated 
ownership periods reduce the value 
of an asset for purposes of collateral. 
The value of a land use right for ‘tin 
chap’ or ‘trusted mortgage’ collateral is 
limited to VND10 million. If 23% of a 
VND10 million annual income stream 
were used at the rate of VND2.3 million 
per year for loan repayments at an 
interest rate of 10% over a 13-year 
period, then a loan of VND16.3 million 
could be supported; if the period 
were extended to 20 years a loan of 
VND19.6 million could be supported. 
The length of life of an asset affects its 
collateral value.
4.  Investment in the long term in 
infrastructure such as buildings, 
irrigation works and equipment requires 
long payback periods. Uncertainty about 
the title of the land on which these 
assets are located or used reduces the 
incentives to invest in them.
5.  Future capital gains in the value of 
land provide a major reason for seeking 
to hold such an asset because gains, 
which are free of taxation, will clearly be 
preferred to income or production that is 
taxed. It could be argued that it is in the 
interest of society to tax both income and 
capital gains; however, any government 
policy intentions in this direction 
should be transparent to avoid being a 
disincentive to investment.20
6.  Survey work in Ha Tay province 
conducted in 2001 showed that the 
average rental price for cultivated land 
was VND500/m2, and the average 
buying price was VND5000/m2. The net 
present value of a stream of rental flows 
of VND500/m2 over 13 years at a 5% 
interest rate is VND4932/m2. Therefore, 
the buying price in Ha Tay appears to be a 
rational capitalisation of the rental rate over 
the approximate time remaining to 2013 
of the 20-year land use rights (granted in 
1993) on annual cropping land.
Policy implications
For a strong and growing agricultural 
industry, exchange of land among alternative 
users and uses will raise the efficiency and 
flexibility to adapt to changes in local and 
world markets.
Such markets function best with:
low transactions costs
long-term certainty of tenure
ease of exchange
enhanced certainty of future earnings.
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Taxes and agricultural 
land use
Purpose
To inform policy makers and others about 
some of the implications of the new policy of 
tax exemptions and reductions on agricultural 
land use from 2003 to 2010, and to present 
recommendations on planning for the reintro-
duction of an agricultural land tax after 2010.
Background
Exemptions and reductions to the 
agricultural land use tax were announced 
under Resolution 15/2003/QH11 (17 June 
2003) and Ordinance 129/2003/ND-CP (3 
November 2003).
The agricultural land use tax in Vietnam 
was based on Decree 031/SL (1951) and 
was designed as a tax on the benefits arising 
from land use. This has changed to be a 
tax on both land and land use benefits (ie 
a tax on ‘property’ and ‘income’) since the 
Ordinance on Agricultural Tax (1983) and 
the Tax on Agricultural Land Use Law 
(1993) were issued.
Under the existing law the tax is calculated 
as an amount of rice for a land class, but 
farmers pay an amount in cash dependent on 
the rice price determined each year.
The total amount of agricultural land use tax 
forms only a small part of the country’s GDP 
and the total national budget (Table 1). The 
cost of collection of the tax has been large in 
relation to the revenue derived.21
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
requires its 145 members to reduce agricul-
tural taxes by 45% overall in the next 5 years 
(see WTO available at: <www.nhandan.org.
vn/vietnamese.taday/kinhte/17kinhtethegioi_
wto.htm>). At the end of 2003 China will 
reform agricultural taxes to help support 
farmers, and in line with Vietnam’s application 
to enter the WTO, overall agricultural taxes 
must be reduced in the medium term. This is 
a worldwide trend resulting from globalisation 
and integration with the WTO.
The implementation of Resolution 
15/2003/QH11 and Ordinance 129/2003/
ND-CP will result in most farm households 
and organisations either being exempt from 
paying agricultural land use tax, or having 
the amount they must pay reduced.
The new policy
The tax exemptions include:
agricultural land under the land limits 
for both farm households and individuals
agro-forestry land under the land limits 
allocated to households from state-
owned enterprises
agricultural land, both under and above 
the land limits, for ‘poor’ households and 




as having ‘special difficulties’. Poor 
households are determined on criteria set 
by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and 
Social Affairs. ‘Difficult’ areas are based 
on the Government’s Poverty Alleviation 
Program 135.
Subject to 50% tax reduction are:
economic, political, sociopolitical, 
socioprofessional, armed forces and 
administrative organisations which 
manage and use agricultural land
land holdings in excess of the land limits 
which are used for agriculture and forestry 
by households and individuals, including 
land allocated by state-owned enterprises.
Implementation of the policy is from 2003 
to 2010.
Issues
Advantages of the 2003 reforms:
Improve the balance between taxation 
and income for all land users, most 
of whom are farmers. Farmers are the 
poorest class in Vietnamese society, and 
the majority of ethnic minority people 




Table 1  Agricultural land use tax as a percentage of the GDP and national budget
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percentage of GDP (%) 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
Percentage of national budget (%) 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.7
Source: <www.vietnamtourism.com/\/pages/business_eco/sltk/nam2002/n_thunstyle.htm>22
Reduce the difficulties and inequities 
associated with a tax based on a standard 
rice quantity and where payments in 
cash are determined by the rice price. In 
poor-yield years or when the rice price 
is high, the tax collection is high relative 
to those years with a good harvest or a 
lower price. In some poor regions the rice 
price may be higher, and therefore the 
tax amount will be higher, than in richer 
regions for the same land class.
The tax exemption is considered to be 
assistance to farming and an incentive for 
reinvestment in production, or to be used 
for savings and consumption by farmers.
Generally, farmers have welcomed the 
removal or reduction of the agricultural 
land use tax. The reforms have been 
politically popular.
Disadvantages of the 2003 reforms:
Budget revenue of local governments will 
be reduced as all of the agricultural land 
use tax was collected and used by local 
governments.
Tax exemptions may not help in 
natural resource management. There 
are anecdotal reports that some farmers 
are not using their land since they are 
no longer required to pay tax, and local 
authorities have no incentive to enforce 
productive land use practices.
In areas of less fertile land and in the 
mountainous areas, farms tend to be 
bigger and farmers are more likely to 
have to pay the reduced rate of tax. In flat 
fields and deltas land productivity tends 







under the land limits, so the tax is 
exempted. Thus, there continues to be an 
inequity where users of less fertile land 
may pay tax while users of more fertile 
land may not.
There is now a big gap in the amount 
of land use tax paid between urban and 
agricultural land users because the value of 
urban land is much higher in comparison 
with the value of agricultural land.
Issues requiring consideration
Compensation of local governments (in 
agricultural areas) may be appropriate 
for the loss of agricultural land use tax 
revenues; otherwise, in order to cover 
their budgets, local governments may ask 
farmers to pay additional fees.
A policy may be needed in relation to the 
management of land resources so as to 
avoid situations where farmers let land 
lie fallow.
Agricultural land use tax reductions and 
elimination provide very limited income 
relief so poverty alleviation should still be 
considered under other agricultural and 
rural development policies.
If poor farmers have sold, leased or 
transferred their land already without 
recording changes in the Red Book (a 
common practice), this policy does not 
help them, and the people who farm 
their land may be richer but not officially 






In the longer term a new policy on taxing 
of agricultural land use will be needed 
after 2010. The use of rice quantities and 
payments dependent on the rice price is 
inequitable in relation to either income 
or the value of the land used.
Farm communities may wish to pay 
for community services which relate to 
the value of land but which cannot be 
provided without the collection of taxes.
In the years between 2003 and 2010 
there is a window of opportunity for 
the government to give consideration 
to policy regarding market-based 
land valuation.
Recommendation
In order to reduce the inequity in tax collec-
tion between urban and agricultural land, tax 
should be calculated on a fixed percentage of 
the land value rather than land class. In this 
way the tax becomes a ‘property’ tax rather 
than a tax on the benefits of land use (an 
‘income’ tax).
To implement such a recommendation there 
is a need for new regulations on the value 
of land. If land value is based on the market 
price, there needs to be an active and unre-
stricted land market so that the market price 
can be used to determine land values. If the 
land value is to be determined by the govern-
ment, it should change based on changes in 
the market price of land. In addition, the tax 
rate will need to be adjusted to the new set of 
land values. There is likely to be a significant 
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Interest rate policy 
changes
Purpose
To inform policy makers and others about 
some of the possible consequences of the 
major changes made to interest rate policy on 
30 May 2002.
Background
Changes in interest rate policy were 
implemented on 30 May 2002 as a result 
of Decision 546/2002/QD-NHNN of 
the Governor of the Central State Bank of 
Vietnam. This Decision has allowed new 
arrangements for the direct negotiation of 
interest rates with borrowers for commercial 
credit contracts in Vietnamese dong. While 
this will result in freer interest rate markets, 
the rural economy may suffer some disadvan-
tages from this new policy.
The previous situation
The banking system in Vietnam has 
operated at both state and commercial 
levels, with commercial banks being 
business organisations operating in the 
monetary sector.
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Since 1988 the State Bank has regulated 
interest rates charged by commercial 
banks. In reality, commercial banks are 
state-owned banks and therefore have 
been required to sponsor and support 
government programs.
Many sectors/programs receive 
government support by way of favourable 
interest rates. This has meant that 
commercial banks have been unable to 
operate as market-oriented businesses.
These policies have meant that the credit 
markets are underdeveloped.
Loans for agricultural households are 
generally small and usually for short to 
medium terms, and are for production 
purposes and usually not for investment 
reasons (see Table 1 below).
Main content of the policy 
(Decision 546)
Commercial banks can negotiate directly 
with customers when setting interest 
rates for commercial credit contracts in 
Vietnamese dong.
The bank can determine interest rates 
based on the supply of and demand for 
capital in the market, and take into account 
the level of trust or confidence they have in 







Customers can include Vietnamese legal 
entities and individuals, and foreign 
legal entities and individuals operating 
businesses in Vietnam.
The interest rates set by the Central State 
Bank are to be considered as a reference 
and indicator of current market interest 
rates. Commercial banks are allowed to 
set varying interest rates, loan types (eg 
short-, medium- or long-term) and loan 
amounts for each individual customer.
The requirement for mortgaged property 
has been reduced, especially for farmers.
Issues
The new policy has a number of possible 
advantages and disadvantages, especially for 
the rural economy.
Advantages include:
The markets determine the interest rates, 
which are therefore no longer controlled 
by direct regulation of the government.
This liberalisation of interest rates will 
lead to the development of credit markets 





















Per household 9.86 4.60 11.47 9.28 7.69 10.33 8.97
VBARD loans 7.49 4.25 10.58 8.56 6.37 9.50 7.82
a Calculated as the average for the two provinces in the north and south and for the whole country
Source: ACIAR Project ADP 1997/092 survey of 400 households in 20012
As constraints on loan amounts have 
been removed, farmers can now borrow 
larger amounts without the need for 
mortgaging assets, as long as they can 
prove credit solvency and their project is 
accepted by the bank.
The new policy should result in better 
conditions for farm households and 
commercial farms to be able to borrow 
the capital they need to expand their 
production, according to their individual 
financial resources.
Possible disadvantages of the new 
policy are:
Agricultural production is risky. 
Commercial banks will therefore tend to 
lend to customers who present less risk 
to the bank, and this has the potential 
to affect lending to farmers and restrict 
their financial resources and projects.
Rural sector banks will have the 
opportunity to transfer capital to non-
rural sectors where profits may be higher. 
Larger loans generally have lower interest 
rates; for example, the Vietnam Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD) set different interest rates as 
of 8 August 2002 as follows:
for loans less than VND10 million 
the interest rate is 1% per month
for loans less than VND50 million 
the interest rate is 0.9% per month
for loans greater than 
VND50 million the interest rate 
reduces to 0.85% per month.
Generally, larger loans are found in the non-








Following liberalisation the interest 
rate has tended to increase and reach a 
consistent level for the whole economy. 
Therefore, the agricultural and rural 
sectors, with generally smaller profits, 
face disadvantages compared with other 
sectors; for example, the interest rate for 
short-term loans before 31 May 31 2002 
was 0.9% per month, but was increased 
to 1% per month from July 2002.
The Decision is a major policy change for the 
State in the management of capital resources. 
The direct negotiation of interest rates with indi-
vidual customers represents a substantial change 
in the way banks do business. Commercial 
banks will change to operate more like true 
market-oriented business organisations.
Recommendations
The effects of the new policy on the rural 
economy should be carefully monitored 
to see that the requirements for credit in 
the rural sector are met so that its growth 
and development is not restricted through 
limited availability of credit.
Monitoring could include:
tracking of the distribution of bank loans 
into the rural and non-rural sectors and 
comparison with distribution prior to the 
Decision
monitoring of loan amounts and interest 
rates made by VBARD and other 
commercial banks to both household 
farms and larger commercial farms.
Facilitation could be provided to farmers 
when making loan applications to banks 
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To outline the importance of price policies 
in a market economy, and discuss trends in 
the Vietnamese Government’s application of 
agricultural price policies.
Background
In a market economy price is considered 
an important and efficient signal for 
resource allocation. It is also a major 
factor in assessing the opportunity cost 
of commodities and services. Under the 
market mechanism price is the engine which 
stimulates not only production but also 
other economic relations in order to meet 
consumer demands. Based on the price, 
scarce resources of a society will be used in 
whichever industry is the most profitable.
The price of agricultural products is significant 
not only in economic terms, but also from a 
political aspect because it affects the income of 
farm households, the prices paid by consumers 
and export earnings. The income of almost 
half the world’s population is dependent on 
agricultural production, which is affected by 
the prices of agricultural products.
In a market-driven economy price is consid-
ered to be a major mechanism of resource 
allocation, helping to answer questions 
such as:
What commodity and services should be 
produced?
How should they be produced?
How should benefits be distributed 
between production factor owners?
Issues
In developing countries where multiple 
market failures are common, the price 
mechanism does not always operate well. In 
the presence of market failure the market 
price does not guarantee that targets of both 
efficiency and equity will be obtained. In 
Vietnam government intervention on price 
has been used to: i) increase the output 
of agricultural production; ii) stabilise the 
price of agricultural products; iii) guarantee 
national food security; and iv) provide food 
and other raw materials for an industry.
The risks associated with intervention in 
market price mechanisms include distortion 





The requirements of AFTA and entry to the 
WTO will result in the lowering or removal 
of many price and non-tariff interventions 
to agricultural input and output prices. 
Enterprises and domestic producers will face 
challenges in obtaining a level of competi-
tiveness that will enable them to compete 
effectively in global markets.
Research findings
Liberalising policy trends
Since the doi moi policy was introduced in 
1986 Vietnamese agriculture has generally 
reached higher production levels. The price 
of agricultural products has increased (or 
decreased) to the level of international prices, 
and the price of production inputs has also 
moved to more closely reflect world market 
prices. The price policy of the government 
has provided more equitable prices for 
consumers and reduced the impact of crises 
that have occurred in the world market, 
especially for sensitive commodities such 
as food. In the rice market, for example, the 
government has applied measures to control 
price such as quotas and regulation of the 
number of exporters.
Domestic policy has focused on the provi-
sion of subsidies for material transportation, 
as well as on tax reduction and exemption, 
to encourage the development of trade in 
the mountainous areas in order to reduce 
the price gap between regions. Other 
policies have been related to determination 
of the floor price for rice, encouragement of 
exports, establishment of a fund for price 
stabilisation, and support for farmers to sell 
agricultural products.
Since 1989 the Vietnamese Government has 
implemented significant steps to liberalise 
trade. The monopoly previously held by 
state-owned enterprises in export and 
import activities has been terminated. As a 
result, in recent years enterprises managed 
by provincial or district authorities and 
private companies have entered into export 
and import activities. Today, most agricul-
tural products are generally not affected 
by non-tariff barriers, with the notable 
exceptions of rice, sugar and fertilisers.
The government has implemented a trade 
liberalisation policy for rice exports. As a result, 
in 1997 the number of rice exporters was 23 
companies, increasing to 33 in 1998 and 47 in 
1999. Rice export quotas also increased year 
by year and were able to be adjusted. For the 
sugar industry, imports are controlled by a 
quota system and the government determines 
the number of importers. In Vietnam there is 
a limited regional area which has international 
competitiveness in sugar production. The 
removal of sugar quotas and other non-tariff 
barriers in the next 10 years presents a chal-
lenge not only for sugar companies but also for 
farmers who produce sugarcane.
Farmer perceptions of price policies 
from survey data
Services which have been traditionally 
performed by agricultural cooperatives, 
such as irrigation and seed supply, are still 
the dominant activities of cooperatives 
and were rated as ‘good’ by farmers. For 
services not traditionally performed by 
cooperatives and where the private sector 
can be involved, such as veterinary services 
and sale of produce, it is likely that there 
will be competition between cooperatives 
and private sector organisations.
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Inputs and materials supplied to farmers 
came from different sources (state-owned 
and private companies, cooperatives, 
traders and exchange between farmers). 
Supply to households from the 
agricultural cooperatives increased 
between 2000 and 2001. The agricultural 
cooperatives sold inputs to farmers at 
lower prices in comparison with other 
sources (traders and private companies), 
even when taking account of the interest 
rate levied for late payment.
More farmers in the northern surveyed 
provinces (Ha Tay and Yen Bai) assessed 
the price of seeds as ‘high’ in comparison 
with southern farmers (in Can Tho and 
Binh Duong). Most farmers believed that 
the prices of fertiliser and pesticides were 
high. Generally, farmers assessed that 
wages were at an ‘average’ level, but more 
households in the south said that wage 
rates were ‘high’ or ‘very high’.
Many farmers believed that they would 
invest more on inputs such as seed 
and fertilisers if the prices of inputs 
decreased. This suggests that a financial 
constraint is one of the barriers to 
increased agricultural production on 
small household farms in Vietnam.
Policy recommendations
As information is important for household 
decision-making in a price-responsive 
economy, there is an opportunity for 
government to focus on market research 
as well as price forecasting, and provide 
farmers with sufficient information on 
demand, supply and prices of agricultural 
products in both the domestic and 





about where and what to produce (eg 
products with high quality, low production 
cost and high comparative advantage) 
could also be provided.
Where advantageous, the government may 
find ways to change policies to strengthen 
cooperatives so that they can serve farmers 
not only in the supply of production 
inputs but also by selling their outputs. 
Raising the efficiency and effectiveness of 
cooperatives may mean that they can have 
a more effective role in the sale of products 
and use their marketing skills to achieve 
better and timelier sales, possibly through 
a wider use of contracts.
As price subsidies and other forms 
of support distort the real expression 
of comparative advantage and lead 
to inefficient use of resources, such 
mechanisms should be gradually reduced 
and removed in a way which allows for the 
necessary resource adjustment to take place. 
A focus on providing for macroeconomic 
stability and a stable set of international 
trading relationships will greatly enhance 
the domestic stability of prices and allow 
necessary adjustments to take place.
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Agricultural land policies 
and poverty
Purpose
To outline land policy changes that will 
further encourage the development of the 
rural sector and contribute to the alleviation 
of poverty.
Background
Land resources are one of the key determi-
nants of poverty. Land is a primary means of 
generating a livelihood, and a main vehicle 
for investment, accumulating wealth and 
transferring wealth between generations. 
Over the last two decades the Vietnamese 
Government has adopted land policies to 
move from a collectivised state-controlled 
agricultural production system to one based 
on individual farm households in the market 
place. New land policies have granted land 
use rights to individual farmers, which, given 
the property rights attached to land use 
rights, approximates land ownership. Land 
policies can affect: i) the household’s ability 
to produce for their subsistence and generate 
a marketable surplus; ii) farmers’ socioeco-
nomic status; and iii) farmers’ incentives to 
invest in using land in a sustainable manner.
Vietnam is still predominantly a rural 
country, and the rural economy will play an 
important role in the future industrialisation 
and modernisation of the national economy. 
During recent years poverty has been 
reduced at an impressive rate, from 58% 
of the population in 1993 to 29% in 2002 
(Asian Development Bank et al 2004). 
However, poverty is concentrated in rural 
areas, with urban households spending 
78% more than equivalent rural households 
(Asian Development Bank et al 2004). 
A large proportion (80%) of the poor are 
farmers who lack skills and technical know-
how, and have low accessibility to credit and 
other production resources. Land policy that 
enables and encourages development of the 
rural economy is crucial.
Land policies affecting 
development of the rural 
economy
Although the new land policies create a favour-
able environment for growth of the rural 
economy, some policy bottlenecks still exist:
Of farmers who operate large-scale 
commercial farms in Thai Binh, Ha 
Nam, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Ha 
Tinh, Yen Bai, Tra Vinh and Dong Nai 
provinces, 75% reported that they were 
allocated land in 1988 and now there 
are only 4–5 years left on their land use 
certificates. This time is too short for a 
sustainable long-term investment in land.
Of large-scale farms, 65% exceed 
the ceiling level on land holdings. 
The government has issued an inter-
ministerial circular on issuing certificates 
to large commercial farms to enable 
farmers to obtain credit and market 
access. However, the process of issuing 
land certificates in general, and to large-
scale commercial farms in particular, is 
still slow, and this acts as a disincentive 




Although on-farm decision-making 
has generally been liberalised, in some 
provinces where strong traditional 
cooperatives exist, crop choices in 
land use are still controlled by the 
cooperatives or district authorities to 
achieve production targets set at a higher 
government level (eg VND50 million/
ha). This inhibits farmers from 
optimising their objectives in accordance 
with their needs, their resource 
endowment and market demands. Some 
crop choices set by outsiders can face a 
market risk that may have farmers fall 
below the poverty line again.
Information about market transactions 
is still limited and this sometimes 
causes land markets to be inefficient. 
An inefficient land market will hinder 
reallocation of land resources in 
accordance with adjustments in the rural 
and urban economies.
In some northern provinces, especially in 
the Red River Delta, land exchanges have 
been administratively directed under the 
close supervision of local authorities to 
address problems of land fragmentation. 
This can create greater risks for farmers; 
for example, after land redistribution 
some farmers may be left with all their 
land holdings being infertile or prone 
to flooding.
A considerable number of farmers 
who are only engaged in rural cottage 
industries still keep land for farming. 
All farming activities in these cases are 
carried out by hired labour. Of these 
farmers, 75% reported that, although 





from their farming activities, they 
still wanted to keep land due to the 
uncertainty associated with their rural 
off-farm industries.
With the high rate of urbanisation and 
industrialisation taking place, more 
agricultural land resources will be 
converted into industrial land, leaving 
many more farmers as landless farmers. 
For example, land funds in Bac Ninh and 
Hung Yen provinces that were provided 
for industry zoning up to the year 2020 
were fully allocated by 2002. Farmers 
with money from land compensation 
often cannot run their non-farming 
activities in a sustainable manner since 
they lack the technical know-how needed 
to run the businesses or to be employed 
by entrepreneurs.
Land is not the single determinant of 
poverty. More effort should be made 
to help the poor improve their farming 
skills and access credit and markets, so 
that they can effectively use their land 
and labour resources.
Policy recommendations
1.  The term of land use rights is still short 
(20 years for cultivated land), and that 
can create a degree of land insecurity and 
inhibit investment in land improvement. 
There is a need to critically look at the 
term of land use rights with a view to 
lengthening it.
2.  The policy on land ceilings inhibits 
productive farmers from consolidating 
and investing in land. The ceiling 
policy should be reviewed, taking into 
account crop choice, technology and the 
socioeconomic situation of each region.
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3.  Further policies to encourage and permit 
land use flexibility are needed. Individual 
farmers should be able to make crop 
choices based on their own objectives 
and resource availability.
4.  An institutional framework to facilitate 
transferability and security of land use 
rights is necessary. This framework 
should recognise the reality of the 
land market and provide an efficient 
mechanism for the land market to 
operate. It should also specify the rights 
and obligations of people involved.
5.  Land exchange to address land 
fragmentation would operate better 
in the market mechanism within a 
recommended institutional framework, 
so that people involved in land exchange 
can benefit from their transactions based 
on agreed market prices.
6.  There is a need to help farmers who have 
left their land for other non-farming 
businesses to have access to markets, and 
to provide information on markets and 
technologies for their new businesses.
7.  More training is needed to help farmers 
in the expanding urban and industrial 
areas obtain better skills to enable them 
to be engaged in non-farming activities 
if they leave their land because of 
urbanisation and industrialisation.
8.  Access to credit and market information 
is essential. Credit provision should be 
closely linked with extension services 
to ensure that credit is efficiently used 
to help farmers generate income in 
a sustainable manner. Participatory 
approaches to extension should be 
adopted to involve all farmers and 
farming communities in identifying 
their own problems and solutions. The 
solutions should then be implemented 
using local resources with considerable 
support from the public sector.
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Household incomes and 
income diversity
Purpose
To comment on the relationship between 
farm size and the value of farm production, 
and the diversity of sources from which 
Vietnamese rural households’ incomes are 
derived. The importance of off-farm income 
in raising overall agricultural household 
income is highlighted.22
Background
Vietnam has approximately 11 million small 
household farms, many of which consist 
of fragmented land holdings that total less 
than one hectare. There is a diverse range 
of on-farm activities in many households, 
including multiple crops, livestock and aqua-
culture. Off-farm activities also provide a 
substantial component of household income 
for many households. However, many other 
households are almost totally dependent on 
income from crop and livestock activities. 
Improvements in rural living standards 
during 1993–98 were driven predominantly 
by a diversification in on-farm activities 
(World Bank 2000).
Issues
The need to increase agricultural produc-
tivity (and hence farm income) is central to 
the debate on rural development in Vietnam. 
Agricultural productivity involves both land 
and labour productivity. The combination 
of small farm sizes and a high proportion of 
the population involved in agriculture means 
that labour productivity is low, indicating a 
potential for productivity growth as labour 
moves out of agriculture or, alternatively, 
combines agriculture with off-farm work.
Rural poverty is a significant problem and the 
income gap between rural and urban areas is 
increasing. Poverty is concentrated in rural 
areas, with an estimated four-fifths of the 
poor working mainly in agriculture. Earning 
off-farm income is perceived as one way that 
small households can escape the small farm 
poverty trap, and is one of the major reasons 
for differentiation between farm households 
in Vietnam (Luong and Unger 1999; World 
Bank 2003). However, households who are 
unable to make a living from the land find few 
opportunities for stable income generation off 
the farm. There is an urgent need for reforms 
to stimulate greater off-farm employment.
Both diversity of farm production and 
diversity of income sources can be viewed 
as risk reducing strategies used by small 
landholders. However, risk plays a role 
in restricting the land use choice of poor 
households, whose livelihoods are extremely 
vulnerable to both household-specific (eg 
illness) and community-wide shocks. The 
risk of failure associated with on-farm invest-
ments or new enterprises can deter subsist-
ence farmers from expanding their economic 
base or changing their farming activities. 
Furthermore, when marketing institutions 
and infrastructure such as transport are not 
well developed, a shift to non-food crops can 
make small farmers particularly vulnerable.
Research findings
The results reported were calculated from 
survey data of 400 farm households in Ha 
Tay, Yen Bai, Binh Duong and Can Tho 
provinces in 2001. Estimates were made of 
the percentage of household net value of 
production (NVP)1 from a range of sources. 
Off-farm income was also estimated.
  NVP is the total value of household 
production from agriculture, aquaculture and 
forestry, including produce consumed by the 
household, minus the cash costs of production 
(ie the cost of family labour is not deducted).2
There was a substantial inequality in 
land area farmed both on a household 
and per capita basis. For example, among 
the households surveyed, 80% of the 
population/households farmed only 50% 
of the land in Ha Tay and 34% in Yen Bai.
Small farm size and low asset value were 
linked to households classified as being 
in the ‘poor’ socioeconomic group2. For 
example, poor households in Ha Tay had 
on average approximately half the land 
area of households classified as ‘above 
average’, and in Yen Bai poor households 
had only approximately one-fifth the land 
area of above average households.
2  Prior to surveying, households were classified 
by commune authorities into socioeconomic 
groupings: ‘above average’ (ho giau), ‘average’ 
(ho trung binh) or ‘below average’ (ho ngheo).


Total NVP from agricultural activities 
was related to farm size and land 
type, but other factors such as assets, 
education, family labour and measures of 
land fragmentation significantly affected 
the NVP in some provinces.
Households were engaged in a wide 
range of farm production activities in 
all regions, but more so in the northern 
provinces where the percentage 
of production from livestock and 
aquaculture activities was generally 
higher. However, it is clear that 
farming activities are a key component 
of production for these small farm 


Figure 1  Percentage of total net production value from different sources for surveyed 
households in four provinces in Vietnam: Ha Tay (n = 97), Yen Bai (n = 89), Binh Duong (n = 84), 


















































households (Figure 1). Aquaculture 
and forestry generally provide only a 
small proportion of production value 
(although it is high for some individual 
households).
Income from off-farm activities included 
income from handicrafts, the provision 
of services, and wage and casual labour. 
Handicraft production value was 
generally very small. In all provinces 
off-farm earnings made a substantial 
difference to both average and median 
net values of household production 
(Figure 2). The increase in median values 
indicates that off-farm employment was 
important in raising the incomes of the 
poorer 50% of households.

Generally, there was a perception 
among households that there were more 
opportunities for off-farm work than 
5 years previously.
Policy implications
The research work undertaken in the project 
was not sufficiently broad in scale to make 
policy recommendations, but a number of 
policy implications are given below.
Off-farm income is important for rural 
households. Policies that foster opportunities 
for rural people to access off-farm work will 
be important in reducing rural poverty. Such 
policies will include those that:
improve education levels of rural people


Figure 2  Average and median net value of farm and total production for surveyed households 
















































relax restrictions on labour movement for 
people seeking off-farm work
encourage the establishment of small to 
medium rural enterprises in rural areas.
Small farm size and low asset value were 
clearly linked to households classified as 
being in the poor socioeconomic group. 
These data are concerning, and give some 
insight into the challenge of Vietnam’s small 
farm problem. Policies that encourage adjust-
ment in the rural sector and the movement 
of people into sectors other than agriculture 
are necessary.
Land fragmentation was positively related to 
the NVP of households in Yen Bai province. 
In this province land fragmentation is not a 
disadvantage, possibly because of the nature 
of agriculture in mountainous regions, 
where a larger number of plots will reflect 
many different land types and crop choices. 
The results of these analyses suggest that 
care needs to be taken in some areas with 
policies that encourage the consolidation of 
land holdings.
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Land markets and 
agricultural development
Purpose
To provide an outline of what may happen 
to land markets as the process of economic 
development occurs in Vietnam. Such 
development includes rising wages, changes 
in output prices and reduced transaction 
costs in the land market.
Background
The 1993 Land Law built the foundation for 
development of a market for land use rights 
(LUR) in Vietnam by providing increased 
security of tenure over land, facilitating 
access to credit and making LUR tradeable.
Considerable official restrictions still exist 
for LUR transfers for agricultural land. 
Official decrees restrict the circumstances 
under which, and to whom, LUR can be 
transferred. However, following the 1993 
Land Law many researchers have reported 
that transfers of agricultural LUR are 
occurring. It has also been reported, both 
before and after 1993, that many land 
transfers occur illegally. The reasons given 
for these illegal transactions include the 
costs associated with registering LUR 
transfers, time-consuming and cumber-
some procedures, unclear regulations, 
and opportunistic rent-seeking behaviour 
in near-urban districts and along newly 
constructed inter-regional roads.2
During 2001, 400 farm households were 
surveyed in four provinces in Vietnam. 
Details were sought about the involvement 
of households in the LUR market, as well 
as evidence of land accumulation and 
consolidation.
Issues
Land rental markets, with typically lower 
transaction costs and requiring little capital 
outlay, operate more freely than land sale 
markets in many developing countries.
Various authors argue that, as there is little 
empirical support for the notion that large 
farms are more efficient than smaller farms 
in areas of unmechanised agriculture, land 
should, theoretically, pass from large to 
smaller family-operated farms, although they 
note that this seldom occurs. Deininger and 
Jin (2003) also argue that land transactions 
should favour the small producer with good 
agricultural ability.
Many countries undergoing transition, 
and facing situations of multiple market 
imperfections, place restrictions on the free 
operation of the land market because of 
the risk of land becoming concentrated in 
the hands of larger, wealthier farmers, and 
concerns about potential negative effects on 
both productivity and equity (Deininger 
and Jin 2003).
However, the land market, and an active 
rental market in particular, has been recog-
nised as playing a large role in giving access 
to land to the more productive farmers in 
developing countries (Deininger 2003).
Research findings
In the research undertaken for the ACIAR 
project land markets were investigated in 
two ways:
1.  By analysing land transactions that had 
taken place since 1993 in the surveyed 
households.
2.  By modelling household farms in a 
village context and investigating the 
effects of various external factors (eg 
wage rates) on land transactions.
Results from the analysis of land transactions 
since 1993 were that:
There was an active market for agricultural 
LUR, especially in Ha Tay province, where 
the number of transactions had increased 
markedly since 1997.
Land transaction activity varied 
substantially between regions.
There was a clear demand for rental land, 
particularly so in the north of Vietnam.
In Ha Tay province a similar percentage 
of households from all socioeconomic 
groups were involved in the LUR 
market, but wealthier households held 
a higher percentage of the total land 
area transacted.
Results from the modelling work were that:
An increase in wage rates leads farmers 
to rent-out more land because crop 
production becomes relatively less 
profitable in comparison with working 
off-farm. If wage rates and opportunities 
for off-farm work increase significantly, 
some farmers in a village may rent-out 






Farm profits decrease significantly with 
decreases in the output prices of paddy 
crops, encouraging farmers to want to leave 
farming. As the prices of rice and corn 
decrease farmers tend to rent-out more 
land, but the total area of land transacted 
decreases because land exchanges decrease. 
This result illustrates the problem facing 
agricultural development in the north of 
Vietnam where farmers depend heavily on 
the cultivation of paddy crops.
The amount of land rented-in and -out 
decreases with increasing transaction 
costs in the land rental market, leading to 
a reduction in the number of households 
who participate in the rental markets.
Policy implications
Encouraging development of off-farm 
work opportunities, together with a level 
of education that allows participation in 
the off-farm workforce, is a key method 
of raising farm family income levels.
Land availability affects the ability 
of households to rent and buy land. 
Households will not rent-out or sell 
their LUR unless there are opportunities 
for them to move freely, and without 
overwhelming financial risk, to other 
regions and employment.
An active LUR market, as appears to 
exist in Ha Tay, will tend to concentrate 
land in the hands of the more wealthy 
farmers. This will assist with the 
commercialisation of Vietnamese 
agriculture, but will inevitably raise 
poverty and equity concerns while off-







As the prices of paddy products fall, land 
transactions will decrease if profitable 
alternatives are not available. Agricultural 
policy allowing farmers the freedom to 
cultivate alternative crops, especially cash 
crops other than rice, is desirable.
Reducing the costs of land transactions 
(such as those associated with the 
sale and purchase of LUR) would 
enhance the land market and encourage 
adjustment in the agriculture sector.
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Introduction
ACIAR Project ADP 1/1997/092 ‘Impacts 
of alternative polices on the agricultural 
sector in Vietnam’ was designed to allow an 
examination of a set of policy changes and 
their effect on land use at the farm house-
hold level. This required careful data collec-
tion and analysis of the production system 
of farm households in a limited number of 
agricultural areas, and consideration of the 
consequences of various policy changes. In 
this appendix the design and methodology 
associated with the collection of primary 
farm household data for the project are 
outlined. Data from the household surveys 
are used in the research work reported in this 
ACIAR Proceedings.
Appendix i 
FArm HouSeHold Survey conducted 
in 2001 And 2002 in Four provinceS: 
deSign And metHodology
Overview of household 
survey design and 
methodology
For the purposes of this research a ‘farm 
household’ was defined with reference to 
three criteria:
Household members shared the same 
fund or budget.
Household members ate meals together.
Household members were related by 
blood or marriage.
Survey design and pre-testing
During the first year of the project (2000) 
a detailed household questionnaire was 
prepared, tested and revised prior to imple-




to the household survey, a survey at district 
and commune levels was also prepared. 
Development of the survey followed desktop 
research in four policy areas: land use, land 
accumulation and consolidation, tax and 
credit, and agricultural input and output 
prices. This research provided direction 
and context for the survey questions. Both 
sampling strategy and survey design were 
extensively discussed by the project partners 
at project team meetings held at Hanoi 
Agricultural University (HAU) in October 
and November–December 2000.
In the survey, questions were asked of each 
farm household to obtain quantitative data 
in the following areas:
general information about the household 
and household members
land and land use
household and production assets
production costs and productivity of a 
number of selected plots
total production, and distribution of this 
production (eg consumption, sales)
credit use
consumption
perceptions of yield and price risk.
Additionally, qualitative questions were 
asked about:
landholdings and changes to these in the 
last 5 years
land use and changes to this in the last 
5 years













new technologies introduced in the last 
5 years
perceptions of household welfare and 
opportunities.
These data were collected for the years 
2000 (survey conducted in 2001) and 2001 
(survey conducted in 2002).
The survey was pre-tested in Can Kiem 
commune, Thach That district, in Ha Tay 
province. Following the pre-test, changes 
were made to the survey in a number of 
areas. It was decided to collect input price 
data from secondary sources at the commune 
level as well as the household level. Following 
the initial survey period in Thach That 
district, a number of further changes were 
made to the survey, especially in relation to 
the collection of data on household wealth, 
input prices, household consumption, 
storage and attitudes to risk. The University 
of Sydney’s Human Ethics Committee 
approved the final version of the survey.
Sampling design
Households were surveyed in four provinces. 
The aim was to gather information from 
varied regions where a range of responses 
to land policy changes might be observed. 
The four provinces chosen are representative 
of four of Vietnam’s agro-ecological zones, 
namely the northern and southern delta 
areas, the northwestern mountainous region 
and the southeastern region (Figure 1). Two 
of the provinces are located adjacent to the 
major cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City. The provinces were also chosen because 
they were areas where land use change was 
known to be occurring and more active land 
use markets were thought to be likely.

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Ha Tay province is located in the Red River 
Delta adjacent to the capital Hanoi. The 
main farming activities are rice, livestock and 
vegetables, although aquaculture, flower and 
fruit production are increasing, as farmers 
have good access to markets in Hanoi. 
Yen Bai is a mountainous province in the 
northwestern region, the poorest and most 
remote of the four surveyed provinces, with 
many households producing at subsistence 
level only. The main farming activities are 
rice (in river valleys), upland annual and 
perennial crops such as tea, corn and cassava, 
industrial trees (for paper), mixed gardens 
and livestock. Can Tho province is located in 
the heart of the Mekong Delta and is a major 
rice growing region. Fruit production in this 
province is also important and increasing. 
Binh Duong province is located adjacent to 
Ho Chi Minh City and has a very diverse 
agriculture, including rice, industrial trees 
(rubber), fruit trees and pepper. Its location 
close to Ho Chi Minh City means that some 
districts have substantial industrial and 
service provision sectors.
As the survey was particularly concerned 
with land use and farm size changes, a strati-
fied, rather than random, sampling strategy 
was used. Two districts were chosen within 
each province, and two communes were 
selected within each district. The districts 
and communes were chosen on the basis of 
comparative average area per household. This 
sampling strategy gives a stratified sample at 
district level based on comparative farm size.
Discussions were held with provincial leaders 
in the four provinces to decide which districts 
would be appropriate to survey. Further 
discussions were then held with district 
leaders and people from district offices of 
the Department of Agriculture to choose 
two communes within each district. The 
communes selected are listed in Table 1. 
During these discussions the nature of the 
research and the data to be collected were 
outlined. Information was also collected from 
officials at district level via a written survey.
Commune/village leaders and the people 
responsible for agriculture and land use 
were consulted about the composition of 
the sample, and their advice was critical 
in sample selection of approximately 25 
households. Two or three hamlets or villages 
were chosen (in consultation with district 
leaders) in each commune. A purposefully 
stratified sample was chosen, based on the 
main criterion of achieving a range of farm 
Figure 1.  Map of Vietnam showing the 
household survey areas marked in red20
incomes that reflected the approximate 
percentages of low, average and above average 
incomes that occurred in the commune.
Other criteria that influenced sample selec-
tion were:
Commune leaders were asked to identify 
which production ‘models’ were thought 
to be successful in the region, and 
examples of these were included in the 
sample. The main production activities in 
the communes are shown in Table 2.
Some social issues were considered in 
deciding which households should be 




Commune leaders were asked about house-
holds selling or leasing land, and examples 
of these were included in the sample.
Commune leaders were asked to indicate 
households with high and low credit levels.
The capacity of the farmer to give informa-
tion was also considered. The sampling 
strategy used at the commune level gives a 
stratified sample based on income and farm 
size, with care taken to include main produc-
tion activities in the sample. For example, if 
10% of the commune is officially classified 
as ‘poor’, then 10% of the sample was 
composed of households classified as poor. 
Although these household classifications 

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Table 1  Districts and communes surveyed showing comparative farm size
Province District Farm size Commune Farm size
Ha Tay Thach That Large  Thach Hoa Large
Dai Dong Small
Dan Phuong Small  Tho Xuan Large
Song Phuong Small
Yen Bai Van Yen  Large  Dong Cuong Large
Mau Dong Small
Yen Binh Small  Dai Dong Large
Bao Ai Small
Binh Duong Ben Cat Large  Lai Uyen Large
An Tay Small
Thuan An Small  An Son Large
Vinh Phu Small
Can Tho O Mon Large  Truong Thanh Large
Dong Hiep Small
Chau Thanh Small  Dong Phuoc Large
Dong Thanh Small21
are made by village and commune leaders, 
they are recognised as being an accurate 
reflection of farm households’ income groups 
(ADB et al 2004).
The farm household survey did not include 
many farm households from Vietnam’s 
ethnic minority groups. District officials 
indicated that they thought ethnic farmers 
would have great difficulty answering the 
questionnaire as concepts of changing land 
use (including land use rights) and commer-
cial production orientation were in conflict 
with traditional practices and land use. For 
this reason it was decided to concentrate 
the survey in communes with mainly Kinh 
(Vietnamese majority) people.
Survey implementation
The first household survey commenced in 
2001 in Ha Tay province in March–April, 
followed by Yen Bai in June, Bing Duong in 
July and finally Can Tho in August.
The village leader accompanied and intro-
duced the survey team to each household, 
and explained the purpose of the survey to 
them. Within each commune 25–28 house-
holds were surveyed. Reimbursement for 
participants, which is standard practice when 
conducting household surveys in Vietnam, 
was determined after discussion with 
commune leaders. It was either in the form of 
money (VND15,000–20,000 = AUD$1–2), 
Table 2  Main production activities in the surveyed communes
Province Commune Main production activities
Ha Tay Thach Hoa Fruit tree garden, rice fields, raising livestock
Dai Dong Rice fields, raising livestock, vegetables
Tho Xuan Rice fields, raising livestock, vegetables, flowers
Song Phuong Rice fields, raising livestock, vegetables
Yen Bai Dong Cuong Tea, industrial trees (paper), rice fields, vegetables
Mau Dong Rice fields, cassava, industrial trees (paper), aquaculture
Dai Dong Rice fields, corn, tea, industrial trees (paper)
Bac Ai Rice fields, tea, industrial trees (paper), raising livestock
Binh Duong Lai Uyen Industrial trees (rubber), fruit trees, raising livestock
An Tay Industrial trees (rubber), rice fields, mixed garden plus livestock
An Son Fruit tree gardens
Vinh Phu Very diversified – livestock, industry, services (including tourism)
Can Tho Truong Thanh Rice fields
Dong Hiep Rice fields
Dong Phuoc Rice fields, fruit tree gardens (mixed), aquaculture
Dong Thanh Fruit tree gardens, rice fields22
a 454-g packet of monosodium glutamate, 
candy or cigarettes, and was appropriate for 
rural areas in Vietnam.
The survey team also spent at least one day 
with the village leader, who was often able 
to provide information about the surveyed 
households on topics where answers to 
questions had been avoided or were unreli-
able for cultural reasons, eg the receipt of 
pensions for poverty or war service, and the 
area of land allocated. The village leader 
was also able to provide general background 
information about the commune (a formal 
survey was also completed at commune 
level), and help in situations where informa-
tion provided by the farmer was unclear or 
appeared contradictory.
Some examples include:
information about the results (effects) 
of credit loans – whether or not there 
had been a ‘good’ result from a loan 
designated for a particular purpose
reasons not apparent from the interview 
why some families are classified as poor 
but appear to have a high income, eg 
death or sickness of family members in 
the past 12 months, poor management of 
funds, or inability to ‘bargain’ good prices 
for inputs.
In the northern provinces of Ha Tay and 
Yen Bai, members of the project team and 
staff of the Faculty of Economics and Rural 
Development (Ha Tay only) at HAU 
conducted the survey. In the southern prov-
inces of Binh Duong and Can Tho, 20 staff 
and recent graduates from the Faculty of 
Economics at the University of Agriculture 
and Forestry in Ho Chi Minh City, and 

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the Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration at Can Tho University, 
were recruited and trained to help with 
the survey work. Care was taken to ensure 
that all interviewers had a background in 
agricultural economics and understood 
the purpose of the data collection. Project 
team members interviewed households with 
each different ‘production model’ in these 
provinces, to ensure that they had experience 
of the type of farming activities that were 
being surveyed.
In February–May 2002 the household 
survey was implemented again in the two 
northern provinces, Ha Tay and Yen Bai, 
using the same questionnaire as in 2001. 
This time the survey was conducted by 
Masters and 4th year undergraduate 
students in the Faculty of Economics and 
Rural Development at HAU. Because the 
surveying was done by students who would 
use the data for their Masters and Honours 
theses, more households (30–40 in each 
commune) were surveyed, even though it 
was originally planned to only resurvey half 
the number of households.
The second survey in Binh Duong and 
Can Tho provinces (100 households) was 
conducted in July–August 2002. Prior to 
this, the questionnaire was revised after 
discussions held in team meetings in July. 
The project team from HAU conducted the 
survey. Half the number of households in 
each commune were resurveyed, and more 
detailed data at both commune and village 
levels were collected. In choosing which 
households to resurvey, the team targeted 
those households that could give good infor-
mation (based on the previous year’s survey).